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 Between 1921 to 1941, Canada and Japan were close trading partners.  The end of World 
War II provided the two countries with the opportunity to resume their former economic 
relationship.  However, Japan was a defeated country, lacking in resources and credit, and 
subject to the Occupation led by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.  In contrast, 
Canada was left with a strong economy and political independence.  In 1945, Canada was invited 
to participate in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission that later became the Far Eastern 
Commission in 1946.  In August 1946, Canada established a Liaison Mission at its former 
Legation in Tokyo.  Using archival material, this study explores how trade was conducted 
between 1945-1951 and explains how Canada and Japan redeveloped their economic relationship 
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Canada and Japan 
 
2 
1  Canada and Japan: What’s Old is New 
 American economic policies during the Allied occupation of Japan along with the 
recovery of Japan’s economy following World War II have received an abundance of attention in 
scholarly literature.  Presently there are no significant studies looking at how Canada and Japan 
rebuilt their economic relationship in the aftermath of World War II and before the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951.  This thesis helps fill a gap in the current historiography by 
detailing the redevelopment of Canada and Japan’s economic relationship during the Occupation 
period.  Specifically, this thesis outlines the primary policies that affected Japan’s international 
trade, details the Canadian Government’s short and long-term economic interests with regards to 
Japan, and provides a thorough account of the trade conducted between the two countries from 
1945-1951. 
 
 Historically, Canada and Japan maintained good economic relations prior to 1941, and, 
generally, Japan has remained one of Canada’s top five export markets along with supplying 
many imported goods to Canada for the past eighty years.  As of 2008, Japan was the fourth 
largest supplier of imported goods to Canada and Canada’s third largest export market.1  When 
Canada established a Legation in Tokyo in 1929, it was only the fourth for Canada—the first 
three were in London, Washington and France.  Herbert M. Marler was Canada’s first Minister 
to Japan when the Legation was established in 1929 and was aided by Hugh L. Keenleyside, the 
First Secretary and Chargé D’affairs, and James A. Langley, the Commercial Secretary.2  The 
officials at the Legation were given wide breadth to develop cordial relations and operated with 
relative independence from the government.  Japan was Canada’s fifth largest export market in 
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1929 and fifth largest supplier of imported goods, accounting for nearly a third of all Canada’s 
total imports and half of its total exports to “Far Eastern” countries.3   
 
 Trade between Canada and Japan decreased in the 1930s and the economic relationship 
was not free of political difficulties.  The attitudes toward Canada’s relationship with Japan in 
the 1920s and 1930s exhibited by the Liberal and Conservative Parties, led respectively by 
William Lyon Mackenzie King and Richard B. Bennett, indicate that Canadian-Japanese 
economic relations following World War II benefited from the Liberal Party’s continued 
governance.  The governments led by Prime Minister King during the 1920s and 1930s 
consistently placed the importance of good trade relations with Japan above domestic and 
international political differences.  Japanese emigration to Canada, specifically into British 
Columbia, was a thorny issue for varying federal governments in Canada during the first decades 
of the 20th century, but King navigated the issue during negotiations throughout the 1920s.  
Furthermore, King was a driving force behind the creation of the first Canadian Legations and a 
staunch supporter of good political and economic relations between Canada and Japan.  
Conversely, Bennett had opposed the opening of Canada’s Legations in the late 1920s.  Trade 
between Canada and Japan suffered during the early years of the Depression, particularly from 
1934-1935 when Bennett, who had defeated King in 1930, levied duties and tariffs during a trade 
war dispute that harmed Canadian exports to Japan and led to an anti-Canada campaign by the 
Japanese Government.  King, though, was re-elected as Prime Minister in 1935 and helped 




 Both the Bennett and King governments in the 1930s did not allow Canadian-Japanese 
relations to be deterred by Japan’s actions in China, and exports of scrap-iron, lead, nickel and 
zinc actually rose in 1938 despite the Second Sino-Japanese War.  Following the lead of the 
United States and the United Kingdom, however, Canada gradually restricted imports on 
strategic minerals and metals in 1939 and 1940, and finally froze all Japanese assets in Canada 
on 25 July 1941.  Japan’s entrance into World War II halted all trade but did not harm Canadian-
Japanese economic relations in the long-term.  King served as Canada’s Prime Minister 
throughout the war and was succeeded by Louis St. Laurent, another Liberal, in 1948.  Despite 
what was transpiring in the Pacific, King wrote with sadness about the departure of Japan’s 
Minister to Canada, Seijiro Yoshizawa, from Ottawa in May 1942: 
[I] felt a great pain in my heart that I should have left him and his wife to go without a 
word. . . . I was not interested in protocol, was thinking of my heart and what was right to 
do. . . . Must remember that when all this war is over, we may wish to bind together the 
different countries and Yoshizawa might be helpful in that way, if his faith in me were 
not destroyed.  Luckily, they were to stay over in Montreal for some time.4 
 
Canada and Japan’s diplomatic relationship was not formally restored until the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty was ratified by the Canadian Parliament and put into effect on 28 April 1952, but 
the lack of normalized diplomatic relations did not prevent the Canadian Government and private 
businesses from attempting to rebuild economic relations with Japan during the Occupation 
period.   
 
 At the end of World War II, Canada was left with a strong economy and had gained 
prominence as a dependable political and military ally because of its large contribution to the 
war effort.  When the United States invited Allied countries to participate in the Far Eastern 
Commission (FEC), a body created to provide advice to the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
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Powers (SCAP) about Occupation policies, Canada was among those countries invited to 
participate.  In August 1946 the Canadian Government set up its own Liaison Mission at the 
former Legation in Tokyo.  From the beginning of its involvement in the Far Eastern 
Commission to the eventual peace settlement, the Canadian Government had consistent short and 
long-term policy aims concerning Japan’s international trade.  Security was the Canadian 
Government’s top priority and it sought to ensure that Japan would not be a military threat in the 
future.  The government also supported Japan’s reintegration into the international market and 
advocated for the reduction of trade barriers along with high levels of peaceful economic activity 
for Japan.  As Japan’s international trade recovered, imports and exports between Canada and 
Japan resumed.  Economic matters were at the centre of Canadian-Japanese relations during the 
Occupation period.  The two primary channels that Canada used to reengage Japan during this 
period were the Far Eastern Commission and the Canadian Liaison Mission.  The Department of 
External Affairs was primarily responsible for the formulation of political policies related to 
Canada’s short and long-term interests in Japan’s economic recovery.  The Department of Trade 
and Commerce played the more direct role in facilitating trade between the two countries largely 
due to the work performed by its representatives at the Canadian Liaison Mission who handled 
enquiries related to trade.   
 
 The redevelopment of Canada and Japan’s economic relationship during the Occupation 
took place during an era when the Canadian Government heavily promoted political and 
economic multilateralism through institutions such as the United Nations and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Participation in the Far Eastern Commission afforded 
Canada a voice that it did not have in the Allied control of Europe.  The Canadian Government 
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balanced its new-found voice on international affairs with its political relationship to the United 
States and the United Kingdom.  During World War II, Canada and the United States started to 
develop the close relationship based on mutual security and economic interests that the two 
countries are accustomed to now.  At the same time, the predominance of the United Kingdom as 
Canada’s principle political and economic ally shifted to the United States.  The intensification 
of the Cold War in the late 1940s had ramifications for Occupation policies causing the United 
States to work towards the rehabilitation of Japan’s international trade, but Washington did not 
intend to create an American monopoly within the Japanese market.  Japan itself was a defeated 
country in the midst of rebuilding both its domestic economy and international trade that had 
been devastated by the war.  Consequently, Canadian policy was shaped in part by factors that 
the government had no control over.  The redevelopment of trade between Canada and Japan was 
constrained by a number of factors including: varying trade policies and procedures in place for 
Japan that complicated the conduct of trade, Occupation controls on Japanese imports and 
exports, a global shortage of raw materials, and American hegemony over North American 
exports to Japan.  Under difficult circumstances, the Canadian Government pursued its goals as 
best it could, while supporting what trade was possible during the Occupation period. 
 
 This thesis opens with a historiography about the existing, albeit limited, literature 
relating to Canada and Japan’s political and economic relationship between 1945-1951.  With so 
few scholarly publications related to this subject, there is a need for a study of this kind to 
expand the understanding of Canadian-Japanese relations.  Following this introduction and the 
historiography, Chapter 1 explains how the framework of control for Occupied Japan was 
developed and what guided the United States’ Occupation policies.  A brief history of Canada’s 
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involvement in the Pacific War is provided along with an account of how Canada first came to 
reengage Japan after the war through its participation in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission 
and, later, the Far Eastern Commission.  The primary thrust of the thesis is contained in the 
Chapters 2-4, which document trade policies and procedures during the Occupation, the 
Canadian Government’s policies regarding Japan’s economic recovery, and the actual trade that 
was conducted between Canada and Japan.  Chapter 2 looks at the years 1946-1947, the period 
when Japan first transitioned from government-to-government trade to limited private trade.  
This section shows how Canada’s long-term economic policies regarding Japan were established 
early on during the Occupation through Canada’s participation in the Far Eastern Commission 
and because of the work performed at its Liaison Mission in Tokyo.  Chapter 3 examines 1948-
1949, highlighting the decline of the Far Eastern Commission’s activities and focusing on the 
work performed by the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Canadian Liaison Mission 
to facilitate trade between Canadian and Japanese businesses.  This section contains a number of 
examples from letters written to the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Canadian 
Liaison Mission as companies established themselves within the system of Japan’s limited 
private trade.  The examples demonstrate the types of businesses that were interested in trade and 
the sorts of trade conducted between Canada and Japan, while also providing firsthand accounts 
of the factors that limited trade between the two countries at the time.  Chapter 4, 1950-1951, 
assesses Canadian-Japanese economic relations and Canadian policies leading to the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty.  During these final two years, Japan gained control over most of its 
private trade while the Korean War increased demand for Japanese goods along with Japan’s 
need for raw material imports.  By the end of 1951, Canada was the fourth largest exporting 




 This thesis uses an expository style of writing to provide an overarching narrative about 
how Canada and Japan redeveloped their economic relationship during the Occupation period.  
Due to the sources available and used in this study, the events of this period are described from a 
Canadian perspective.  Chapters 2 and 3 begin with sections on the foremost policies and 
measures undertaken by the United States and the Japanese Government that affected Japan’s 
international trade during each of the respective years for 1946-1949.  SCAP’s economic 
demilitarization and economic deconcentration programs were important components of its 
efforts to eliminate Japan’s economic and industrial means to wage war.  These programs 
affected Japan’s economic recovery but were not as closely related to the conduct of Japan’s 
international trade as other policies at the time, thus they are described within the context of the 
“reverse course” initiated by the United States in 1948 to rehabilitate the Japanese economy. 
 
 The recovery of Japan’s fishing industries was a highly-politicized and contentious affair 
involving a complex diplomatic dialogue between several states over the course of the 
Occupation, and is beyond the scope of this study.  Imports and exports of fish products were 
part of Japan’s economic recovery but this study does not provide an account of this recovery.  
For Canada, issues related to Japan’s fishing industry were handled by the Department of 
Fisheries, not the Department of Trade and Commerce, and records indicate that fish products 
were not a primary item of trade between the two countries.  Leading up to the peace conference 
in September 1951, provisions about Japan’s fishing industries that circulated in the draft treaties 
were of particular concern to the Canadian Government.  A description is provided about how 
these concerns affected Canada’s negotiations over the final peace treaty. 
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 Primary resource materials used in this study come mostly from three sources.  First, 
documents contained in the Department of External Affairs publication, Documents on Canadian 
External Relations, are the major source for information about Canada’s participation in the Far 
Eastern Commission and provide additional insight into the early years of the Canadian Liaison 
Mission.  Documents obtained from Library and Archives Canada form the bulk of material 
about Canadian-Japanese trade from 1946-1951 and provide most of the information about the 
Department of Trade Commerce and the Canadian Liaison Mission.  Likewise, copies of the 
Department of Trade and Commerce’s journal, Foreign Trade, were obtained through Library 
and Archives Canada.  Credit must also be given to the two Commercial Representatives who 
worked at the Canadian Liaison Mission: J. E. Kenderdine, who worked from 1946-1948, and  
J. C. Britton, who worked from 1949 through the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.   
The correspondence of these two individuals and the articles they wrote for Foreign Trade 
during the years they worked at the Liaison Mission are the source of most of the trade statistics 
and information about Canadian businesses used in this study.  Primary sources for trade 
regulations and procedures have been derived from Foreign Trade and the United States’ 
Department of State publication, Foreign Relations of the United States. 
 
 A select few secondary sources have factored prominently into this thesis’ analysis and 
description of the framework of control and trade policies for Occupied Japan.  Miko Sumiya’s A 
History of Japanese Trade and Industry Policy has been the most integral source for information 
about specific American Occupation policies that affected trade and the redevelopment of 
Japan’s trade following World War II.  Sumiya’s text is arguably one of the more profound 
works on Japan’s international trade during this period, with a depth unmatched in other literary 
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sources used for this study.  Leon Hollerman’s concise descriptions of trade regulation and 
policy during the Occupation provided in his article “International Economic Controls in 
Occupied Japan” must also be acknowledged.  George H. Blakeslee’s Far Eastern Commission 
gives a thorough account of the development, progress, achievements and shortcomings of the 
Far Eastern Commission, and was integral in this study’s analysis of the Far Eastern 
Commission.  Finally, a thesis by University of Victoria student Keith Stuart Webster, Canada 
and the Far Eastern Commission, is currently the foremost account of Canada’s participation in 
the Far Eastern Commission.  Although there is slight overlap between the subject and material 
in Webster’s thesis and this one, the scope of the two studies is entirely different.  Webster 
focuses on situating Canada’s efforts at the Far Eastern Commission within analytical 
frameworks and in the context of the Cold War.  His arguments, while informative, are not 
connected to the development of Canada and Japan’s economic relationship and he does not 
discuss trade between the two countries nor the work performed by the Canadian Liaison 
Mission.  Conversely, while this thesis examines Canada’s participation in the Far Eastern 
Commission, it concentrates specifically on the Commission’s relevance to the development of 
Canada’s economic policies concerning Japan and does not discuss the other work performed by 
the Commission.  The primary and secondary sources consulted for this thesis demonstrate that 
the redevelopment of Canada and Japan’s economic relationship during the Occupation period 
was important to both the Canadian and Japanese Governments and that there was interest from 





2  Historiography: Canada and Japan, 1945-1948 
 How Canada and Japan redeveloped their economic relationship in the years leading up 
to the San Francisco Peace Treaty is a topic that has received very little scholarly attention.  
Consequently, there is a significant gap in the historiography of Canadian-Japanese relations.  
Presently, studies about Canada and Japan’s economic relationship in the first half of the 20th 
century usually, though not always, are a byproduct of studies about the contentious political 
issue of Japanese emigration to Canada.  One such example as the thoroughly researched 
collaborative monograph, Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese during the Second World 
War, by Patricia Roy, J. L. Granatstein, Masako Iino, and Hiroko Takamura.  A number of 
publications exist documenting Canada and Japan’s trade relationship following the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty such as The Politics of Canadian-Japanese Economic Relations by Frank 
Langdon or Neighbours Across the Pacific: Canadian-Japanese Relations 1870-1982 by Klaus 
H. Pringsheim.5  Studies concerned with the repatriation of  issei (first generation Japanese-
Canadians) or nisei (second generation Japanese-Canadians) to Japan after the war, although 
important to the broader historiography of Canada and Japan’s relationship, are generally a part 
of those analyses about the evacuation of Japanese-Canadians during World War II.  Because 
this was not connected to Canadian-Japanese economic relations, this historiography does 
provide an account of the existing literature on the repatriation of Japanese-Canadians after the 
war. 
 
 Currently there are generally three types of studies about Canada’s involvement with 
Japan during the Occupation period.  The first, typically journal articles from the 1940s or early 
1950s, discuss Canada’s initial “Far Eastern” policies following the end of World War II.  One 
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such account comes from noted historian W. L. Morton.  In an article from September 1946, 
“Canada’s Far Eastern Policy”, Morton provides a number of astute observations about the 
changing nature of Canada’s relationship to Europe.  These observations include the commentary 
on the Canadian public’s attitudes towards broader world affairs along with their attitudes 
towards China and Japan in the 1930s (sympathy for China, but never enough hostility towards 
Japan to affect diplomatic relations) and about how Canadian interests were becoming closely 
aligned with those of the United States as evidenced by the Permanent Joint Defence Board.6  
Interestingly, though, at that point in Canada’s Far Eastern policies, China was still an ally and 
had received a $60,000,000 loan.7  Though a number of Morton’s observations have stood the 
test of time, the author does make a minor mistake of saying Canada was on the Allied Council.  
What Morton’s article captures is the deeply complex changes happening in Canadian society 
and within the government as Canada moved away from the Euro-centric diplomacy of its past 
and embraced the partnership of the United States.  This partnership, however, did not define 
Canada’s Far Eastern strategy and Morton argues the government did not hold much sway over 
the United States’ Pacific policies. 
 
 The second—and majority—of current studies connected to Canadian-Japanese relations 
during the Occupation period are biographies or critiques of E. Herbert Norman.8  By almost all 
accounts, Norman was a brilliant Canadian scholar whose works on Japanese history were 
greatly admired.  Most accounts of Norman portray him as a gentle individual with a strong work 
ethic who was deeply committed to bettering the lives of others, but often fail to provide a 
detailed analysis of his work as Head of the Canadian Liaison Mission.  At the end of war, 
Norman worked for SCAP’s intelligence division and was responsible for researching members 
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of Japan’s government and bureaucracy to be purged.  Following his work for SCAP, the 
Canadian Government retained Norman’s services for the Far Eastern Commission after which 
Norman served as the Head of the Canadian Liaison Mission from August 1946 to October 1950.  
During an April session of the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Norman’s 
name was mentioned and it was alleged that he had communist associations and was potentially 
a spy.  The Canadian Government cleared him of these charges in 1951 but the experiences 
impacted Norman greatly and a renewal of these accusations from the United States in 1957 
caused Norman to commit suicide.   
 
 James Barros, one Norman’s few detractors, argues that he was likely working for the 
Soviets in No Sense of Evil: Espionage, The Case of Herbert Norman.  During Norman’s 
university years in the 1930s, he did have associations with individuals who actively supported 
communism or who were sympathetic to the ideology.  Norman was also partly responsible for 
the release of two Japanese communists who had been prisoners.  However, there is no evidence 
that Norman was a spy, worked for the Communist Party in Canada at any point, or betrayed his 
responsibilities and loyalties working for the Canadian Government.  At the end of 1989, Peter 
V. Lyon was given unrestricted access to all the Department of External Affairs’ records on 
Norman including memoranda, dispatches and telegrams authored by Norman.  In his 42 page 
article “The Loyalties of E. Herbert Norman,” Lyon provides a detailed assessment of Norman’s 
personal connections in the 1930s and 1940s along with his work for SCAP and the Department 
of External Affairs.  Lyon is scathing in his assessment about Barros’ work, having meticulously 
examined the sources Barros used and ultimately denounces Barros’ research and account of 
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Norman as being entirely flawed.  The article is the definitive defence of Norman and Lyon is 
unequivocal about Norman’s innocence. 
 
 Finally there are studies that touch on Canada’s participation in the Far Eastern 
Commission and the Canadian Liaison Mission in the first two to three years of the Occupation.  
Historians have faced three problems looking at Canada and Japan’s relationship from this 
period.  The first problem has been the lack of sources available on this topic.  The Department 
of External Affairs’ classified files are closed for 30 years after an event, while the Documents 
on Canadian External Relations for 1947 and onwards were only published beginning in 1993.  
In Neighbours Across the Pacific: Canadian-Japanese Relations 1870-1982, Klaus H. 
Pringsheim acquired his post-1947 material from interviews or documents that had been 
published up to that time, and only quoted “material reflected in [his] analysis” that came from 
classified documents by special permission.9  
 
 The second problem, which is also the most serious, is one of perception.  Canada’s role 
in the Far Eastern Commission and the work of the Canadian Liaison Mission during the 
Occupation are not well known or documented.  Asia was of secondary importance compared to 
Europe for the Canadian Government after World War II, and trade between Canada and Japan 
was minimal during the first years of the Occupation.  However, Japan occupied a key position 
within Canada’s strategic East Asian policy formulation and trade that developed between the 
two countries during this time was the basis for their economic relationship following the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty.  Unfortunately this period is misunderstood, deemed unimportant, or 
seen as simply irrelevant.  Describing the Canadian Government’s views during the 
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reconstruction of Japan after the war, Carin Holroyd and Ken Coates write, “Canada stood back 
from this transformation, for it was of marginal importance on the international scene.”10  
Without fail, their book includes a brief discussion on E. H. Norman, but does not discuss his 
work for SCAP (and close relationship to General MacArthur), his work for the Canadian 
Government in the Far Eastern Commission, or his position as Head of the Liaison Mission.11  
Readers unfamiliar with the significance of Norman’s writings and political work would be left 
undoubtedly confused by his inclusion in this book.  Moreover, the authors completely miss that 
Canada developed short and long-term political and economic goals during this time and actively 
engaged in trade with Japan. 
 
 Finally, aside from government documents, not much material has been left behind from 
those who played the most important roles as Canada rebuilt its economic relationship with 
Japan.  William Lyon Mackenzie King’s diaries are available online, and biographies, notably 
John English’s Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson, volume 1, 1897-1948, exist about 
Lester B. Pearson.  However, E. H. Norman left no memoirs nor do any exist for the likes of  
H. Hume Wrong, J. E. Kenderdine, J. C. Britton, G. R. Heasman, A. R. Menzies, or other 
Canadian Government officials who played integral roles within the Far Eastern Commission 
and at the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo. 
 
 H. F. Angus’ 1953 monograph, Canada and the Far East, 1940-1953, is one of the first 
accounts of Canada’s relationship with Japan during the Occupation period.  Angus was a 
respected professor at the University of British Columbia, worked for the Department of External 
Affairs in the early years of the World War II, and had been sympathetic to the plight of 
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Japanese-Canadians prior to and during the war.  Considerably longer than Morton’s article, 
Angus presents a diverse number of issues in Asia that concerned the Canadian government 
during this period.  The thrust of Angus’ topic chapters concern issues and events occurring in 
China, Japan, Korea, India and Pakistan and their effects on Canada’s foreign policy.  The 
writing reflects the Cold War era with Angus arguing that the United Nations was an integral 
component of how the Canadian Government formulated its policies concerning Asian states.  At 
the same time, the Canadian Government is presented as being disinterested in involving itself in 
the power politics surrounding Asian states at the time, though keenly aware of the geopolitical 
importance of the region at the time.12  Angus explains the importance of the Commonwealth, 
but argues, correctly, that the United States had surpassed Britain as Canada’s most important 
strategic partner as it developed its foreign policy. 
  
 Canadian-Japanese relations occupy only a few portions of Angus’ assessment, but there 
are some useful insights to be gained from his writing.  Aside from the background he provides 
about the deportation, repatriation and resettlement of Japanese-Canadians following World War 
II, the foremost issues presented by Angus tend to reflect the interests of the Canadian 
Government in the early 1950s.  Concerning Canadian-Japanese trade, Angus comments that 
Japan offered “an attractive outlet” for Canadian exports and that Canada could likely count on a 
favourable trade position vis-à-vis Japan.13  However, Angus argues there were two potential 
problems that could emerge from Canada’s economic relationship with Japan.  Both were, it 
should be added, issues under deliberation by the Canadian Government at the time.  First, 
Angus worried that the entrance of Japan as a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade would give Japan a favourable a trading position with Canada comparable to that enjoyed 
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by the other Commonwealth members, potentially displacing goods imported into Canada from 
the United Kingdom.14  The second problem was similar to the first postulated by Angus.   As 
Japan created new trade agreements with other countries, exports from the United Kingdom 
would be challenged either directly or the competition would lower the price of those goods.  
Moreover this competition would potentially hamper Canada’s exports to the United Kingdom 
and its efforts “to promote the restoration of the convertibility of Sterling.”15  Angus’ arguments 
were partially correct.  Canada did not want to grant Japan most favoured nation treatment in 
1949, but, as a policy, supported Japan’s eventual accession into the GATT.  After the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, Canada was a much more vocal proponent of Japan’s 
accession into the GATT.16  While Angus’ book is informative in parts, it suffers from a dated 
style, and it is not a thorough analysis of Canadian-Japanese political and economic relations 
during the Occupation period. 
 
 The most noteworthy research concerning Canada and Japan’s economic relationship 
from 1945-1951 appeared within a short period of time in the early 1980s.17  Dr. Nobuya Bamba, 
a professor at Tsuda College in Tokyo, and the founder of the Japanese Association for Canadian 
Studies (JACS), published Japanese-Canadian Relations: An Overview.  He also published a 
working paper in 1983 that briefly covers Canadian-Japanese cultural, political, and economic 
relations from the mid-1800s to the early 1980s.  Bamba notes that after Canada emerged “as a 
strong nation in comparison to the war-torn European powers,” the government sought its own 
particular role in international politics.18  Conversely, Japan was at the beginning of the 
Occupation.  Amidst this contrast, the Canadian Government’s attitude towards Japan was much 
friendlier and relations were increasingly bilateral, but Canada remained subordinate in its 
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importance to the Japanese Government compared to the United States.19  Even so, Bamba notes 
the important role played by Norman during the formulation of the Japanese Constitution, along 
with Canada’s mediating role within the Far Eastern Commission.  Regarding trade during this 
period, Bamba is brief, stating that the federal government thought that trade interests would be 
curtailed as long as the Occupation continued, and that at the Canberra Conference, Canada 
indicated it was a “Pacific nation” concerned with political and economic stability in the 
region.20 
 
 Klaus H. Pringsheim divides Canadian-Japanese relations into five time periods in 
Neighbours Across the Pacific: Canadian-Japanese Relations 1870-1982.  The section devoted 
to the period of 1941-1952 sketches the resettlement and repatriation of Japanese-Canadians, and 
E. H. Norman’s roles in SCAP, the Far Eastern Commission, and as the head of the Canadian 
Liaison Mission in Tokyo.  He also includes information about the peace settlement process 
including Lester B. Pearson’s role.  Pringsheim’s account is thoroughly researched, relying on a 
number of unique and primary sources, but his segment regarding postwar Japan is short with the 
diplomatic activities and personal life of E. H. Norman receiving the bulk of attention.  Even so, 
it provides a decent outline of issues and events in Japan that were of relevance to the Canadian 
Government after World War II.21  Trade in the 1950s becomes the focus in the next section of 
his book, with Pringsheim arguing that trade topped military concerns in the East Asia as Korea 
moved closer to an armistice and Japanese signed the peace treaty.22  The Canadian Government 
was eager for trade with Japan, and in turn, so were the Japanese, who sent a trade mission to 
Canada in 1951 expressing needs for raw goods like nickel and asbestos, while also stating a 
desire to join the International Wheat Agreement and the GATT.23  Pringsheim’s work is 
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essential for a solid understanding of Canadian-Japanese political relations prior to World War 
II, and a solid survey of 100 years of Canadian-Japanese relations. 
 
 The 1980 publication Canadian Perspectives on Economic Relations with Japan is a 
notable example of how the politics of Canadian-Japanese trade have generally been examined.  
As an anthology, Michael G. Fry leads the text with an assessment of the politics behind 
Canadian-Japanese trade between 1919-1947.  Though only two pages are devoted to politics 
and trade post-1945, Fry provides some insight as to how the Canadian Government’s policy was 
formed by individuals such a Pearson, Norman, and others like R. E. Collins, General H.D.G 
Crerar, and Brooke Claxton in the immediate years after the war.24  Fry pays particular attention 
to the Crerar mission’s report in 1947 that gave a rather dim perspective for trade in 1948 
between the two countries.25  Just like Pringsheim’s text is indispensable for understanding 
Canadian-Japanese political relations prior to the World War II, so to is Fry’s contribution for 
understanding the politics behind Canadian-Japanese economic relations prior to the war.   
 
 A working paper by Fry in 1983, Canada and the Changing Economy of the Pacific 
Basin: The Development of Economic Relations Between Canada and Japan, 1945-1953,  
resumed his narrative of the history of Canadian-Japanese economic relations where his work in 
1980 had ended.  This working paper is short at seventeen pages including the bibliography and 
attachments, but it is integral to the historiography.  Fry places Canada’s Japanese policies within 
context of the declining importance of the Commonwealth, the “special relationship” that had 
developed between Canada and the United States that was reinforced by the Cold War, and the 
Canadian Government’s need to maintain policies autonomous from those of the United States.26  
 
20 
Importantly, he points out that Canada’s relations with Japan existed through the Canadian 
Liaison Mission in Tokyo under the auspices of American Occupation.  Fry argues that the 
Canadian Government’s policy towards Japan was largely developed by the Department of 
External Affairs, with the Departments of Trade and Commerce, Fisheries, Justice, and Defence 
all playing smaller, subordinate roles.27  Moreover, External Affairs had such an influence 
because it was largely independent from internal Cabinet politics or interference by the Prime 
Minister.28  Fry sums up the Canadian Government’s policy in seven points—some that parallel 
American goals.  Aside from the need to create and preserve a demilitarized and democratic 
Japan that could have a peaceful role in the international system, Fry argues the Canadian 
Government sought renewed trade that was favourable to Canada, modest reparations, the 
protection of its fisheries, and the assurance that Japanese immigration to Canada would not 
resume.29   Two of the biggest obstacles to trade, as Fry presents them, were United States 
policies that attempted to tie Japan economically to the United States, along with the 
combination of the Japanese Government’s policies and the preferences of Japanese business 
leaders that harmed early trade.  The Canadian government’s priority of the European markets, 
its slow approach to stimulating trade with Japan, the inability for mineral exports to resume 
beyond coal, iron ore, and zinc, and general fears of the potential threat to Canadian industries 
and of discriminatory trade practices from a revived Japan are all cited as additional reasons that 
hampered trade in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  It is very unfortunate that no further work by 
Fry on this time period exists. 
 
 The foremost study of Canadian-Japanese political relations during this time is Keith 
Stuart Webster’s thesis, “Canada and the Far Eastern Commission.”  The thesis is the first 
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comprehensive study about Canada’s participation in the Far Eastern Commission from 1945-
1948.  The thesis opens with a significant historiography that details the development of 
Canada’s foreign policy during the early phase of the Cold War.  Webster describes the major 
analytical frameworks that have been used to assess Canada’s foreign policy during this time: 
functionalism, middle power theory, and multilateralism.  Webster defines functionalism as a 
policy wherein: “states should influence world affairs on matters where they were most involved 
and where they had the capacity to contribute to the matter at hand.”30  According to the middle 
power theory, Canada could use its influence from past military actions to act on a tier below the 
great powers.31  Lastly, multilateralism was a means to bring together states and encourage 
standards of behaviour, but this did not necessarily translate into a greater say for Canada.32  
Webster also includes an outline of the orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist views of Cold 
War and explains that Canadian historians, diplomats and pundits “were less willing to use 
extreme language in describing the Soviet Union or communism in general.”33  The primary 
sources used by Webster mostly come from the Documents on Canadian External Relations.  He 
also uses a limited number of documents from Library and Archives Canada, and is informed on 
Cold War policy and analytical frameworks by a plethora of secondary resources.  The judicious 
use of both the primary and secondary sources is one of the compelling features of Webster’s 
study and his analysis about how Cold War politics, multilateral systems, and bilateral interests 
affected Canadian policy developments and the country’s participation in Far Eastern 
Commission is a critical component of the existing historiography.  
 
 The thesis covers the development of the Far Eastern Commission from the Far Eastern 
Advisory Commission in 1945 and looks at the years when FEC’s work was most productive, 
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1946-1948.  Canada’s involvement in four issues the Commission dealt with are examined by 
Webster: the development of Japan’s constitution, reparations, the peace settlement, and the 
International Military Tribunal that prosecuted Japanese war criminals.   Because Webster 
analyses Canadian interests through the lens of the Cold War, he tends to augment the impact of 
Cold War developments on Canadian policies for Japan.  Furthermore, Canada’s participation in 
the Far Eastern Commission is treated as the definitive forum wherein Canada displayed its 
policies for Japan, but Webster misses that Canadian-Japanese relations were impacted by 
factors other than the Commission’s activities.  For instance, Webster writes that the Far Eastern 
Commission and the Cold War: 
 forced the Canadian government and its diplomatic service to think about East Asia, and 
 to develop positions on many issues that would otherwise have passed by out of Canadian 
 sight.  There was continuity with the pre-war era in Canadian concerns about trade but as 
 trade stagnated in the early post-war years, issues of security and post-colonial 
 governance emerged to become more important.”34 
 
The first sentence is entirely correct; the problem is his assertion in the latter sentence.  Broader 
strategic concerns had been a part of Canada policy formulation since 1945 and were often 
directly related to Canada’s trade interests in East Asia.  There is little discussion of events 
beyond 1948 in Webster’s thesis and it does not inform on broader Canadian economic aims for 
Japan beyond the reparations issue.   
 
  However, there are very few problems with Webster’s analysis and the ones that do exist 
are either minor or open to debate.  His assessment is rigorous and no study exists at this moment 
that pays greater attention to Canada’s Japan policies in the late 1940s.  He is correct that 
Canada’s primary interest in the Far Eastern Commission involved promoting its political, 
security, and economic interests, and that Canada supported the Commission because of the 
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government’s commitment to multilateralism.  Furthermore, Webster’s thesis conveys that 
Canada’s voice within the Commission was limited and that its ability to affect the outcome of 
some of the most pressing issues deliberated by the Commission was minimal.  One of the most 
important outcomes of Webster’s thesis is that it demonstrates Canada was involved in the 
creation of policies that affected Japan after the war.  The second last sentence of Webster’s 
conclusion reads, “Canada’s involvement in the FEC provides further evidence of extensive, if 
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1  SCAP and FEC: Creating the Administration for the Occupation of Japan 
 On 14 August 1945 Japan announced its unconditional surrender, bringing to a 
conclusion the combative phase of World War II.  Until the San Francisco Peace Treaty came 
into effect on 28 April 1952, Japan was under military occupation by the United States.  The 
United States began planning its postwar Far Eastern policies in 1942 when the State Department 
began studying questions about American postwar objectives and the nature of a potential 
occupation of East Asia.35  The State Department later formed the Inter-divisional Area 
Committee on the Far East, and in December 1944 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee 
(SWNCC) was formed to coordinate questions emerging from the State, War, and Navy 
Departments.  A Sub-Committee on the Far East was formed on 5 January 1945 and tasked with 
preparing papers for the SWNCC.36  As the war with Japan drew to its end in August 1945, 
President Truman designated General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers (SCAP) and MacArthur’s General Headquarters (GHQ) was established in Tokyo 
in September.  The United States’ military and civilian administration overseeing the occupation 
of Japan was known synonymously with MacArthur’s designation as SCAP and reached a peak 
of 3,200 bureaucrats working for it by 1948.37  John Dower writes that the breadth of SCAP’s 
mission to completely demilitarize, democratize and remake Japanese society was an “audacious 
undertaking by the victors in war [that] had no legal or historical precedent” and that General 
MacArthur’s authority during the Occupation, particularly in its first years, was immense: 
“MacArthur was the indisputable overlord of occupied Japan, and his underlings functioned as 




 The papers SWNCC produced were fundamental to the development of SCAP and its 
initial policies, but the framework for occupation of postwar Japan was also laid out, in part, by 
three conferences held by the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and China.  The Cairo 
Declaration, issued on 1 December 1943, specified the territorial possessions Japan would be 
limited to after its defeat, including all those acquired after 1914 and all territory that had 
previously belonged to China.  The secretive agreement made at the Yalta Conference in 
February 1945 outlined the terms under which the Soviet Union would enter the war against 
Japan along with Japanese territories the Soviet Union stood to gain.  Finally, the Potsdam 
Declaration, issued on 26 July 1945, clarified the terms of unconditional surrender, outlined the 
layout for Japan’s postwar economy, and contained the territorial provisions from the Cairo 
Declaration.  These conferences formed the legal precedents for SCAP’s authority and helped 
guide its decisions.   
 
 The functions of SCAP and framework of the Occupation were further determined by: 
General Order No. 1 (JCS 1467/2) issued on 17 August 1945; the Instrument of Surrender signed 
on 2 September 1945; the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC 150/4) 
approved by President Truman on 6 July; and an agreement made by the United States, Soviet 
Union, Britain and China at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow on 26 
December 1945.  The Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan was updated on 3 November 1945 
with the Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers 




 General Order No. 1, issued by General MacArthur on 17 August, gave specific orders to 
the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters for their unconditional surrender.  Orders included: 
a list of territories under Allied control and their respective commander to whom the Japanese 
commanders were to surrender their forces to; instructions for the movement and stationing of 
Japanese troops until their surrender; disarmament procedures including the removal of land and 
naval mines; measures to be taken to ensure the safety of prisoners of war; and provisions about 
the nature of assistance Japan’s military and civil authorities were to make available to SCAP.39  
Conditions set forth from General Order No. 1 were incorporated into the Instrument of 
Surrender including those that subjected the Japanese Emperor and Government to SCAP’s 
authority.  The Initial Post-Surrender Policy was created by the SWNCC and contained the 
foremost policies that determined the framework for the American-led occupation and the 
ultimate objectives of the United States for postwar Japan.40  Japan was to be disarmed, 
demilitarized and prevented from becoming a menace to the United States and the world; its 
people “encouraged” to form a respect for human rights and democracy; and the country 
permitted a basic economy to meet the minimum needs of its people.  The Japanese Emperor and 
Government were permitted to retain the powers of a normal government, though subject to 
SCAP’s control; SCAP had ultimate authority over all matters, but exercised its power through 
the Japanese Emperor and Government.  Because of the Instrument of Surrender and Initial Post-
Surrender Policy, the Japanese Government was not an idle or passive actor during the 
Occupation.  Far from being simply dictated to, the Japanese Government, along with its 
ministries and various bureaucratic agencies, undertook organizational reforms, developed a 




 Control of Japan at the war’s end was markedly different from what was taking place in 
Europe at the same time.  Germany had been divided into four zones of control administered 
respectively by the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France; the European Advisory 
Commission was dissolved after the Potsdam Conference.  Japan was not partitioned by territory 
at the war’s end and the United States provided the bulk of military, civilian and fiscal resources 
for the duration of the Occupation.  However, it was never envisaged that the United States 
would bear sole responsibility for the occupation of Japan.  The Initial Post-Surrender Policy 
affirmed SCAP’s authority and reiterated the supremacy of the United States, but provided for 
the participation of other states in the occupation of Japan: 
 The occupation shall have the character of an operation on behalf of the principal allied 
 powers acting in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan. For that reason, 
 participation of the forces of other nations that have taken a leading part in the war 
 against Japan will be welcomed and expected. The occupation forces will be under the 
 command of a Supreme Commander designated by the United States.  Although every 
 effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to 
 establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will 
 satisfy the principal Allied powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among 
 them, the policies of the United States will govern.41 
 
 A number of Allied countries had contributed to the war against Japan and their 
participation in the occupation had been considered during the development of American 
occupational policies.  On 13 March 1944 a policy paper was submitted by the Inter-Divisional 
Area Committee that called for representation from Allied states who had actively participated in 
the war against Japan, so long as the United States’ retained the dominant position.42  Through 
the efforts of the State Department, SWNCC and the Sub-Committee, a draft for the terms of 
reference of a Pacific-Far Eastern high commission was submitted on 11 April 1945.  This first 
draft proposed that the commission consist of representation only from the United States, United 
Kingdom, and China, and included a broad mandate to deal with problems in the “Pacific-Far 
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Eastern area” in addition to the fulfilment of Japan’s unconditional surrender.43  After further 
discussion by SWNNC and the Sub-Committee on the Far East, SWNCC proposed that the 
commission be named the Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC), its mandate limited to 
making recommendations about Japan’s fulfilment of the Instrument of Surrender, and each state 
party to the agreement allowed only one representative, although the composition of FEAC was 
determined later during discussions over SWNCC’s proposal.44    
 
 On 21 August, the final terms of reference developed by SWNCC and the Sub-
Committee were transmitted to the governments of the United Kingdom, Soviet Union and 
China, whose countries were invited to participate in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.  
Initially, terms of reference limited the commission’s functions to “policies, principles and 
standards by which the fulfilment by Japan of its obligations under the instrument of surrender 
may be determined” but contained no mention of voting procedures or how FEAC policy 
recommendations would be carried out.45  All three states accepted their invitation to participate 
in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, but the United Kingdom objected to the draft terms of 
reference and submitted a revised terms of reference on 1 October to change the name to the Far 
Eastern Commission and have the commission’s authority strengthened.46  The British Embassy 
had already suggested to the Secretary of State on 20 August that a control council be 
established, but upon the United States’ consideration of British amendments to FEAC’s terms of 
references, the United Kingdom “agreed not to proceed with [its] earlier proposal for a Control 
Council in Tokyo and thus consented to make the Far Eastern Commission the principal channel 
for exerting [British] influence on the treatment of Japan.”47  The Soviet Government had also 
changed its opinion about the commission in October and proposed that a control council be set 
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up prior to the establishment of FEAC.48   Participation by the Soviet Union was seen by the 
British as essential to forestall problems arising from potential Soviet actions in China and North 
Korea, and to offset problems arising on matters such as Japanese reparations or the coordination 
of Allied policy on strategic and economic controls.49   
 
 SWNCC, the Sub-Committee and the State Department considered the British and Soviet 
proposals for the Far Eastern Commission and the control council, and submitted two major 
revisions to the terms of reference on 27 October and 1 December.  Elements remained from the 
original terms of reference such as the commission’s primary function to formulate the policies, 
principles and standards required to carry out the Instrument of Surrender, but the suggestion for 
the creation of the Far Eastern Commission was adopted.  The new commission’s voting 
procedures were clarified and required a majority from all members of the Far Eastern 
Commission including a majority from the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, or 
China.  The authority of the Far Eastern Commission was expanded to allowed any 
representative to review directives issued by SCAP and stipulated that any changes to the 
Japanese constitution or “regime of control” could only be done after consultation with the 
Commission.50  The Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, 
agreed upon the final terms of reference for the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council 
at the Moscow Conference on 26 December 1945.  The final terms of reference gave veto power 
to the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and China, granted the Commission the 
authority to formulate policies rather than just act as an advisory body, and permitted the United 
States to issue interim directives.51  The Commission was precluded from recommending policy 
about military operations or territorial adjustments.  Over the course of the Occupation, the terms 
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of reference of the Far Eastern Commission were a source of contention between the United 
States and Commission members, but the United States Government took seriously the legal 
obligations outlined by the Initial Post-Surrender Policy and the Far Eastern Commission’s terms 
of reference.  The Far Eastern Commission was the principle organization for the development 




2  Canada and Japan, 1944-1945: The Pacific War and the Far Eastern Commission 
 Canada’s defence policies throughout the 1930s were premised on receiving support from 
the United Kingdom, but the worsening situation in Europe led Canada and the United States to 
enter into secret discussions in 1938 over mutual continental security concerns.52  The eventual 
result was the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in August 1940.  As an advisory 
body, it presented thirty-three formal recommendations to the governments of Canadian and the 
United States over the course of World War II.53  When Pearl Harbour was attacked, Canada was 
the first country to declare a state of war against Japan and provided a small military contingent 
that fought in the disastrous Battle of Hong Kong in December 1941.  However, Canada’s 
overall contribution to the war against Japan in the following years was small, consisting mostly 
of financial or material support to the United States and other Allied countries, while the Hong 
Kong expedition was Canada’s only military engagement.  Furthermore, although Japan had 
been considered to be one of Canada’s primary security threats in the 1930s, it was only in 1944 
when the government began to earnestly formulate plans to enter the Pacific theatre.  
 
 Canada’s reasons for its participation in the war against Japan were reiterated in an 
extract from a Cabinet meeting in January 1944.  “Canada’s position as a Pacific Power, as a 
member of the Commonwealth, and as an American nation, made it necessary that she take part 
in the subjugation of Japan.”54  In early January 1944, the Cabinet War Committee discussed 
sending up to 30 Army Officers to British units in Southeast Asia to acquire experience, 
eventually approving Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel to be attached with “United 
Kingdom and other Commonwealth forces and to U.S. forces in the Pacific and Asiatic areas.”55  
At the same time, Charles Power, Canadian Minister for National Defence for Air, was 
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concerned about planning for the eventual demobilization of Royal Canadian Air Force.56  Over 
the course of January and early February, discussions were held between Canadian and United 
Kingdom officials about the Commonwealth Air Training Plan.57  These and subsequent 
discussions about the program affected Canada’s long-term policies for entering the war against 
Japan: Canada wanted its forces to operate on a definite as opposed to unlimited commitment; it 
wanted RCAF personnel unscrambled from the Royal Air Force at the conclusion of the German 
war; and Canada’s demobilization at the end of the German war would be related to its 
participation in the air war against Japan.58  Moreover, the Minister of National Defence for Air 
wrote in an aide-mémoire that: 
 Any plans for the final campaign against Japan, which may involve the use of Canadian 
 forces, should accordingly take account of the following amongst other factors: the 
 deployment from Canadian bases of some part of the Canadian forces; the importance 
 which the northwestern route to Asia, across Canada, may assume in the later stages of 
 the war; the defence of the Canadian Pacific Coast; questions of supply and equipment.  
 These and other related considerations may render it advisable for Canada to play her part 
 in the Japanese war in very close co-operation with the United States, at any rate in 
 certain operational areas.59 
 
 
 Discussions between Canada and the United Kingdom continued in May 1944 when the 
Canadian Joint Mission in London met with the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff.  Canadian 
plans were not the only ones at the tentative stage.  At the Prime Minster’s meeting in London it 
was expressed to the Canadian Prime Minister that the British Naval and Air Forces would play 
the major role, but that these plans were not final.60  Likewise, no final plans had been formed 
between the United States and the United Kingdom by mid-June.61  The Minister of National 
Defence for Air had surmised that Canada’s military participation in the Pacific would be most 
effective if it acted in close concert with the United States rather the United Kingdom, while 
United Kingdom planning was already considering a reduced role for Canadian air squadrons.62  
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A report from June 1944 weighing the benefits of Canada’s prospective contributions to the 
Southeast, North, or West Pacific theatres, argued that the United States would not likely request 
Canadian cooperation in the Pacific.63  Furthermore, an aide-mémoire from July 1944 anticipated 
that an attack by British forces from the North Pacific was unlikely to begin until spring 1946 
and not earlier than the summer of 1945.64   
 
 American gains in the Pacific in spring 1945 changed Canadian and United Kingdom 
planning; however, even in mid-June 1945 it was only hoped that the first Canadian squadrons 
would begin operating in Japan by December 1945.  On the basis of United Kingdom plans, the 
Canadian Government approved “the employment of two RCAF VLR bomber squadrons and 
three transport squadrons with the forces to be based in the Ryukyus” but the Canadian 
Government mostly remained non-committal about the specific size of its Pacific contribution.65  
The delays caused a slight strain in Canada’s relationship between the United States and United 
Kingdom in July.  During one Cabinet meeting, it was argued that Canada’s contribution by that 
point would have solely been to “maintain national prestige.”66  The rapid conclusion of the war 
in August did not eliminate the possibility for Canadian military participation in the occupation 
of Japan, but Prime Minister King rejected participation by the Canadian Army and Air Force in 
the occupation: “ We [Canada] are not prepared to furnish a brigade group for occupation or 
other special duties in the Pacific theatre as you [United Kingdom] suggest...  We now have 
considerable forces in Europe and we are not ready to undertake any further commitment of this 
nature involving either Army or Air Force units.”67  Nonetheless, Canada’s contributions to the 
war against Japan were enough to earn it an eventual seat in the Far Eastern Commission and the 
government was informed by the United Kingdom on 24 August that it was on the list of 
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countries suggested to be participants in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.  While Prime 
Minister King continued to be apprehensive about a military contribution at the time (in part 
because the United States was not aware yet of Canada’s decision not to send a contingency 
force to Japan), the government welcomed the potential for participation in the Far Eastern 
Advisory Commission since it was “a departure from the three, four or five power patterns” that 
Canada had been accustomed to during the war.68 
 
 Invitations were sent to Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the 
Philippine Commonwealth (as it was known until 1946) between 5 and 6 October to participate 
in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, while India was invited on 25 October.69  Canada 
received its invitation on 8 October and Prime Minster King and the Cabinet approved Canada’s 
participation by 10 October.  Lester B. Pearson, Canada’s Ambassador to the United States, was 
already in Washington where the Far Eastern Advisory Commission was set to meet, and was 
selected to be Canada’s representative.  The Canadian Government had received updates on 
FEAC developments by the United Kingdom and was forwarded a summary of the instructions 
sent to the United Kingdom representative prior to the Far Eastern Advisory Commission’s first 
meeting on 30 October.70  The instructions stressed the need for the United Kingdom 
representative to press for increasing the authority of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission and 
to attempt to gain Soviet Union inclusion into FEAC.  The instructions also directed the United 
Kingdom representative to maintain close contact with other Commonwealth members, and 
recognized that the United Kingdom and the Untied States were likely to share similar positions 
on economic matters such as reparations, the nature and direction of foreign trade, Japan’s 
industrial and financial organization, and relief supplies for Japan.  Pearson was issued his own 
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set of instructions on 27 October that outlined the guiding principles for Canada’s participation 
in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, and in a separate message also sent on 27 October, 
Pearson was provided further instructions developed in response to those of the United Kingdom.   
 
 The initial instructions sent to Pearson were refined in the following weeks and proved to 
be enduring guidelines for Canada’s later participation in the Far Eastern Commission.  Because 
of Canada’s minimal contribution to the war against Japan and because Canada’s political and 
economic interests were seen as a “good deal less extensive than those of the United Kingdom,” 
Pearson was instructed not to take the initiative in bringing forward proposals during the early 
sessions, but also not to hesitate to “make clear Canadian interests and concerns.”71  Pearson was 
instructed to support the Initial Post-Surrender Policy since the Canadian Government regarded 
the United States’ singular military control as advantageous compared to the situation in 
Germany at the time.72  The Canadian Government regarded American cooperation with other 
Allied countries including the Soviet Union as advantageous for both Canada and the United 
States.73  To this end, Canada supported amendments that would strengthen the Far Eastern 
Advisory Commission’s ability to recommend and pass policy directives to SCAP.  However, 
the Canadian Government was anxious to “[avoid] any appearance that the representatives of the 
British Commonwealth countries on the Commission constitute a bloc.”74  This became a 
reoccurring issue for the Canadian Government after the formation of the Far Eastern 
Commission, and Canada’s representatives were duly instructed in many instances to avoid the 




 Between 30 October and 21 December, the Far Eastern Advisory Commission met ten 
times, carried out organizational duties, and considered its basic policies and objectives.75  
General Frank R. McCoy from the United States was selected as the Chairman, and Dr. Herbert 
V. Evatt, the Australian Minister of External Affairs, was selected as the Vice-Chairman.  Six 
working committees were created to study the following topics: Committee 1, Basic Policies and 
Objectives; Committee 2, Economic Problems and Reparations; Committee 3, Strengthening of 
Democratic Processes; Committee 4, Constitutional Reform; Committee 5, War Criminals; 
Committee 6, Aliens in Japan.  In late November, plans were developed to send the Far Eastern 
Advisory Commission to Tokyo in December on a fact-finding mission.  Such a mission was 
advantageous for Canada because the government was lacking first-hand information directly 
from Japan aside from limited reports from the United Kingdom and from E. H. Norman.76  Due 
to Pearson’s duties as Ambassador, and because Hugh Keenleyside, who had worked at the 
Legation prior to the war, was busy with his duties as the Canadian Ambassador to Mexico, it 
was decided that Norman, who was already in Tokyo working for SCAP, would join the 
Commission in Japan and return to Canada after the FEAC tour of Japan was completed.  On 26 
December, the same day that the Foreign Ministers in Moscow agreed to establish the Far 
Eastern Commission, the Far Eastern Advisory Commission members began their fact-finding 
mission to Tokyo.  Pearson relayed Canada’s invitation to join the Far Eastern Commission and 
the new terms of reference on 29 December.  Prime Minister King formally accepted the 
invitation on 3 January 1946 and announced that Pearson would represent Canada in the Far 











Early Decisions, 1946-1947:  




1  SCAP and the B!eki-ch!, 1946: The Government-to-Government Trade Period 
 Japan’s economy lay in ruins at the end of the war and the country faced severe 
challenges as it began the process of rebuilding its international trade.  SCAP calculated in 1946 
that Japan had “lost one-third of its total wealth and from one-third to one-half of its total 
potential income.”77  Furthermore, Japan lost 45 percent of its prewar territorial possessions, 
notably those in China and Korea, along with access to the resources and income generated by 
trade (and coercion) from those territories.78  World War II had caused a global shortage of raw 
materials and commodities, consequently Japan could not just simply rely on other sources.  
Japan’s coal supply had been devastated by the loss of imports from its former colonial 
possessions and domestic production was in dire condition.  Industrial production had 
plummeted to 10 percent of the prewar 1930-1934 level while inflation went unchecked.  
Illustrating the rapid rate of inflation, Chalmers Johnson writes, “If we take the price level of 
August 1945 to be 100, then the level rose to 348.6 in September, to 584.9 in December, and to 
1184.5 the following March.”79  The war had also taken a tremendous toll on Japan’s population, 
further contributing to the difficult process of economic recovery.  Millions of Japanese had died 
or were injured during the war, its major cities were burned out and most factories virtually 
destroyed by Allied bombing, and millions of other Japanese citizens were stranded in the former 
colonial territories.80  Establishing Japan’s international trade was a necessity in order for the 
country to recover economically, but SCAP’s priority in 1945 and 1946 was to change the 
country’s ideological propensity towards war while eliminating Japan’s material and economic 
means to wage war.  Inflation, lack of raw materials, low industrial capacity and production, and 
the uncertainty caused by looming reparations removals were problems that plagued Japan’s 
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economic recovery and ability to conduct trade until 1950.  The task ahead of SCAP, the Far 
Eastern Commission, and the Japanese Government to rebuild Japan was immense. 
 
 From the outset of the Occupation, it was expected that Japan would eventually 
participate in international trade.  The Potsdam Declaration, Initial Post-Surrender Policy and, 
later in November 1945, the Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive were the principle documents 
that guided SCAP, the Far Eastern Commission and the Japanese Government’s policies for the 
redevelopment of Japan’s economy and trade.  The Potsdam Declaration provided the basic 
framework for the shape of Japan’s postwar economy: 
 Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and 
 permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to 
 re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials 
 shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be 
 permitted.81 
 
The Initial Post-Surrender Policy built upon the Potsdam Declaration and outlined Japan’s 
postwar economic structure.  The document blamed Japan for its own economic ruin and 
declared that “the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage” but Japan’s 
authorities were called upon to “facilitate the restoration of [the] Japanese economy so that the 
reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied.”  The Initial Post-Surrender 
Policy’s subsection on international trade and financial relations detailed the sorts of control 
Japan’s trade would be subject to.  SCAP’s authority extended to all economic matters including 
control over all Japanese imports, exports, foreign exchange and financial transactions.  Exports 
were to be used to pay for approved imports, and foreign purchasing power was to be used only 
for essential needs.  The purchase of raw materials from foreign countries was permitted 
although certain materials were restricted.  While SCAP had the final say in all matters, the 
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Japanese Government was permitted to establish and administer control “over economic 
activities, including essential national public services, finance, banking, and production and 
distribution of essential commodities...”  The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive elaborated 
on the economic provisions of the Initial Post-Surrender Policy, providing greater detail about 
economic controls, reparations, and called upon the Japanese Government to curb rampant 
inflation.  Two provisions of the Directive, however, created a slight inconsistency between 
SCAP’s mandate and American policies.82  The two relevant passages read: 
 Your supreme authority as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan will 
 extend to all matters in the economic sphere. In the exercise of that authority, to the 
 extent that the accomplishment of your objectives permits.  In the exercise of that  
 authority, to the extent that the accomplishment of your objectives permits, you will use  
 the services of the Emperor and the machinery of the Japanese Government to  




 You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the 
 strengthening of the Japanese economy. You will make it clear to the Japanese people 
 that... You assume no obligations to maintain, or have maintained, any particular standard 
 of living in Japan.”83   
 
Consequently, SCAP did not actively attempt to rehabilitate Japan’s economy until 1948 and left 
intact much of the existing bureaucracy.  In turn, the Japanese Government was assured an active 
role helping to rebuild the country’s economy rather than being a vessel to simply carry out 
dictates from SCAP. 
 
 Government-to-government trade was the sole type of international trade conducted by 
Japan until the resumption of limited private trade in 1947.  At the level of trade conduct and 
oversight, two developments during this period had lasting effects for Japan’s international trade 
throughout the Occupation: the systems of economic control SCAP devised, and the creation of 
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the Japanese Government’s agencies responsible for trade and economic planning.  A lesser 
development was the Far Eastern Commission’s approval to establish the Inter-Allied Trade 
Board (IATB) on 10 October 1946.  The IATB was set up “to make recommendations to the 
United States on questions concerning 1) the disposition of commodities available for export 
from Japan, 2) the sources from which commodities were to be imported into Japan, and 3) 
general facilitation of Japanese exports and imports.”84  The IATB’s primary contribution was its 
recommendations in 1947 concerning the allocation of quotas for the 400 businessmen to 
initially be allowed into Japan once private trade was resumed.85  By 1949, Canada’s Department 
of Trade and Commerce had dismissed the relevance of the Inter-Allied Trade Board.  “In an 
effort to circumvent the deadlock in the Far Eastern Commission, the Inter-Allied Trade was 
formed, but this has not achieved much in promoting recovery of Japan’s foreign trade.”86 
 
 The Japanese Government’s ministry with the foremost responsibility for Japan’s 
economy, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI), was one of the more powerful 
bureaucracies that emerged in the aftermath of the war, having been reborn in August 1945 from 
its brief but towering existence as the Ministry of Munitions.  Because the Japanese Government 
was responsible for oversight of its domestic economy, both SCAP and MCI recognized the need 
to shift control of wages, prices, and the allocation of rations and distribution of commodities to 
the government.87  To fill this need, the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB; Keizai Antei 
Honbu) was created on 12 August 1946 as “a policy planning and coordination organ” for 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry.88  The ESB was responsible for some of the Japanese 
Government’s most prominent economic policies during the Occupation and SCAP ordered that 
all ministerial planning be transferred to the ESB in 1947.89 
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 While the Economic Stabilization Board was pivotal in the broader development of 
Japan’s postwar economic policies, the Board of Trade (B!eki-ch!) had the more direct impact 
on Japan’s international trade during the Occupation.  In response to an order given by SCAP on 
9 October 1945 that called on the Japanese Government to create a single agency to handle the 
flow of trade, the B!eki-ch! was created on 14 December 1945 as “the exclusive agency of the 
Imperial Japanese Government to handle all Japanese foreign trade transactions.”90  The B!eki-
ch! was an agency attached to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and while it operated 
mostly independent from MCI, it had no official policy-making capability.91  The importance of 
the B!eki-ch! cannot be overstated.  It oversaw the reorganization of the domestic trade 
associations that had operated during the first year and a half of the Occupation, into four 
governmental corporations (kodan) in 1947: the Mining and Manufacturing Goods Trading 
Kodan, Textiles Trading Kodan, Foodstuffs Trading Kodan, and Raw Materials Trading Kodan.  
Sumiya writes that the kodan were “established with total equity provided by the government to 
handle specific trading.”92  Imports and exports were subject to SCAP’s approval, but the B!eki-
ch! handled all of Japan’s imports and exports until being merged with MCI in 1949 to create 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 
 
 At the international level, the system of government-to-government trade instituted in 
1945 required that Japan use its exports to acquire desperately needed raw materials and 
commodities for Japan’s industries.  Until 1947, the B!eki-ch! was authorized to deal only with 
representatives of foreign governments (a limited group in 1946 that did not include Canada) and 
trade was handled on a consignment basis.  Imports to Japan were handled by SCAP who 
received purchased goods from the War Department and then passed these on to the B!eki-ch!; 
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the B!eki-ch! received payment for Japan’s exports only after the United States Commercial 
Company (a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation) deducted its charges.93  All 
trade was conducted solely in U.S. dollars during the government-to-government period, and 
both SCAP and the B!eki-ch! subsidized all transactions until a fixed exchange rate for the yen 
came into effect in April 1949.  Japan was reliant on the United States for the bulk of its imports 





2  Canada and Japan, 1946: The Far Eastern Commission 
 In 1946, the Canadian Government was given its first real opportunity to reengage 
politically and economically with Japan.  Of course, no official diplomatic relations existed 
between the two countries until 1952 and Japan was in the early stages of the Occupation, but 
Canada’s participation in the Far Eastern Commission and the establishment of its Liaison 
Mission in Tokyo were the first crucial steps towards the redevelopment Canada and Japan’s 
economic relationship.94  Participation in the Far Eastern Commission enabled Canada to play a 
role in shaping the future of Japan’s economic system.  At the same time, the establishment of 
the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo provided the Canadian Government a direct link for 
Canadian-Japanese business interests.  Representatives from the Department of External Affairs 
handled most of the political duties, while the Department of Trade and Commerce handled 
business affairs.  With Japanese citizens unable to travel abroad during the first years of the 
Occupation, having Canadian personnel working alongside Allied representatives in addition to 
having representatives working in Japan was favourable compared to the situation that had 
emerged in Europe. 
 
 Canada entered 1946 represented on the newly created Far Eastern Commission by its 
Ambassador to the United States, Lester B. Pearson, while Norman represented Canada in the 
Far Eastern Advisory Commission’s inspection trip from January to mid-February.95  The 
instructions given to Pearson in October 1945 for Canada’s participation in the Far Eastern 
Advisory Commission remained the guiding criterion for Canada’s participation in the Far 
Eastern Commission.  Thirteen days after the return of the former Far Eastern Advisory 
Commission’s fact-finding mission, the Far Eastern Commission held its inaugural meeting on 
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26 February 1946 in Washington at the former Japanese Embassy.  The composition of the Far 
Eastern Commission was like that of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission except for the 
addition of the Soviet Union.  At the inaugural meeting of the Far Eastern Commission, it was 
decided that FEAC documents would be renumbered as FEC documents.  General McCoy, who 
was previously selected as Chairman for FEAC, was once again elected for this task at the Far 
Eastern Commission.  In addition to the Steering Committee, seven committees were created: 
Committee 1, Reparations; Committee 2, Economic and Financial Affairs; Committee 3, 
Constitutional and Legal Reforms; Committee 4, Strengthening of Democratic Tendencies; 
Committee 5, War Criminals; Committee 6, Aliens in Japan; and Committee 7, Disarmament of 
Japan.  With Pearson’s busy schedule as the American Ambassador, Ottawa wasted no time 
putting to use the talents of its other diplomatic staff.  It was suggested on 6 March that Norman 
become temporarily attached to the Embassy in Washington as the alternate delegate in the Far 
Eastern Commission.96  Soon after this placement, Norman’s expertise was put to use acting as 
the de facto head of Committee 3, though he was originally selected to be the Deputy Chairman 
of the sub-committee.97   
 
 Canadian representatives at the Far Eastern Commission advocated for multilateral 
solutions and cooperation as best they could.  The unique position of being close to both the 
United States and the United Kingdom necessitated the Canadian Government balance its 
continental interests with its European ties all while asserting the country’s independence.  
Despite the common economic interests of Canada and the United States, the Canadian 
Government had cause to worry about excessive American hegemony affecting Canada’s long-
term economic aims.98  Similarly, while Canada agreed with the United Kingdom on a number of 
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economic matters, Canada’s representatives at the Far Eastern Commission were instructed to 
distance themselves from agreements or arrangements that had the appearance of a 
Commonwealth bloc.  Although the instructions sent to Pearson in October 1945 stated, “It is 
obvious that the strategic, political and economic interests of Canada are a good deal less 
extensive than those of the United Kingdom and we shall therefore be less likely to take the 
initiative in bringing forward proposals,” the Canadian Government certainly was concerned 
with its own economic interests in Japan.99 
  
 Pearson was supportive of the Commission’s purpose and work, and through the Far 
Eastern Commission, the Canadian Government gained insight into the relations of the other 
members’ East Asian relations and policies.  Still, the Far Eastern Commission’s ability to 
formulate policy soon ran into problems early during its work as it was evident that SCAP was 
being insulated from outside influence.  Pearson conveyed this problem on 4 June, stating that 
the United States did its best to shield SCAP from the Commission, and that decisions of the 
Commission were welcomed so long as they did not “encroach upon [the] details of [the] 
occupation administration.”100  The Commission also faced problems from the United States’ 
legalistic interpretation of policy and policy implementation.  Members approached SCAP with 
caution for fear of offending its prestige.101  Consequently, the Canadian Government was made 
aware early on for the need to pursue avenues that could help place it in favour with SCAP and 
the United States.  Pearson, though, was contented that the Commission was operating more 
smoothly than the mechanisms of control in Germany at the time, and felt that there was genuine 
room for disagreement amongst even the American members of the Commission.  As Canada’s 
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representative to the Far Eastern Commission, Pearson worked until October 1946 whereafter he 
was replaced by Humphrey Hume Wrong. 
 
 The economic issues for the Canadian Government in 1946 were Japanese reparations, 
establishing contacts in Japan through the Liaison Mission, assessing the prospects for Canadian 
companies interested in conducting business in Japan, and attempting to relax some of the 
stringent economic controls in place.  Members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission’s 
inspection trip had cited the issue of reparations as being an integral element for the revival of 
trade.102  The level of reparations was a protracted issue for the Far Eastern Commission due to 
conflicting views from the Commission’s members.  The Canadian Government did not have a 
significant stake in receiving indemnities because its contribution to the Pacific war effort was 
minimal.  The government’s Inter-Departmental Committee on Reparations shaped Ottawa’s 
attitudes towards the creation of a reparations policy for Japan.  Canada’s stance was forward-
looking, recognizing the need for reparations that would not harm Japan’s economic recovery.   
 
 In March, the United Kingdom proposed that reparations be negotiated on a political, 
rather than a statistical basis (although it was suggested that some discussion between 
Commonwealth members take place with statistical comparisons).103  The Canadian Government 
rejected this.  Although the government saw merit in the proposal, it felt that the proper 
discussions should be within the Far Eastern Commission and not a Commonwealth bloc.104  
Canada’s insistence on presenting its views separately from the United Kingdom’s repeatedly 
occurred during the Occupation.  Canadian and United Kingdom interests intersected over 
rebuilding the Japanese economy, though, with Canada agreeing that the Interim Reparations 
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Program should not impair the minimal requirements of a viable economy.105  Writing to 
Norman in order to help him prepare for a memorandum on the Far Eastern Commission, the 
First Secretary of the Embassy in the United States emphasized Canada’s priorities: 
 The main point that Canada wishes to have kept in mind is that Canada's long term 
 interest is in the peaceful economic recovery of Japan, that payments for essential imports 
 should be a first charge on Japanese industry and production, and that extraction of 
 reparations should be carefully limited to prevent the possibility of it being necessary for 
 the Allied nations to assist the Japanese financially or otherwise at a later date.106 
 
The overriding concern was returning Japan to some capacity of trade, and Canada was prepared 
to mediate differences between the United States and United Kingdom to settle the reparations 
issue in a timely fashion.107 
 
  Instructions sent to Pearson on 1 April outlined the broader Canadian views on 
reparations and advised that the first priority for reparations removal was to use them to pay for 
approved imports to help the Japanese economy.108  Additionally, it was expressed that figures of 
remittances from Japanese abroad and property owned by Japanese in Allied countries should be 
excluded from the reparations.109  Canadian claims amounted to 2 to 4 million dollars of 
Japanese assets and 9 to 11 million dollars in claims against Japan.110  While Canadian forces 
had not seen action in the Pacific other than in Hong Kong, Canada had contributed money to the 
Pacific war effort.111  Pearson stated that the Bureau of Statistics was considering the following 
in summing Canadian losses: 
 1. Mutual Aid to China, Australia, India. 
 2. Mutual Aid to U.S.S.R. after May 7th, 1945. 
 3. Commercial losses in the Far East due to the Pacific War. 
 4. Relief sent to Allied nationals in the Far East during the war. 




 The government was firm in its insistence to have a share of reparations despite its small 
contribution to the Pacific war effort, but this was posturing rather than actual concern over 
receiving indemnities.113  As the government drew up its lists of items of interest for reparations 
removals, two industries, fisheries and aluminum production, were the centre of its attentions.  
As noted in the introduction, Japan’s fishing industry was one of the most protracted issues 
during the Occupation.  On this issue, Canada was in agreement with the United States that the 
Japanese fishing industry could not be allowed to exploit supplies governed by existing laws 
between the two countries.  In August 1946, Pearson was given the following list of items the 
Canadian Government was interested in having allocated as part of its reparations share: 
 A.  Japanese equipment and methods connected with fisheries processes: 
  1.  The recovery of kelp and sea mosses particularly agars. 
  2.  Sea oyster culture. 
  3.  Utilization of fish skins. 
  4.  Utilization of whales. 
  5.  Pearl essence processes. 
  6.  Reduction of fish oils. 
  7.  Modern canning. 
 B.  Aluminum Sheet Rolling Mill. 
 C.  Aluminum Foil Mill. 
 D.  Electrolyte Caustic Soda Plant.114 
 
 
 The Department of Trade and Commerce submitted additional items that Canadian 
companies might have had an interest in, including an electric caustic soda plant with 
approximately a 12,000 ton capacity (with or without tanks or motors) for the Aluminum Co. of 
Canada, and a plant for the production of phthalic anhydride required by the Dominion Tar and 
Chemical Company.115  Trade and Commerce emphasized reparations related to aluminum and 
aluminum production as being of interest to Canada.  However, far from Pearson’s optimism 
about the progress the Reparations Committee had been making in May, the issue of reparations 
remained at a standstill towards the end of 1946.  The Secretary of State for External Affairs 
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wrote to Pearson in December, stating Canada’s agreement with the United Kingdom’s view that 
“the most urgent aspect of the reparations problem is the stabilization of the Japanese economy 
at peacetime levels.  We also feel this can be largely achieved without a complete settlement of 
the reparations question.”116  Reparations were a minor issue for Canada in 1946 and continued 
to be so in 1947.  As a matter of long-term policy, Canada was more concerned with restoring 








3  Canada in Japan, 1946: The Canadian Liaison Mission 
 The constraints of a chaotic Japanese economy still in the early phases of recovery, the 
inability for Japanese to travel abroad, American direct control over Japanese imports and 
exports, and the gap between the Far Eastern Commission and SCAP meant that trade was 
tightly controlled with little room for improvement in 1946.  In May 1946, SCAP began to 
accept representation in Japan from governments “neither neutral or participants.”117  The first 
plans for a Canadian mission in Japan, though, were linked to the October 1945 Privy Council 
decision to set up a Canadian military mission in the areas of Germany occupied by the United 
Kingdom.  The military mission in Germany was created to maintain Canadian military and civil 
interests, and act as an interim liaison within the British zone.118  Towards the end of the year, 
the Department of National Defence began sending enquiries to SCAP to take part in the 
technical research missions.  Emphasizing the ongoing nature of technical investigations being 
carried out by the United States and responding to the possibility of Canadian participation, 
Colonel W. S. Wood from SCAP’s Intelligence Division sent a letter on 3 December 1945 to 
Colonel Omond McKillop Solandt, Director of Research for Canada’s National Defence.  In it, 
Colonel Wood stated that Japan had made notable developments “in only a very few phases of 
scientific and economics,” notably: fisheries, forest products, meteorology, ionosphere research, 
magnetic research, a few special lines in medicine, and magnetron theory.119  Colonel Wood 
went on to state that Washington would eventually be releasing full reports, and suggested that 
Canadian personnel could perhaps work under the section of SCAP handling the 




 Canadian interest for participating in investigations of Japanese scientific and technical 
developments gained traction in late January 1946.  Japanese fisheries were highlighted by 
Colonel Solandt as being of interest to the Canadian investigators, while forestry and geology 
were seen as less important; textiles, metallurgy and paper were not seen as being of any 
interest.121  Support for sending a representative to investigate Japanese fisheries also came from 
the Departments of External Affairs, Trade and Commerce, and Reconstruction.  The informal 
invitation to Colonel Solandt in December was forwarded by Major Maskell, of the National 
Defence’s Joint Committee on Enemy Science and Technology (JCEST), to the Department of 
External Affairs’s JCEST representative on 23 January 1946.  In turn, the discussion about a 
potential military mission was forwarded to Major General Harry Farnham Germaine Leston of 
the Canadian Army Staff in Washington.122  Based on contact with the United States War 
Department, Major General Leston recommended that, in order to “prevent friction with USWD” 
and expedite any requests, the Canadian Army Staff use its contacts with G-2 and have ready 
information about: the number of people planning to go to Japan; whether they would be in 
uniforms or not (emphasizing that they should be uniformed); what the objective of the visit 
would be; what was the intended use of the information by the Canadian Government; and the 
date of availability for investigators along with the duration of their stay.123   
 
 While Major Maskell used his contacts within the Canadian Joint Technical Mission in 
Washington as part of the effort to secure an invitation for Canadian representation on scientific 
and technical missions, the matter was being taken up by the Department of External Affairs and 
Department of Trade and Commerce.124  G. R. Heasman, Director of the Trade Commissioner 
Service, part of the Department of Trade and Commerce, wondered whether there was something 
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to learn “regarding floating canneries, oyster culture, the use of waste material, etc.”125  External 
Affairs and Trade and Commerce awaited the return of Dr. Finn, Deputy Minister of Fisheries, to 
Ottawa from Vancouver before proceeding any further in early February.126  Upon meeting with 
Dr. Finn, it was decided that Dr. Neil N. Carter, Director of the Fish Experimental Station at 
Vancouver, would be asked to be sent to study the Japanese fishing industry, specifically, 
“processing methods, fishing craft and gear, organization of the industry, education of fishermen 
and, especially, fisheries research.”127 
 
 Specific policies regarding the arrangement for the participation of Allied missions in 
Japan had not entirely been finalized by SCAP by February 1946.  While some discussion had 
taken place during the Far Eastern Advisory Commission’s trip in January and early February, 
the Far Eastern Commission had not taken up the subject formally.128  Prior missions, such as the 
Australian Scientific Mission, had been ad-hoc, while other observers, such as those from the 
United Kingdom, India and China who were partaking in a textile mission at the time by 
invitation of the State Department, had been sent as part of various United States missions 
through invitation or special permission.129  Similar to the ad-hoc nature of other missions in 
early 1946, Canadian efforts to prepare and take part in technical and commercial missions were 
not coordinated.  By early March, the possibility of sending Canadian investigators to Japan was 
unlikely due to the “undoubtedly civilian status of investigators” and because of new restrictions 
imposed by SCAP.130  The Army’s response to the problem of civilian investigators highlighted 
the fact that Colonel Wood’s original letter had cited fisheries at the top of the list of notable 
Japanese developments and countered the problem of civilian investigators with “...Canada is 
unlikely to find experts in fisheries in the Armed Forces.”131  The plans by the Department of 
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Fisheries to send a representative continued, but the emphasis shifted towards the plans for a 
civilian, rather than scientific or technical, mission that had been developing at the same time. 
 
 Concerted discussion had been underway since at least January 1946 about Canada’s 
economic representation in Japan.  The Department of External Affairs had already sent various 
documents to the Department of Trade of Commerce about the “machinery for controlling 
imports and exports.”132  Although fisheries was important to the Department of Trade and 
Commerce, Canada’s broader economic interests also required attention.  Colonel Lawrence 
Moore Cosgrave, Canada’s signatory to the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, was stationed in 
Tokyo and wrote to Heasman on 17 January 1946, urging Trade and Commerce to send a trade 
commissioner to Japan.133  This telegram was the nucleus behind the inter-departmental 
conversation about Canadian economic representation in Japan.  The telegram, which reached 
Heasman on 28 January, was the subject of a phone conversation between Heasman and G. S. 
Patterson, from the Department of External Affairs, on 2 February that resulted in Patterson 
sending Heasman a summary of Japan’s economic conditions, on 7 February.  Patterson stated 
that the purchase of commodities would be “impractical” without Canadian representatives in 
Japan.134  The summary begins with a brief outline of parts from the United States Post-
Surrender Policy for Japan concerning Japan’s international trade and financial relations.135  
Patterson then lists the functions of SCAP’s Economic and Scientific Section, and included 
critiques from New Zealand and the United Kingdom in 1945.  The summary also includes 
points about the United Kingdom’s representation in Japan and refers to the participation of 
Britain, India and China on the textile mission in early 1946.136  Importantly, the summary 
highlighted the degree of control SCAP had over all Japanese imports and exports, and that 
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Japanese authorities were supposed to provide foreign organizations equal opportunity in trade.  
Furthermore, it notes that the United Kingdom had added “political, financial and other technical 
experts to the existing British staff” at the end of November 1945.137  This point underscored 
Colonel Cosgrave’s letter—which Heasman would have had read—that warned Canada was 
significantly behind other countries in economic representation.  “All other British countries 
except South Africa strongly represented both political and economically while believe India 
considering despatch of Trade Commissioner.”138  Even though certain countries had economic 
representatives in Japan, Japanese nationals were prevented from engaging in direct commercial 
contact for reasons of security.  Economic representation in Japan was allowed for the 
arrangement to purchase or ship commodities by working with, or serving on the staff of SCAP, 
while trade ultimately was conducted through the United States Commercial Company.139 
 
 Norman, who had returned from the Far Eastern Advisory Commission’s inspection trip 
in mid-February, favoured a small liaison mission with a political and economic representative, 
while Heasman and R. M. Macdonnell awaited Colonel Cosgrave for further input.140  Patterson 
provided a memorandum on 21 February outlining what services a mission should provide, but it 
was not until April, after the plans for a technical mission had fallen through, that the 
government finally settled on a civilian liaison mission.141  On 2 April, Pearson reported about 
unofficial talks in Washington between Norman and State Department officials about a potential 
liaison mission.  Pearson relayed information outlining the status of various missions operating 
in Japan, and provided suggestions for a possible Canadian mission.  With the exception of the 
French who had their own consular office, most diplomats were attached to their respective 
military missions.  It was suggested that Canada take a similar approach and name an officer 
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from External Affairs to be the political and diplomatic representative.142  Alternate proposals to 
this included appointing a member of the Department of External Affairs as a consular official, 
or attaching officers from the Departments of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce to the 
staff of the Commonwealth forces, though both of these options were seen as restrictive 
compared to the suggestion of a military mission.143  Ottawa, however, preferred a civilian 
liaison mission and kept the military mission as an alternative plan; the other two plans were 
dismissed.144  As requested by Pearson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs 
provided a tentative “deadline” of 15 May for Washington to act on enquiries about a Canadian 
mission.145  On 9 May, when SCAP agreed to accept representation from governments that were 
neither “neutral or participants,” Canada was essentially cleared for a civilian liaison mission.  
Patterson wrote to Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, on 10 
May saying “It now seems clear a civilian liaison Mission will be accepted,” and on 14 May, 
Norman wrote that Ottawa had confirmed a Canadian Mission.146  It was not until 20 May that 
General MacArthur acquiesced, having “grudgingly agreed that a Canadian representative might 
go to Tokyo.”147   
 
 When the Canadian Government drew up its list of potential representatives for the 
Liaison Mission, Norman was tapped to be the Head of the Mission.148  This original list was an 
attempt to draw talent from individuals who had experience with Japan and who could best help 
Canada form closer relations with SCAP.  Norman’s work for SCAP and close relationship with 
General McArthur, in addition to his extensive historical knowledge about Japan, made him the 
ideal candidate to be Head of the Mission.  Lieutenant Colonel A. P. Mackenzie was suggested 
for the Military Attaché position due to his knowledge of Japan, intimacy with the Japanese 
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language, and ability to provide both military and political insight for External Affairs.149  The 
original list also called for one to two Commercial Secretaries and clerical staff.  However, in 
giving consent to a Canadian Mission, General MacArthur only approved of Norman, as Head of 
the Mission, an economic attaché, and “two female stenographers.”150  J. E. Kenderdine was 
nominated by the Department of Trade and Commerce to be the Economic Attaché, but before 
his departure, the Department of Trade specified that Kenderdine was being sent to Japan as a 
“Special Representative of [the] Department” and not as a Trade Commissioner or Trade 
Representative.151  Freda Guthrie Roxborough and Lorne Henry Berlet were selected as the two 
stenographers.152 
   
 An Order-in-Council was passed on 9 July that authorized the opening of a Canadian 
Liaison Mission in Japan and outlined the purposes of the Mission: 
 (a) assume protection of Canadian interests in Japan; 
 (b) render services as required to Canadians resident in Japan; 
 (c) seek recognition and protection for Canadian property titles; 
 (d) deal with problems of Allied Nationals and others who may be seeking entry to 
 Canada; 
 (e) report on political, economic, and cultural developments in Japan; 
 (f) recommend policies affecting future Canadian trade; 
 (g) cooperate with such representatives as the Canadian Government may wish to send to 
 Japan from time to time.153 
 
Further instructions to Norman specified for him to thank the United Kingdom Liaison Mission 
for looking after Canadian interests, “establish cordial relations with the British member of the 
Allied Council for Japan,” “establish and maintain cooperative relations with representatives of 
all the United Nations in Japan,” and to maintain an air of independence from British or 
American influence while working to strengthen mutual cooperation between the United 
Kingdom, United States and Soviet Union.154  Other directions included for Norman to visit 
 
59 
Canadians living in Japan who would likely be unaware of the Liaison Mission and its services, 
draw up a list of names and addresses of Canadians in Japan, and report on their living 
conditions.155   
 
 Clearance for the five members of the Canadian Mission was granted by 18 July, and 
after the arrival of Norman, the Mission began its operations in August.  The members of the 
Canadian Mission were not the only Canadians billeted in Japan.  Canada’s representative on the 
International Tribunal, Justice McDougall, Lieutenant Colonel O. Orr, and Captain John D. C. 
Boland were billeted with the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF).  Dr. Cartier 
from the Department of Fisheries was billeted in the U.S. Army lodgings, and Brigadier H. G. 
Nolan and Colonel T. Moss were at the Legation.156  Conditions at the Legation were cramped 
because the BCOF was still using the building and there was only room for Norman and 
Kenderdine at first; the other three members of the Canada’s delegation had to billet with the 
BCOF four miles away.  Norman also expressed the need for another car because he and 
Kenderdine would be “going our own ways” due to their respective duties.157  Norman 
concluded his initial summary by stating the situation was more difficult than he was able to 
express.158 
 
 Part of the reason for the cramped conditions at the Legation was because of a 
misunderstanding in May between Norman, Brigadier General H. E. Eastwood, the Swiss 
Government, and SCAP.159  With permission from the Canadian Government, Norman had 
allowed the Legation to be temporarily used for the billeting of Allied personnel with the 
understanding that Canadians would receive priority for billeting at the Legation.  When Canada 
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requested to use the building, SCAP refused and stated that it was being completely used by the 
British Commonwealth members of the International Prosecution Section, and the British 
member of the Allied Council.  At the end of May, Brigadier General Eastwood was in 
Washington and helped resolve the matter.  However, Norman had to clear up further 
misunderstandings after his arrival at the Legation as he attempted to gain billeting space for his 
and Kenderdine’s wives, respectively. 
 
 The Liaison Mission’s staff grew with the later addition of J. J. McCardle, a graduate in 
Modern History from the University of Toronto and a graduate of the Canadian Army Japanese 
Language School.160  McCardle was assigned as a probationary Japanese Language Officer to the 
Mission, and Norman, who was swamped with work, welcomed McCardle’s arrival.  Much of 
Norman’s early work was spent interviewing individuals, particularly nisei who were looking to 
return to Canada, and he requested that McCardle study legal material concerning the 
repatriation of nisei.161  Unfortunately, the records obtained for this study only provide insight 
from Norman about the Mission’s activities in late 1946, but Norman did indicate that 
Kenderdine was also having a difficult time in late 1946.  From Norman’s correspondence, the 
Canadian Liaison Mission was overloaded with work in 1946 and still in a period of organization 
towards the end of the year. 
 
 There were Canadian exports to Japan in 1946 but the records obtained for this study do 
not indicate what channels these were delivered through.  Langdon’s study provides a value of 
$1,027,000 for Canadian exports to Japan in 1946 and the figures provided by G. S. Hall in 
Appendix 1 indicate that Canadian exports to Japan for 1946 consisted of 1 car, 8 gallons of 
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whiskey, 10 pounds of cigars, 10 pounds of cigarettes, 40,000 CWT (hundredweight) of 
ammonium sulphate and 354,767 CWT of manufactured fertilizers.  These exports would likely 
have been delivered through one of the Allied trade boards and at the specific request of the 
United States.  Moreover, a memorandum for the Economic Division dated 14 June 1946 states 
that “the machinery for handling Japanese external trade has not yet been established since, as 
you know, agreement has not been reached in the Far Eastern Commission on the terms of 
reference for the proposed Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan.”162  The memorandum also states 
that there was interest from the Sun Life Assurance Company and the Aluminium Secretariat 




4  The United States and Japan, 1947: Limited Private Trade 
 Government-to-government trade was never intended to be a long-term substitute for 
Japan’s regular trade.  Reopening Japan to limited private trade was politically expedient and an 
economic necessity for the United States in 1947 as Occupation costs were tremendous and 
Japan’s economy was only beginning to recover slightly from the dire conditions of the previous 
two years.163  Up until 1 July 1947, Japan’s total government-to-government imports had 
amounted to $500,000,000, with the United States being the largest supplier of imported goods— 
and those mostly consisted of “food, medical supplies, petroleum products, and fertilizer brought 
to Japan to prevent disease and unrest.”164  Exports from Japan totalled only $200,000,000 up to 
1 July 1947.165  Writing to President Truman on 19 June 1947, George C. Atcheson stated: 
 Whether we like it or not, Japan is at present an economic responsibility of the United 
 States and it is to our interest to assist in the process of getting the country on at least a 
 minimum self-supporting basis.  The partial reopening of Japan to private trade on 
 August 15 will start a process which should be productive of good results in due course. 
 
 ... After 21 months of occupation, industry has now inched its way toward recovery only 
 some 30 per cent of the 1930-1934 level.  Lack of coal limits all industrial output 
 including manufacture of needed coal-mining machinery.  The rayon industry has come 
 almost to a standstill.  Cotton yarn output is about five per cent of 1937.  Silk is only one- 
 sixth pre-war and exports meet with poor sales because of the competition of 
 synthetics.166 
 
In September, after private trade was reopened, William J. Sebald, the United States’ Acting 
Political Adviser in Japan, further clarified the need for the resumption of limited private trade to 
the Allied Council, reasoning that: 
 With a population of over 70,000,000 living on the small arable area afforded by the four 
 main islands, and with relatively meagre natural resources, Japan maintained herself in 
 large part by importing raw materials, processing them, and exporting the finished 
 products in exchange for food and additional raw materials. 
  
 It has therefore been clear, from the beginning of the occupation, that a revived Japanese 
 foreign trade is an indispensable prerequisite to the reconstruction of a stable economy 
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 which will strengthen democratic institutions and enable the Japanese to support 
 themselves peaceably by their own efforts.167  
 
 
 SCAP, the Far Eastern Commission and the Inter-Allied Trade Board collectively worked 
towards reopening Japan to private trade.  On 23 January 1947 the Far Eastern Commission 
approved the policy paper “Determination of the Peaceful Needs of Japan” (FEC 106/1) which 
stated that the standard of living for Japanese persons by 1950 should be set at prevailing levels 
of 1930-1934.168  The progress of Japan’s industrial recovery up to that point had already been 
measured against the 1930-1934 levels.  One of the first steps towards resuming private trade 
was taken in January 1947 when SCAP allowed “international correspondence of a non-
transactional nature with private Japanese citizens.”169  The Far Eastern Commission passed two 
further policy papers on Japanese trade—“Destination of Japanese Exports” on 8 May and 
“Interim Import-Export Policies for Japan” on 24 July—that ensured “the criterion of pre-war 
patterns of trade ... be taken into account in any control measures which might apply.”170  
Stockpiles of Japan’s industrial raw materials had already been used to obtain foreign credit 
balances during the government-to-government trade period, but to enhance Japan’s foreign 
credit, SCAP created the Occupied Japan Export-Import Revolving Fund (OJEIRF) on 14 
August 1947.  OJEIRF opened up Japan’s gold and silver supply, held by SCAP and valued at 
$137,000,000, to provide additional collateral for bank credit for self-liquidating projects.171  It 
was hoped that this would generate up to $500,000,000 in loans.172  Finally, in June 1947, 
members of the Inter-Allied Trade Board approved recommendations that set the period of stay 
allowed by entry permits for businessmen going to Japan at 21 days, and additionally, suggested 




 On 22 July 1947 the United States sent a memo to diplomatic and consular offices 
announcing the reopening of limited private commercial relations with Japan was set to begin on 
15 August 1947.  The memo prepared countries for how trade would be conducted, and provided 
details specifically about: quotas and entry permits; accommodations and services; and pricing, 
payment, and other business arrangements.”174  Private trade was a cumbersome process 
complicated by geography and strict regulations.  Trade was conducted either within or from 
Japan: the B!eki-ch! would oversee all private contracts under the auspices of SCAP; 
information on United States customs and tariffs would be supplied from Tokyo; offers for 
tenders on contracts were sent from Japan; and governments with Missions in Japan were urged 
maintain close ties with SCAP for information.175  Of the 400 trade representatives allowed 
during the initial stage, the IATB allocated Canada a quota of only 8.176  The quotas for the 
United States was 102; United Kingdom and its colonies 64; China 64; the Netherlands and its 
colonies 27; India 39; Australia 23; and France and its colonies 16.177  Only the Soviet Union, 
Philippines, New Zealand, and non-FEC members were provided less.  Interested parties whose 
governments were members of the Far Eastern Commission first had to apply to their own 
respective governments who would then requests for entry permits to SCAP.  Initially, four 
categories of entrants were allowed: 
 (1) Private trade representatives, or those engaged in buying or selling on behalf of 
 private firms. 
 (2) Service representatives, or those engaged in shipping, insurance, banking, and other 
 commercial services necessary to facilitate private trade. 
 (3) Investment representatives, or those wishing to make private capital   
 investments or resume pre-war business in Japan, who [were] permitted to enter at a later 
 date. 
 (4) Government trade representatives, who have already been participating in 




Business representatives with interests concerning banking, shipping, and insurance did not 
count against quotas although there were fewer of these sort of representatives than those who 
entered under the quotas.  States that were not members of the Commission or did not yet have a 
Mission set up yet in Tokyo could apply to SCAP.  As per the IATB’s recommendations, entry 
permits were granted for 21 days but could be extended upon approval.   
 
 Payments were to be made into a trust fund account, and the memo stated that SCAP was 
guided by a FEC directive specifying payment for Japanese exports could be made in currencies: 
 a) Freely convertible into currencies which can be used for purposes of procuring 
 necessary imports. 
 b) Inconvertible, but usable to pay for imports already or concurrently purchased, but not 
 paid for. 
 c) Inconvertible but stable in value and subject to specific agreement with areas within 
 which the currency is valid subject to the condition that excess balances of the currency 
 in question arising from sale of Japanese exports, not usable for purchase of imports 
 within a reasonable time period, will be made convertible into dollars.179 
 
Prices were established in U.S. dollars by SCAP in consultation with the B!eki-ch! to “bring a 
fair return for value,” and based on factors such as international market prices, competitive 
bidding, or “when no such prices [for items] exist, pre-war prices, adjusted by the change in 
dollar price index for the commodity group in which the merchandise falls, [were] used.”180  
Traders could negotiate all matters such as prices and contract terms with the B!eki-ch! and 
Japanese producers, but negotiations were complicated since there was no fixed exchange rate 
for the yen.181  In lieu of a fixed exchange rate, prices were quoted in U.S. dollars, freight on 
board, and buyers of Japanese imports had to produce an irrevocable letter of credit in favour of 





specifically by the B!eki-ch!; SCAP merely approved and validated transactions but was not a 
party to them.182  Six sales contracts were formed: 
 (a) Form JX Con 1 provide[d] for general inspection of merchandise in Japan by buyer’s 
 inspector, or by the B!eki-ch! if no inspector [was] appointed, and require[d] an 
 inspection certificate to be provided as to the quantity and condition. 
 (b) Form JX Con 2 provide[d] for the sale of merchandise of an “as is” basis, and [did] 
 not require [the] seller to furnish [an] inspection certificate. 
 (c) Form JX Con 3 provide[d] for the sale of merchandise on the basis of stated brand 
 name without further warranty as to quality, grade or condition.  No inspection certificate 
 [was] required. 
 (d) Form JX Con 4 provide[d] for the buyer to specify recognized inspection agencies, 
 such as laboratories, authoritative organizations, and Japanese Government, for silk.  
 Inspection certification [was] required, which [was] final as to quality. 
 (e)  Form JX Con 5 cover[ed] sales of classes of commodities requiring preliminary 
 determinations of content of merchandise by seller.  Adjustments [were] to be made after 
 analysis at destination.  Seller’s certificate of preliminary determination of content [was] 
 required.  An example of this is class [was] the vitamin group. 
 (f) Form JX Con 6 cover[ed] the sale of merchandise subject to Pure Food and Drug 
 Administration Inspection, on a “no pass, no sale, no replacement” basis, and provide[d] 
 for refund of invoice value of items not passing inspection.  Seller’s inspection certificate 
 [was] also required.183 
 
In practice, SCAP maintained thorough oversight since it issued import licenses and controlled 
the foreign exchange available to cover imports.  Only the most urgent requirements needed for 
import to Japan, such as raw materials for the Japanese industry, “commodities for the basic 
minimum economy, [and] for the prevention of disease and unrest” were permitted for import; 
SCAP was not willing to make foreign exchange for consumer goods.184  Raw materials were 
subject to hefty restrictions despite the necessity and demand for these materials. 
 
 With respect to the United States’ long-term policy objectives, SWNCC clarified these on 
12 August 1947 just prior to the resumption of Japan’s private trade.  General McCoy was 
instructed to press for the approval of SWNCC’s policy statement “United States Policy with 
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respect to the Restoration of Private Trade with Japan” at the Far Eastern Commission.  The 
statement contained three long-term objectives for the reopening Japan to private trade: 
 1.  To foster the development of conditions in Japan which will contribute to the 
 expansion and balanced growth of international private trade. 
 2.  To promote the reduction of trade barriers and the progressive elimination of all forms 
 of discriminatory treatment in international commerce. 
 3.  To encourage an increase in Japanese exports, compatible with occupational 
 objectives, in order that these exports may, as soon as possible, pay for the imports 
 required for the prevention of disease and unrest in Japan, and the reestablishment of a 
 self-sustaining Japanese economy; and, in order that Japan may provide goods required 
 throughout the world—particularly in areas which have suffered as a result of Japanese 
 aggression.185 
 
Reopening Japan to limited private trade was imperative to restoring its normal foreign trade, but 
many of the same obstacles that hampered trade during the government-to-government period 
remained.  The foremost problems were: the slow recovery of Japan’s domestic economy and 
production due to the disruption caused by the war; limited access to raw materials needed by 
Japan’s industrial production; limited credit to pay for imports; currency fluctuations, inflation, 
and the lack of a fixed exchange rate; and, finally, restricted trade with states in Asia due to 
“unstable political circumstances” in the region.186  The use of multiple exchange rates in lieu of 
a fixed exchange rate had a negative impact during the first two years of limited private trade, 
contributed to the rising inflation, and slowed the rate of production.187  At the same time, 
Japanese imports and exports were effectively subsidized: import prices were set below domestic 
levels and export prices set to guarantee exporters a profit.188  Imports of raw materials were 
prioritized and comprised the bulk of exports to Japan during the Occupation.  In the initial phase 
of private trading, the raw materials needed most by Japan were wool, rayon, pulp, dye stuffs, 
jute, coal, coking coal, iron ore, salt, iron, caustic soda, tinplate, fats and oils, hides and skins, 
and tanning materials.189  
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5  Canada and Japan, 1947: The Canberra Conference 
 The resumption of private trade in August was a major step towards normalizing the 
Japanese market, but private trade was still limited, Japan’s industry and the economy as a whole 
were still in disarray, and a peace conference proper did not have a set date.  On 12 March 
President Truman announced to Congress a shift in American policy that came to be known as 
the “Truman Doctrine.”  Five days later, General MacArthur proposed at a press conference that 
a peace treaty with Japan should be concluded within one year.  MacArthur’s announcement, 
coupled with the intensification of the Cold War as underscored by the Truman Doctrine, 
presented new challenges for officials in Washington and Tokyo, with ramifications that 
extended to the Far Eastern Commission.190   The Inter-Allied Trade Board became less 
important in policy formulation after private trade began in August.  With the resumption of 
limited private trade, Canadian trade interests were advanced mostly by the Department of Trade 
and Commerce through the Canadian Liaison Mission, while the Canadian delegation to the Far 
Eastern Commission was left working on broader political and economic policies.  Canada 
advocated for the continued liberalization of Japan’s economy and assumed a mediating role in 
discussion about reparations, but the extent of Canada’s influence over economic policy at the 
Commission was minimal.  The Department of External Affairs focused its attention on the 
economic provisions of a potential peace treaty with Japan. 
 
 Reparations had been a low priority for the Canadian Government in 1946, but 
formulating policy on the reparations issue was a major obstacle at the Far Eastern Commission.  
Despite submitting a very minor claim for reparations shares, Canada’s delegation operated 
under the expectation that the country would receive a share in the final settlement and wanted to 
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avoid statements or agreements that would have hindered any future claims.191  In September 
1946, SCAP invited Allied Powers to put together five men teams under the control of SCAP to 
provide industrial surveys concerning restitution and reparations.  Only one Canadian firm, 
Aluminum Limited of Montreal, had expressed interest in being a part of Canada’s team by 
January 1947.192  Prior to the war, the Sun Life Assurance Company of Montreal, Manufacturers 
Life Insurance Company of Toronto, and Aluminium Limited of Montreal, held “the great 
majority of Canadian assets in Japan.”193  The Sun Life Assurance Company and Manufacturers 
Life Assurance Company had been in touch with the Canadian Government since mid-1946 
about their respective interests in Japan.  When the Canadian Government established its survey 
team on 14 January 1947, Kenderdine, already working in Tokyo, was selected to be 
chairman.194  F. F. Ruthven, an engineer of Aluminium Limited, was selected as the industrial 
investigator, and R. M. Dobson, secretary for the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, was 
selected as the insurance investigator.195  Although the survey teams answered to SCAP, Dobson 
and Ruthven were instructed to make “no expression of Canada's interest in either reparations or 
restitution matters.”196   
 
 The government did not expect an increase in the level of interest demonstrated by 
Canadian companies to acquire shares of reparations, which left the two insurance companies 
and Aluminum Limited as the parties most interested in reparations.  Aluminum Limited’s views 
were sought by the government as it prepared to vote on FEC 218, “Reparations Removals of 
Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping from Japan.”197  As later expressed in the report from 
the Canberra Conference, there was doubt that Japan’s production levels at the time were 
suitable to produce reparations.198  The United States Government’s 4 April directive to SCAP, 
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“Advanced Transfer of Japanese Reparations,” was meant to bypass the Far Eastern 
Commission’s deadlock and deliver 30 percent of reparations for countries deemed most in need, 
but no articles were delivered by mid-August.199  Of the Far Eastern Commission members, 
Canada submitted the lowest claims for reparations by percentage, 1.5%, at the end of August.  
However, the modest position assumed by Canada had little effect on helping the Far Eastern 
Commission progress on the issue of reparations. 
 
   After MacArthur’s 17 March announcement, the United Kingdom proposed that 
Commonwealth nations exchange views, and Australia began efforts to organize a conference in 
Canberra to act as a preliminary forum for discussion on the peace conference proper.200  The 
Canadian Government was initially reluctant to Australia’s requests, stating its interests in the 
Pacific more closely aligned to those of the United States than the Commonwealth.201  The 
Canadian Government did eventually agree to attend the proposed conference.  Leading up to the 
conference, the government was unequivocal in its opposition to make any sort of commitment 
to policies at the conference—even broad ones.  This did not mean Canada would not or did not 
agree with views of other Commonwealth countries, but sought to maintain its autonomy in 
policy formulation.  The Canadian Government sought a balance between economic and security 
concerns as it mulled demilitarization, trade barrier reduction, and reparations.  An undated 
memorandum by the Department of External Affairs in August 1947 highlights the government’s 
position: 
 The development of more rapid means of communication, the discovery of long range 
 instruments of war, and the emergence of new powers in the Far Eastern theatre now 
 make it impossible for Canada to regard as unimportant to its security political 
 developments in Eastern Asia.  ...   Prior to the war Canada had extensive trade 
interests in the Orient and the form of their resumption will depend substantially on the 
position which Japan is to be permitted to assume in the economic field.  This position 
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will no doubt be governed by the Treaty terms and is necessary for this reason to secure 
participation in their preparation.202 
 
Members of the military had assessed, correctly, that the economic demilitarization of Japan had 
been largely achieved, and were in agreement with the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff that any 
demilitarization provisions in the final settlement should include exceptions allowing various 
equipment and materials necessary for the maintenance of civil security, construction and 
mining, along with permitting the development of civil airlines and limited watercraft.203   
 
 Norman proposed a system of control, similar to the one proposed by Australia’s 
Department of External Affairs, whereby an international council be created from the signatory 
nations to carry out inspections within Japan.204  Norman’s view was shared in a 21 July 
memorandum wherein the Department of External Affairs provided a comprehensive outline of 
its views about the economic demilitarization and economic control aspects of the peace treaty.  
External Affairs the weighed the problem of Japanese production if it were constantly supervised 
against potential reaction from “former victims of Japanese aggression” if there were less 
stringent control over Japanese production or imports.205  A political system of economic control 
was advocated as being a flexible means to ensure Japan’s peaceful economic development 
instead of a form of military control that had the potential to leave the United States and the 
Soviet Union vying for “strategic advantage,” consequently weakening Canadian security 
interests in the North Pacific.206  External Affairs submitted its considerations prior to the 
reopening of private trade.  Strict controls were continued even after private trade was allowed to 
resume, but economic controls after the conclusion of a peace treaty had the potential of stifling 
the recovery of traditional Canadian exports to Japan.  Metals and minerals had been a major 
export to Japan prior to the war: aluminum and nickel accounted for 60 percent of the value of 
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Canada’s exports to Japan in 1939, while another 25 percent were from copper, lead, zinc, scrap 
iron, and steel.207  The Department of External Affairs was willing to write off the loss of this 
trade, however: 
 The limitation of our future market in Japan for these materials does not seem an 
 excessive price to pay for security.  Even if this market were entirely eliminated the loss 
 of $16 1/2 millions in income is a trifling figure when set beside the $832 millions which 
 made up only the budgetary cost of our very limited war effort against Japan.  Moreover 
 it would be quite illogical for Canada to participate in any security system vis-a-vis Japan 
 if we are not willing to cooperate in a system of economic controls which would regulate 
 the supply of strategic raw materials.208 
 
On 30 July, Prime Minister King agreed that restricting imports on strategic materials could be a 
key form of economic control, and opined that demand for other Canadian products had the 
potential to mostly negate the long-term loss of these prewar export items.209     
 
 Brooke Claxton, Minister of Defence, was selected as Canada’s representative to the 
Canberra Conference and given rough guidelines in mid-August instructing him to support 
policies that balanced economic recovery with security concerns.  To balance justice with 
security and economic issues, Claxton was instructed to: support economic controls that would 
not prevent Japan’s economic recovery and normal trading conditions, so long as security 
concerns were met; protect Canadian fishing interests; and advocate for no further reparations 
removals from Japan’s production at the time.210  Because Canada’s security interests aligned 
more closely with those of the United States, Claxton was instructed to support the American 
proposals for the procedures of the peace conference.211  At the Canberra Conference, Canada’s 
goal to remain non-committal towards policies was achieved, although Canada participated fully 
in the talks.212  Norman, who had accompanied the delegation, gave presentations that were well-
received, and Claxton was able to express Canada’s desire for resumption of a peaceful 
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commerce.213  Reporting on the conference after its conclusion, Claxton noted that it had quickly 
shifted from security to matters of economic policy.214  His report concludes that there was some 
consensus on restriction or limitations to the production of various materials and substances, and 
that Canada was in agreement with the United Kingdom and India that there should be no undue 
interference in Japan’s internal economy from provisions about Japan’s fiscal policy and 
employment as suggested by Australia and New Zealand.215  Ultimately, the conference was a 
successful venture for the Commonwealth countries.  Canada, worried about offending the 
United Kingdom and the United States, was able to find common ground on a number of issues, 
while principles adopted at the conference were in alignment with United States proposals.216  
The conference served to inform the Canadian Government of the changing attitudes of other 
governments, notably the softening of the Australia Government towards proposed economic 
policies.217  Michael G. Fry argues that the conference also helped the government formulate 
new policies in September “on a variety of issues” although the shift away from government-to-
government trade dovetailed with the Far Eastern Commission’s waning influence over 
economic matters in the coming year.218 
 
 Regarding Canada’s participation in the Far Eastern Commission and the Inter-Allied 
Trade Board up to July 1947, H. H. Wrong, the Canadian representative at the Far Eastern 
Commission, wrote, “One of the main Canadian interests, both in the IATB and the Commission, 
has been to hasten the opening of Japan to private trade, and the Canadian representatives on 
both bodies have consistently supported any proposals which might expedite this.”219  Prior to 
the resumption of private trade, Wrong assessed Canadian interests in Japan as: resident 
commercial or industrial activities (aluminum processing and insurance); trade (lumber, silk, 
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etc.); missionary activity; property; and reparations.220  Wrong’s choice to list reparations last on 
the list of Canadian interests was not a mistake; obtaining reparations from Japan was not as 
significant to the Canadian Government as attempting to break the deadlock on the issue of 
reparations at the Far Eastern Commission.   
 
 With the upcoming Canberra Conference and reopening of Japan to limited private trade, 
a mission headed by General H.D.G. Crerar was sent to Japan to assist formulating peace 
settlement policies and to assess the potential for trade with Japan.221  The mission took place 
between 2 August and 20 August.  When Crerar submitted his report in September, it contained a 
dim outlook on Canadian-Japanese trade prospects in 1948.  Fry’s summary of General Crerar’s 
report states that trade would be hampered by fiscal controls, reparations would continue to 
distort trade patterns, and that competition from the United States would make it difficult for 
Canada to penetrate the Japanese market.222  Furthermore, Japan’s low production, limited 
purchasing power, high unemployment, and unchecked inflation posed formidable barriers.223  
However, the prewar pattern of goods trade between Canada and Japan was expected to 
eventually return once trade had been revived between the two countries.224   
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6  Canada in Japan, 1947: The Resumption of Private Trade 
 Preparation for, and participation in, the Canberra Conference gave the Canadian 
Government an opportunity to refine and clarify its positions about Japan’s economy in the long-
term.  The results of the conference itself, while successful, were negated in the following 
months as American policy moved away from supporting an early peace with Japan; for the 
Department of External Affairs, Japanese aggression became perceived as less of a threat 
compared to potential Soviet aggression.225  The more tangible component of the redevelopment 
of economic relations between Canada and Japan was impacted by the resumption of private 
trade in August.  By mid-August, SCAP had approved six of the first eight entry permits 
allocated to Canada’s quota.  The first six slots were given to: 
 R. M. Andrews, of Andrews and George Company, Incorporated., Vancouver; H. 
 Hacking, of Hacking Company, Limited, Vancouver; R. J. Killiam of the British 
 Columbia Pulp and Paper Company, Limited, Vancouver; J. L. Bennett, of Birks-
 Crawford, Limited, Vancouver; J. C. Muskett, of the T. Eaton Company [Eaton’s], 
 Limited, Toronto; and Frank Hacking of Frank Hacking (Canada), Limited, Toronto.226 
 
These initial business representatives were not indicative of total number of Canadian businesses 
interested in trade with Japan at the time.  Between 1947-1948, thirty-two Canadian businessmen 
entered Japan, two were granted semi-permanent status, and several more made return trips.227 
 
 The Department of Trade and Commerce, normally through its officials in the Asia 
Section of the Foreign Trade Service, assisted businesses interested in the Japanese market by 
responding to enquiries, informing them of new policy developments, and putting them in touch 
with Kenderdine at the Canadian Liaison Mission.  However, the Canadian Government did not 
take part in private transactions and Canadian businesses were responsible for securing their own 
trade agreements with SCAP and the B!eki-ch!.  Nonetheless, Trade and Commerce and 
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Kenderdine played an important role facilitating trade as intermediaries for Canadian and 
Japanese business interests.  Even with the delay of letters and cables going between Canada and 
Japan, Trade and Commerce tended to act swiftly when responding to business enquiries.  This 
was, after all, the period when Japan was first establishing its private foreign trade after the war.  
On 16 August, one day after private trade was officially resumed, a list containing dozens of 
categories of products available for export from Japan, along with their scheduled production, 
was released in the Department of Trade and Commerce’s weekly publication, Foreign Trade.  
The categories of items available for export from Japan were: 
 accessories and dress trade items; bamboo products; belting and hoses, rubber, industrial; 
 ceramics; chemicals and minerals, industrial, clocks, watches, movements and optical 
 glass; construction equipment and material; electrical material; farm implements; foods 
 and beverages; furs; gifts and artware; glassware; housewares; jewellery; leather goods; 
 linen and ramie; metals, ferro-alloy; metals, non-ferrous; miscellaneous and sundries; 
 musical instruments; notions and novelties; paper and stationary; pharmaceuticals, drugs 
 and allied supplies; photographic supplies; rayon; rubber products; seeds; sewing 
 machines; silk; smokers supplies; sporting goods; surgical, dental and laboratory 
 instruments; toys and  holiday goods; wood and wood products; and wool.228 
 
 
 There was no discrimination against Canadian products, but the sorts of goods accepted 
for import were very limited and remained so in the following years.  As anticipated by the 
report from General Crerar, competition from the United States hampered Canadian companies’ 
abilities to export their own products to Japan.  Traditional Canadian exports to Japan, such as 
raw materials used in industrial production, were limited due to the restrictions still in place for 
postwar security, while other traditional exports such as wheat, flour and other foodstuffs, were 
also slow to recover.  Overall trade between Canada and Japan remained low in 1947; exports to 
Japan actually dropped from a total value of $1,026,850 in 1946 to $559,224 in 1947.229  Imports 
from Japan, however, increased substantially from a value of only $3,000 in 1946 to $349,566 in 
1947, reflecting both the severe trade limitations and Japan’s weak industrial output in 1946.  
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Both imports and exports between the two countries were still millions of dollars less than they 
had been from their 1935-1939 average of $23,000,000 in exports to Japan and $4,500,000 in 
imports from Japan.230  Finally, Table 1.1 demonstrates how miniscule trade between Canada 
and Japan was in both 1946 and 1947 compared to its two largest trading partners, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  Whereas the latter half of 1947 was the period when Canadian 
businesses began returning to Japan, 1948 was when Canadian businesses first started to firmly 
establish their trade links with Japan. 
 
 
Table 1.1 Canadian Exports, by Area, 1946-1947231 
U.S.$ 
 
Country   Date    Date    
    January-October, 1946 January-October, 1947 
 
Japan    $577,000   $516,000 
United Kingdom   $480,261,000   $609,403,000 
United States   $714,845,000   $835,422,000 
 
Total foreign countries $1,142,906,000  $1,305,676,000 
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1  The United States and Japan, 1948: Changing Priorities 
 The focus of SCAP’s economic policies during the first two and a half years of the 
Occupation had been directed towards eliminating Japan’s ability to wage war and on the 
economic deconcentration program—the attempt to break up the large industrial and banking 
firms, known as zaibatsu, that controlled the majority of Japan’s economic wealth and 
production prior to and during the war.  Up to 1948, reviving the Japanese economy had only 
been aimed at ensuring the minimal peaceful needs of Japan’s citizens.  This, however, changed 
in 1948 when the United States Government pursued a “reverse course” that made Japan’s 
economic recovery the primary objective of its occupational policies.  The reverse course was 
the result of recommendations from the Strike Report, Draper Mission, Johnston Committee 
Report and Young Mission Report that culminated with the National Security Council’s adoption 
of “Recommendations With Respect to United States Policy Towards Japan” (NSC 13/2) in 
October 1948 (see Appendix 2).  The United States pursued the reverse course by using interim 
directives aimed at making Japan self-sufficient.  The interim directives were legally justified in 
part by broadly interpreting the Far Eastern Commission’s “Interim Import-Export Policy for 
Japan” (FEC 032/26).232  The return of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, after the defeat of the 
Ashida government in October 1948, introduced a government with ideologies more 
complimentary to the changes being sought by the United States Government.  However, 
General MacArthur was resistant to implementing many of the policy recommendations in 1948, 
which caused a number of disputes between policy-makers in Washington and in Tokyo.  
Consequently, many of the reforms Washington wanted to see carried out were delayed until 




 The origins of the reverse course can be traced back to disputes in 1947 about SCAP’s 
economic deconcentration policies.  James Lee Kauffman, who was connected to the First Strike 
Mission in February 1947, visited Japan in August 1947 and became the foremost outspoken 
critic of SCAP’s policies.  He managed to obtain a copy of FEC 230, a draft policy about the 
dissolution of the zaibatsu with ramifications that extended beyond simply breaking up the top 
holding companies.234  Kauffman issued a report about FEC 230 and SCAP that was utterly 
dismissive of the economic deconcentration policies.  He argued that the system was an 
experiment that worked against American economic and political interests by hampering 
business developments at the cost of the American taxpayer and discouraging the Japanese.235  
Washington dispatched a mission headed by the Under Secretary of the Army, General William 
Draper, whose subsequent agreement with Kauffman’s assessment led to the Army Department 
revising its economic policies.  The Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, signified the shift 
of Washington’s views about demilitarization and economic deconcentration during a speech he 
gave in San Francisco on 6 January 1948.  Royall contended that “there was an era of conflict 
between the original concept and the new purpose of building a self-supporting nation” and went 
on to say that the zaibatsu were amongst “the ablest and most successful leaders of [Japan], and 
their services would in many instances contribute to the economic recovery of Japan.”236  
General McCoy, still the United States representative to the Far Eastern Commission, concurred 
that stabilizing Japan’s economy should be the priority and announced to the Commission the 
United States’ intent to remove obstacles towards making Japan self-sufficient.237   
 
 Clifford Strike was again sent to Japan, releasing the Second Strike Report in February 
1948, which argued that in order to raise Japan’s standard of living to the 1931-1937 level, 
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industrial output needed to be expanded but could not be done if more of Japan’s industries were 
removed for reparations.238  George Kennan, the director of the State Department’s new Policy-
Making Staff, became one of Washington’s most vocal proponents for the policy reversal and 
was sent to Japan in February 1948 to discuss with General MacArthur the issues of United 
States security needs in the Pacific, the desirability of an early peace treaty with Japan with or 
without the Soviet Union, and, importantly, steps to speed up Japan’s economic recovery.239  
Forcefully arguing against FEC 230 and in favour of economic reconstruction, Kennan captured 
the predominant views that had emerged from the State Department: 
 I am personally not satisfied that these policies of decartelization with respect to  
ex-enemy countries are sound or desirable.  They rest, as far as I can see, on the strong 
views and convictions of a relatively small group of people who view the respective 
problems exclusively from the standpoint of economic theory and whose enthusiasm and 
singleness of purpose have sufficed to get them documented as US Government policy. 
The concepts behind the decartelization program happen to be ones strongly supported by 
the Russians for political reasons related to their aggressive foreign policy program.  
...This represents the type of interference in Japanese affairs which is no longer justifiable 
in the light of time and circumstance.240 
 
Kennan further argued that FEC 230 would lead to “economic disaster, inflation, unbalanced 
budgets, resulting in near anarchy which would be precisely what the Communists want.”241  In 
March, Kennan was joined by a new mission led by General Draper.  General Draper was 
accompanied by the Johnston Committee which was composed of five representatives from 
powerful American corporations.242  Draper and Kennan both impressed upon General 
MacArthur the shift in American policy, but MacArthur was still resistant. On 26 April the 
Johnston Report was filed, providing for the first time the United States’ full policy for Japan’s 
economic reconstruction.243  The report shared many of Kennan’s views and advocated relaxing 
the program of economic deconcentration, scaling back the reparations program, establishing a 
fixed exchange rate for the yen based on the U.S. dollar, reducing subsidies, imposing wage 
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controls, and having the Japanese Government create a balanced budget.244  The Young Mission 
Report in June 1949 advocated for the establishment of a single fixed exchange rate by 1 October 
1948 to cover both commercial and military transactions.245  The report was also used to create 
the Ten Principles of Economic Stabilization which SCAP directed the Japanese Government to 
implement in July, but because of the domestic political situation in Japan at the time, the Ashida 
government was unable to carry these out. 
 
 MacArthur remained opposed to the recommendations from the Johnston and Young 
Reports, but Washington continued to move forward with its policy creation.  When the National 
Security Council (which eventually replaced SWNCC in 1949) approved NSC 13/2 on 7 
October, the reverse course was made official policy.  NSC 13/2 was sweeping, covering the 
peace treaty, security matters, SCAP’s control and occupational policy.  Concerning Japan’s 
economy and trade, NSC 13/2 declared that Japan’s economic recovery was the primary concern 
of the United States’ new policies for Japan aside from American security interests.  NSC 13/2 
then articulated the need to liberalize and increase Japan’s trade and that aid would be decreased, 
placing a greater onus on the Japanese Government to address the problems of inflation and debt. 
It should be sought through a combination of United States aid program envisaging 
shipments and/or credits on a declining scale over a number of years, and by vigorous 
and concerted effort by all interested agencies and departments of the United States 
Government to cut away existing obstacles to the revival of Japanese foreign trade, with 
provision for Japanese merchant shipping, and to facilitate restoration and development 
of Japan’s exports.  In developing Japan’s internal and external trade and industry, 
private enterprise should be encouraged. ...We should make it clear to the Japanese 
Government that the success of the recovery program will in large part depend on 
Japanese efforts to raise production and to maintain high exports levels, internal austerity 
measures and the stern combatting of inflationary trends including efforts to achieve a 




Based upon the recommendations from the Johnston and Young Reports, NSC 13/2 and in 
consultation with SCAP, the State Department and Army Department issued the so-called “Nine 
Point Economic Stabilization Program” on 11 December.247  The Nine Point Economic 
Stabilization Program was an encompassing plan meant to address the foremost problems facing 
Japan’s economic recovery with objectives to: 
 (1) achieve a true balance in the consolidated budget at the earliest date; (2) accelerate 
 and strengthen the program of tax collection and insure prompt, widespread and vigorous 
 criminal prosecution; (3) assure that credit extension [was] vigorously limited to those 
 projects contributing to the economic recovery of Japan; (4) establish an effective 
 program to achieve wage stability; (5) strengthen, and if necessary, expand the coverage 
 of existing price control programs; (6) improve the operation of foreign trade controls 
 and tighten existing foreign exchange controls; (7) improve the effectiveness of the 
 allocation and rationing system, particularly to the end of maximizing exports; (8) 
 increase production of all essential indigenous raw materials and manufactured products; 
 and (9) improve the efficiency of the food collection program.248 
 
General MacArthur transmitted the directive to Prime Minister Yoshida in a letter on 19 
December 1948, setting into motion major economic reforms that were carried out beginning in 
1949. 
 
 Procedures for private trade remained mostly unchanged from 1947, but just as 
Washington oriented its policies in 1948 towards reviving Japan’s economy, so too were trade 
restrictions relaxed slightly in August and September.  Approved foreign businessmen visiting 
Japan could hire agents in Japan and SCAP increased the allotted duration of stay from 21 to 60 
days.  Conversely, Japanese exporters were allowed to make direct sales to foreign buyers 
although these were still subject to restrictions.  The foremost changes to Japan’s trade 
procedures were the introduction of private barter transactions beginning in August 1948 and the 
conclusion of several bilateral trade arrangements on behalf of Japan by SCAP.  Private barter 
transactions could be made between private businesses and Japanese companies (with contracts 
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still subject to the B!eki-ch! and SCAP’s approval), and served two primary purposes.  First, 
private barter transactions were a means to help foster reciprocal trade between Japan and other 
countries.  Secondly, as a means of liberalizing Japan’s trade, more operational control was 
given to Japanese companies.249  Foreign firms and Japanese manufacturers concluded contracts 
based on negotiations over prices set by SCAP.  Proceeds from the sale of raw materials to Japan 
through this type of transaction were held in escrow by Japanese banks that would reduce the 
accounts as Japanese products were purchased and the proceeds expended (escrow transactions 
did not frequently occur as it was a costly procedure).250   
 
 More significant than the private barter transactions were the bilateral trade agreements 
signed in 1948.  On 31 May the “Overall Trade Agreement and Payments Arrangement With the 
Sterling Area” was concluded by SCAP and initially expected this to result in trade worth 
$200,000,000 by June 1949.251  Countries covered under the sterling agreement that conducted 
trade pacts with Japan in 1948 included Australia, India, New Zealand, South Africa, and the 
United Kingdom and its colonies except Hong Kong, while additional trade agreements were 
made with Siam (Thailand), the Netherlands, Indonesia, and Sweden.252  Countries party to the 
sterling agreement with Japan were expected to mostly provide raw materials and goods such as 
raw wool, iron ore, salt, raw cotton, cereals, petroleum, rubber, tin, jute, oil seeds, wool waste, 
coal, hides and skins, manganese, gums and resins, and shipping.253  In turn, Japanese exports to 
these countries was expected to consist mostly of industrial machinery, raw silk, rolling stock, 
caustic soda and other chemicals, rayon, wool, silk manufactures, paper and paper products, and 
bunker coal.254  Bilateral trade agreements indicated the commodities and quantities expected to 
be involved in trade but were not binding.255  Like private barter transactions, bilateral trade 
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agreements were aimed at balancing Japan’s trade deficits, but they proved to be problematic and 
did not solve the trade deficit issue.  Hollerman recounts that because there were no penalties for 
leaving contracts unfulfilled, many foreign companies simply backed out on agreements when 
fluctuations in market prices or changing market conditions left them at a disadvantage 
compared to when the contracts were first signed.256  Japanese companies also abused the system 
at times, signing contracts simply to obtain scarce materials under the allocations system and 
then backing out of their agreement.257  Nevertheless, bilateral trade agreements were the 
preferred method of arranging and conducting trade until early 1950, and the system was 




2  Canada and Japan, 1948: Economic Liberalization 
 As a legal and practical necessity, policy makers in Washington and in SCAP took into 
consideration the recommendations of the Far Eastern Commission during the reverse course.  
Nevertheless, the ability of the Far Eastern Commission to seriously enact policies that affected 
Japan’s economic recovery was in decline.  Canadian economic interests were aligned with the 
United States on the practical aspects of Japan’s recovery and trade but Japan’s ability to conduct 
private international trade was impacted by American policies which Canada had no influence 
over—however closely the two countries’ interests intersected.  Canada’s Assistant Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Escott Reid, summed up the relationship as it stood in 
May 1948 by stating: “ Our position is influenced by the fact that Canada and the United States 
are the only two North American members of the Far Eastern Commission and Canada is 
therefore more inclined to share United States views on security questions than other members 
are.  Our common commercial and other interests also tend to draw us closer together.”258  The 
deadlock on reparations continued to be problematic for Japanese industries, but with the 
Johnston Report and Young Reports, Washington was putting forth policies that had a greater 
impact on Japan’s economic recovery than what was emerging from the work of the Commission 
at the time.   
 
 As the Cold War intensified, the Department of External Affairs correctly assessed the 
changing situation between the United States and the Soviet Union as something that would 
affect American policies on Japan’s economic recovery and the more long-term outlook for a 
peace treaty.  For Canada and the United States, Japan was no longer the threat to world peace 
when compared to the Soviet Union, and because the Canadian Government had already been 
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prepared to support a peace settlement with Japan in 1947, it made little sense for the 
government not to continue to advocate for the restoration of economic conditions in Japan.259  
Arthur Menzies, who was working for the American and Far Eastern Division, stated as much to 
Bryan S. Lendrum, Assistant Secretary of the Office of High Commissioner of New Zealand, 
arguing that a peace treaty was not urgent and that “[Canada was] not seriously affected one way 
or another.”260  Menzies then elaborated about how the increasing Soviet tensions affected 
Canada’s position on Japan’s economy: 
 If the United States felt that it was desirable to build up the Japanese economy to a point 
 where it would be better able to assist in resisting Soviet expansionism in Northeast Asia 
 than [sic] we were hardly in a position to argue over this policy.  In the final analysis it 
 was the United States which held the preponderance of power in the North Pacific and on 
 whom  we would rely for protection whether the aggression came from the Soviet Union 
 or a revived Japan.261 
 
Trade restrictions and the lack of a fixed exchange rate were still obstacles that needed to be 
tackled.  Menzies iterated that trade prospects were low between Canada and Japan and that 
Canadian businessmen who had gone to Japan had experienced difficulties, but future trade 
between the two countries could be bolstered by Japan’s increased trade with “all countries.”262  
This multilateral line of thinking reflected the inter-connectedness of postwar trade and how 
important the revival of Japan’s prewar trade partnerships were to its economic recovery. 
 
 A problem for Canada was that the increasing tensions between the Soviet Union and the 
United States carried over into the Far Eastern Commission and caused members to refrain from 
putting matters to a vote where either the American or Soviet veto could be used.263  For the first 
time in the Far Eastern Commission’s existence, veto power was used on 4 March—by the 
Soviet Union.264  The Canadian Government was cognizant that political opinion in some of the 
American political circles was that the Far Eastern Commission, along with the Allied Council, 
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had outlived its usefulness.  On the other hand, the Canadian Government felt that the United 
States still remained “susceptible to moral and diplomatic pressure, and ... would be prepared to 
go a long way to gain general support for its policies in Japan.”265   Because the Canadian 
Government did not want to completely lose its voice within the Commission—limited as it 
was—it supported a potential change to the Commission’s voting procedure that would have 
allowed policies to pass with a two-thirds majority vote (although this change ultimately did not 
occur).  A memorandum from 23 July clarified the Canadian Government’s position vis-à-vis the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Far Eastern Commission with respect to Japan’s 
economic recovery and trade.  Even though the Canadian Government had communicated to the 
United States potential “avenues” to consider in order to bring about a peace conference, 
responsibility for the success or failure of the Occupation hinged on the Americans, and the 
government considered it “unwise to press the United States towards a course of action which 
they themselves consider imprudent.”266   
 
 However, the Canadian Government was not as willing to let slide the issue of Japan’s 
economic recovery if it threatened Canada’s security.  Despite the Commission’s 
recommendations in 1947, up until July 1948 it had not reached a conclusion on what the levels 
of Japanese industry should be, although the Commission continued to work from the original 
proposal to fix levels in 1950 by 1930-1934 levels.267  Canada was willing to agree with the 
United Kingdom that industrial levels could be increased so long as they were not a “menace” to 
security, but, on the other hand, the similarities between Canadian and American security 
requirements meant that Canada was cautious in supporting the Commonwealth creating its own 
working paper, and preferred to defer to the Far Eastern Commission as the proper body for 
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policy proposals.268  Canada had already been supporting within the Far Eastern Commission 
levels of industry for Japan that were often higher than what other members on the lower 
committees accepted.269 
 
 The United States had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain most favoured nation treatment 
for Japan at the Havana Conference and had also unsuccessfully attempted to get the Economic 
Cooperation Administration to grant Japan bilateral agreements under the European Recovery 
Program (Marshall Plan).270  Canada had also been attempting to garner support for giving Japan 
most favoured nation status, and was supporting the United States in this endeavour in 1948.  
The United Kingdom was against the idea of granting most-favoured nation treatment to Japan 
based on limited time to study the issue and out of concerns for its textile industries.271  
Reminiscent of Menzies’ comment that increasing trade between Japan and other countries 
would benefit Canada, the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy and its Sub-
Committee considered the revival of Japanese markets important to Canada.272  Blocking the 
revival of Japan’s textile industry or opposing arrangements that could harm trade in the Pacific 
area was not considered justifiable even though the Department of External Affairs noted that the 
Canadian textile industry might face some difficulties.273  The issue of granting most-favoured 
nation treatment to Japan was not resolved in 1948 and was the primary issue regarding Canada 
and Japan’s economic relationship that the Canadian Government addressed in 1949.
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3  Canada in Japan, 1948: Private Trade Case Studies 
 Norman, as Head of the Mission, was still Canada’s top political representative in Japan 
while Kenderdine continued in his role as the Canada’s economic representative until the end of 
1948, when he was replaced by Joseph Cleland Britton.  Norman and Kenderdine’s opinions 
were solicited by the Department of External Affairs on political and economic matters.  Norman 
handled meetings with United States officials like Kennan or General Draper, and also was asked 
for opinion on matters like the revival of textile trade.  Kenderdine, acting as an intermediary 
between Canadian businesses, SCAP, and the B!eki-ch!, handled more direct trade matters 
relating to specific enquires such as the availability of wheat or lumber.274  In Ottawa, Heasman, 
as Director of the Trade Commissioner Service, and G. S. Hall from the Asia Section of the 
Foreign Trade Service, were the principle individuals responding to enquiries from Canadian and 
Japanese companies.  The government ruled out providing a loan to Japan, citing both the 
unlikelihood of interest from Canadian private businesses and that, even if they were, they would 
not be permitted to do so because “the Canadian economy [was] in no position to send 
unrequited exports to Japan.”275  Loans aside, Canadian companies were interested in trade with 
Japan. 
 
 Companies encountered many difficulties already enumerated earlier such as the lack of a 
fixed exchange rate, limits on what commodities could be imported to Japan, and especially the 
process involved in contacting the appropriate authorities to setup trade business agreements in 
the first place.  Canadian companies often contacted the Department of Trade and Commerce, 
Foreign Trade Service, or Trade Commissioner Service as a first step.  If they followed the Trade 
and Commerce’s weekly journal, Foreign Trade, they would be informed about who in Japan to 
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contact in order to set up trade: SCAP, the B!eki-ch!, or Kenderdine.  Nonetheless, companies 
often sought information from Ottawa as a first step.  In turn, officials from the Foreign Trade or 
the Trade Commissioner Service would reply that their letter(s) had been forwarded to 
Kenderdine and suggested that they contact him directly.  The following selected letters from 
Canadian companies, Heasman, Hall, Kenderdine and Norman provide a partial outline of what 
sorts of Canadian businesses were interested in trade and how it was handled by the Canadian 
Government.  The letters also provide insight into some of the Japanese trade interests with 
Canada. 
 
 Most often, parties interested in trade were provided a reply from the Department of 
Trade and Commerce that outlined the recent history of trade between Canada and Japan since 
August 1947, how trade was conducted, and who were the appropriate authorities in Japan to 
contact about trade.  The Asia Section of the Foreign Trade Service had a general template they 
used to respond to Canadian businesses.  One such letter to A. B. Willson, from Canadian 
Refractories Limited, in Montreal, typifies the response Canadian businesses could expect.  
Formalities aside, the two page letter begins with G. S. Hall stating, “ Trade between Japan and 
Canada is both possible and practical, and is being carried out on a limited scale.  For the first 
quarter of this year imports from Japan totalled $203,707 and exports to Japan totalled 
$769,735.”276  Hall then briefly outlines how SCAP and the B!eki-ch! handled potential imports, 
contracts, and what foreign exchange was being made available to.  It is suggested to Wilson that 
he get in contact with Kenderdine, as the Special Representative of Trade and Commerce, and to 
pursue SCAP, the B!eki-ch!, and Kenderdine when making any business offer as “it has been 
found that the B!eki-ch! needs pressure to bring about results.”277  Towards the conclusion of the 
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letter, Hall brings attention to the enclosed reports that were intended to provide greater detail on 
the background of trade conditions in Japan, notably “report No. 3 regarding representation.”  
This report expanded on the earlier theme that in order to obtain results, constant approaches 
needed to be made to SCAP: “... a foreign supplier with a representative in Japan who could 
make daily calls on SCAP to enquire how things are proceeding, is most likely to be the 
successful in developing business.”278  Canadian Refractories, in turn, responded positively, 
saying that they had contacted SCAP, the B!eki-ch!, and Kenderdine, and were grateful for the 
information provided by Foreign Trade, particularly with reference to Canadian magnesite.279  
This same letter was sent by Foreign Trade to the Canadian Manufacturers Sales Co., in 
Montreal, on 31 August, and again to K. Hori from Toronto, with the content in the latter 
discussing the need for persistence with SCAP and the B!eki-ch! but not specifically citing 
“report No. 3” in the letter’s text.280  A similar letter was sent on 28 July to Canada Far Eastern 
Commerce Limited, of Toronto, but was shorter and included reports on commodities available 
for export from Japan.281 
 
 A more detailed response was given to Thomas Flynn of the Lancashire & Yorkshire 
Timber Co., in Vancouver, who wrote to the Minister of Finance, D. C. Abbot, expressing his 
concern about the trade situation between Canada and Japan. Flynn worried that the United 
States was purposefully hampering Japan’s economic recovery and trade opportunities.  An 
article from the Nippon Times, dated 22 June 1948, sent to Flynn by “Japanese industrial 
concerns ready and anxious to do trade with Canada,” was the source of his worries in addition 
to an interview given by General MacArthur to one of the local Vancouver papers.  Flynn 
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minimized Japan’s role and conduct in World War II and encouraged the restoration of normal 
trading ties with Japan based on humanitarian concerns: 
 The U.S.A. did the lion’s share in the subjection of the Japanese, who were Hitler’s 
 pawns, in a great effort to conquer the world, and Canada took her part in other spheres, 
 in the ultimate destruction of the mighty German Machine, which brings me to the 
 definite conclusion, that the U,S,States [sic] are presuming entirely too much, in setting 
 up or drawing down a curtain of isolation to the detriment of Canadian trade... There is as 
 you know a limit to human endurance, and the bonds of restraint may yet be broken.282 
   
In order to better understand trade policies and what Canada was doing to improve the trade 
situation, Flynn sought information about: Canada’s representative in Japan (Kenderdine), what 
authority was given to Canada’s representative and whether Kenderdine could investigate 
potential trade between British Columbia and Japan.   
 
 Flynn’s letter was forwarded to the Asia Section and Hall attempted to clear up a number 
of the issues Flynn was concerned about.  Addressing Flynn’s assertion that trade was limited 
specifically due to American policy and the “careful guidance of MacArthur,” Hall noted a 
number of the factors that were affecting trade between Canada and Japan such as the lack of 
raw materials within Japan, labour issues, adjustment to newer commercial conditions, and 
Japan’s unstable currency.283  Hall then went on to state that Japanese merchandise was arriving 
in the United States and not Canada, not because any restrictions on Canadian shipping to and 
from Japan (there were not any), but because limited cargo to and from Japan was an unattractive 
economic prospective for Canadian shipping companies.  On the more pertinent points of trade 
conduct and the authorities responsible for economic policy, Hall outlined the Far Eastern 
Commission’s responsibility for directing general policy to SCAP, the role of the Inter-Allied 
Trade Board to deal with trade affairs in conjunction with SCAP and that Canada was 
represented on the IATB.  Finally, Hall pointed out that “there was a great deal of inaccurate 
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reporting on Japanese affairs, particularly regarding trade with that country, and the alleged 
discriminatory attitude of SCAP,” and noted that Foreign Trade had helped a number of 
Canadian businesses in their endeavours to conduct business with Japan.  As such, Hall provided 
information on Kenderdine and offered Foreign Trade’s further assistance if Flynn had specific 
business interests he wanted to purse with Japan.  
 
 Companies that were interested in conducting trade with Japan offered a diverse number 
of products, but Japanese commodity import lists changed periodically and the window for 
securing trade could be short despite the often lengthy process involved in securing trade 
agreements with the B!eki-ch! or SCAP.  Staying on top of the changing lists of acceptable 
exports to Japan and informing Canadian companies that may have had an interest in supplying 
these particular goods was another aspect of the work Trade and Commerce and Kenderdine 
performed to help facilitate trade.  Two notable instances of how this work was conducted appear 
in the 1948 records.  The first example shows Trade and Commerce working to gauge interest in 
limited number of products and potential suppliers of these.  In early August, G. A. Newman, 
Acting Director of the Export Division, sent Kenderdine a letter about Canadian supplies of 
vegetable seeds, starches, and pulses, peas and beans.  According to Newman, Canada was 
unlikely to be able to compete against the United States on corn starch, but had good supplies of 
potato and wheat starch.  At the time, Canada had available for export to Japan: 20,000 metric 






Upon receiving the information from Newman, Kenderdine provided the following list 
from SCAP requesting vegetable and flower seed imports: 
 95 metric tons Red Clover (midland strain preferred) 
 25 metric tons Timothy 
 25 metric tons  Orchard Grass 
 145 metric tons Hairy Vetch 
 445 metric tons Common Vetch 
 30 metric tons Jute.285 
 
Regarding pulses, only soy beans were needed at that time, while starches were handled in a 
separate letter by Kenderdine.286  With this information, G. F. Clingan from the Export Division 
sent out letters to various companies who might have been able to supply red clover and timothy 
seeds for export.  Kenneth McDonald & Sons, Limited, responded that they were unable to make 
up the quantities requested.287  One company, Hogg & Lytle, Limited—“Growers, Dealers, 
Exporters” of “Forage and Cereal Seeds”—responded to both Clingan and Kenderdine, 
expressing their interest to export the seeds.  After Kenderdine investigated the time of shipment 
for the seeds, Hogg & Lytle sent an offer for Kenderdine on: “95 metric tons 1948 Canadian 
medium red clover, 98% purity, normal germination of the new crop, dodder free, at U.S.$58.00 
per 100 pounds, gross weight new seamless cotton bags included, C.I.F. Tokyo, 
November/January shipment.”288  However, Hogg & Lytle did not make an offer on timothy 
seeds because the price of Canadian timothy seeds could not compete with American firms.289 
 
 A much more sweeping assessment of trade interests was conducted by Trade and 
Commerce in September after Kenderdine sent Newman a list of various commodities that 
SCAP was inviting offers for tenders on.  Kenderdine also supplied a list of several Canadian 
exporting companies who had representation in Japan at the time.  In Tokyo, there was Jardine 
Matheson & Co., Limited, Dodwell & Co., Limited, Brunner Mond (Japan), Limited, Butterfield 
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and Swire (Swire and Maclaine Limited), and East Asiatic Co., Limited; Cornes & Co. were 
operating out of Yokohama; and Cameron & Co., Limited, were operating out of Osaka.290  Even 
with this information, Kenderdine conceded that he could not be certain of how many Canadian 
companies were operating or the extent that the above companies represented Canadian interests.  
Moreover, because Canadian companies had already plenty of time to negotiate their 
representation in Japan, Kenderdine questioned the value of the continuing to send Trade and 
Department cables when SCAP and the B!eki-ch! offered invitations for tender.291  In response, 
Newman sent a memorandum on 8 October to the Section Chiefs of the Department of Trade and 
Commerce, soliciting information on what commodities they wanted be informed of when SCAP 
or the B!eki-ch! provided these opportunities.292 
 
 The reports that came back from the Section Chiefs contained mixed reactions and were 
compiled and sent to Kenderdine.  J. D. Moorman reported back with a number of 
commodities—mostly large machinery such as trucks and agricultural equipment—that were 
available for immediate export along with the names of firms producing those items that would 
have likely been interested in receiving updates from Kenderdine.293  The Commodity Officer for 
Chemicals and Allied Products, S. G. Barkley, also supplied a similar list.294  Despite the 
availability of products, trade prospects were unfavourable due to a lack of interest in Canadian 
products or because of competition from American companies.  Emphasizing the lack of interest 
from Canadian companies, Moorman wrote, “Up to date we have not received any enquiries for 
the above [trucks and agricultural equipment] to Japan.  It is felt that most of the items 
mentioned could be supplied in competition from the United States.”295  A. M. Tedford, 
Commodity Officer for Non-Ferrous Metals and Non-Metallic Minerals, noted some items could 
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be supplied in competition with the United States, but stated, “It is doubtful if Japan will wish to 
secure the bulk of these items from Canada. ...Up to date coal has been the only item which 
Japan has requested other than asbestos, and some of the non-ferrous metals which, of course, 
are not available.”296  Similarly, L. G. Dornan wrote, “Iron and steel products are in short supply 
and Canadian firms are not in a position to quote on primary or finished steel items at this 
time.”297  Allister S. MacRae, Commodity Officer for Electrical & Electronic Equipment, wrote 
“I cannot think of any items under the purview of this Section that would lend themselves to 
economical development of an order through cable exchanges alone, as a fair amount of specific 
material is usually involved in such transactions of much significance.”298  Nonetheless, a list of 
six categories of commodities was compiled by Trade and Commerce and sent to Kenderdine 21 
October: foodstuffs and allied products; automotive and agricultural machinery and equipment; 
non-ferrous metals and products; chemicals and allied products; leather and textile products; and 
iron steel products (see Appendix 3).299 
 
 Letters from Canadian companies to the Department of Trade and Commerce and 
Kenderdine in 1948 reveal interest in commodity exports such as minerals, ferrous and non-
ferrous metals, logging and associated products such as pulp, foodstuffs (including interest from 
the Purity Popcorn Co.), clothing and tailoring, medical supplies, and toys.  The letters highlight 
the difficulties Canadian companies faced as they attempted to conduct trade and how these 
companies attempted to deal with competing businesses.  One example, Canada Talc Limited 
was unable to export talc in December due to labour problems that had caused a lapse in 
development, although they had “enormous bodies of ore to develop” and stated they would 
notify Trade and Commerce if their company’s position changed.300  Another company, 
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Canadian Refractories Limited, had been in contact with the Department of Trade, Kenderdine, 
and the B!eki-ch! beginning in June 1948.  Responding to a letter that was sent by Tedford on 
14 December, Canadian Refractories revealed that they had lost out on a contract for dead 
burned magnesite to Czechoslovakian magnesite producers who had aggressively cut their prices 
for the Japanese market.301  Normally their company had been able to compete in Europe on 
prices, and intended to pursue the matter with the Canadian Commercial Corporation in 
Washington, hoping that “within a few weeks we can get some of this business rediverted to 
Canada.”302    
 
 Toy companies and wool knit glove producers registered their complaints to the 
Department of Trade and Commerce about competition from Japanese companies.  Toy 
companies were concerned that imports from Japan did not have the country of origin marked on 
imports.303  A special committee of the toy trade was formed with the intent on bringing the 
subject up in Ottawa, so Hall sought information from Kenderdine about the prices and 
production of Japanese toys, along with export markings.304  Wool knit manufacturers pressed 
their case in December (which carried over into 1949) that Japanese wool mitts and gloves were 
being imported at a lower cost into Canada compared to Canadian manufactured gloves.  They 
provided figures showing that per dozen gloves, Japanese imports to Canada cost $3.79, duty 
paid, compared to $8.50 for Canadian wool gloves.305  For mitts, Japanese imports were $3.13 
compared to Canadian manufactured gloves at $4.23 per dozen.306  There was no argument 
against the competition being unfair due to the quality or style of the gloves; rather, the focus 
was on low labour costs bringing down the cost of Japanese gloves.  The solution advocated by 
the Canadian Woolen and Knit Goods Manufacturer’s Association was for duties to be fixed 
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under Section 43 of the Customs Act to bring the imports of Japanese gloves into closer 
approximation with Canadian costs.307 
 
 There were, however, opportunities for new trade alongside the chance to resume prewar 
business.  Colonel Marc Logie went to Japan to work for a newly-formed company associated 
with Colonel de Long, one of the principles of the Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc.308  The 
Silver-Skagit Logging Co., Limited., from Canada, was a “participation venture” of Morrison-
Knudsen, and Colonel Logie supplied the Trade and Commerce with reports about pulp and 
lumber after his first visit to Japan.  Alternatively, H. S. McCarty of Lendrum (Eastern) 
Limited—the “local agents for Export Sales Co., Ltd, Howard Smith Paper Mills and a number 
of other Canadian manufacturers”—was put in touch with Kenderdine prior to his trip to Tokyo 
meant to resume Lendrum’s prewar business.309  Similarly, Trade and Commerce and 
Kenderdine also dealt with non-Japanese companies who had operations in Japan.  D. R. Daver, 
who was in charge of sales in Japan for the R. E. Daver & Co, based in Bombay, had sought the 
Canadian Embassy and its officers in order to enquire about Canadian products for sale in 
Japan.310  Trade and Commerce passed along Kenderdine’s contact information along with 
sending Kenderdine one of Daver’s business cards.  In the cases of H. S. McCarty and R. E. 
Daver & Co., Kenderdine was the principle contact for businesses seeking to do business with 
Canadian companies. 
 
 Interest in trade also came from Japanese companies and local boards of trade that would 
send information, or had their letters forwarded, to the Department of Trade and Commerce or 
Kenderdine.  Periodically companies or boards of trade would send lists containing information 
 
100 
about commodities they were looking to import or export.  Because of Trade and Commerce’s 
existing files on Japanese companies prior to the war, trade restrictions and regulations, and 
Kenderdine’s presence in Japan as the principle connection for Canadian commercial interests 
there, investigating Japanese businesses on behalf of Canadian companies or responding to these 
letters were tasks well-suited to Trade and Commerce and Kenderdine.  In some cases, responses 
to enquiries from companies were handled easily.  For instance, Canada’s Commercial Secretary 
in London, R. Douglas Roe, was contacted in May by K. Kawase who was acting in an 
“honorary capacity” as a representative for the Naigai Trading Company.  Trade regulations 
prevented Japanese businesses from appointing representatives abroad, complicating the ability 
for businesses from both countries to communicate their interests.  However, Trade and 
Commerce was able to obtain information on Kawase who had been living in England for over 
20 years, including during the war, and had worked for the Okura Trading Company which had 
reorganized itself after the war as the Naigai Trading Company.311  Kenderdine was also 
approached by Y. Harada, Director of the Naigai Trading Company, who was interested in 
Canadian suppliers of asbestos, lumber, pulp, flour, and other goods.  Ultimately, it was 
Kenderdine in Japan who handled affairs with the Naigai Trading Company.312   
 
 Another such case involved enquiries made by E. Kagetsu, of Toronto, about importing 
butter, wheat, pulp, and men’s suits.  Kagetsu had been appointed as the Canadian agent for a 
Japanese firm, which surprised Hall from the Asia Section of Foreign Trade given the 
restrictions on such representation at the time.313  Kagetsu expanded on his background and 
qualification in a follow-up letter, stating that he had a letter from the Director of the B!eki-ch! 
dated 3 May 1948, and had worked as a timber exporter in Vancouver prior to the evacuation of 
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Japanese-Canadians in 1942.314  He had received enquiries for exporting nearly 3,000 tons of 
pulp, and was looking for commodity prices, information on export policy, and how payments 
for exports were secured.  Hall’s response to the first letter—surprise aside—provided 
information on trade regulations, noting that butter was under export control, wheat under 
international allocation, and the world shortage of pulp.315  Although the situation was 
improving, Hall wrote in his second letter that “the supply situation [of mechanical pulp] 
prevents such trade except through organization in close association with supplies.”316  It was 
suggested that Kagetsu contact the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association or the Canadian Pulp 
and Paper Association, and he was provided further information about SCAP’s import payment 
procedures.  Hall was unable to supply commodity export prices despite Trade and Commerce’s 
ability to supply similar information to other companies and to Kenderdine.317   
 
    Sometimes obtaining information for or about companies could take months.  The war 
had disrupted business for many Japanese companies, and many had folded or were reorganized 
after the war.  In November, the Fisher Scientific Company Limited from Montreal enquired 
about the Hospital Supply Company—as it was known before the war.318  Trade and Commerce 
had the company on its 1939 index as “exporters of surgical instruments and hospital supplies, 
and importers of prepared medications and toilet articles,” although it could not find reference to 
the company in the B!eki-ch!’s “Who’s Who” of companies.319  Although Kenderdine was 
asked to look into the matter, it was not resolved until January when F. B. Clark communicated 
the findings of G. Moore to the Fisher Scientific Company.  The B!eki-ch! had determined that 
the Hospital Supply Company had been dissolved during the war, and Moore suggested the 
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Matsuanmi Glass Works, based in Osaka, as an alternate supplier for the Fischer Scientific 
Company’s needs.320 
 
 When Japanese companies contacted Canadian companies, Canadian companies were 
sometimes at a loss as to how to make use of the supplied information or what the proper 
response should have been, and would defer the matter to the expertise of the Department of 
Trade and Commerce.  The Nomura Trading Co., and Osaka Asaito Co., Limited, were two such 
companies whose letters were forwarded to the Department of Trade and Commerce in 1948.  
The Nomura Trading Co. enclosed a list of dozens of items that it was able to export and items it 
was looking to import.  The categories of items the Nomura Company was looking to export 
were: textiles; “made-up goods” such handkerchiefs; shirts, beddings, pillow-cases; hosiery; 
blankets and towels; chemicals and drugs; rubber goods; glassware; machineries and tools; and 
sundry goods.321  The principle categories of goods the Nomura Trading Co. was looking to 
import were: raw materials including rubber products, oils, coal and minerals, lumber, cotton and 
leather; foodstuffs such as oils, peas, wheat, cocoa, coffee, and salt and sugar; and manufactured 
goods like dyes, fertilizer, paper, gunny bags, and tobacco.322  In this instance, Kenderdine was 
forwarded a copy of the letter and it was conveyed to the company that Kenderdine would follow 
up with them.323   
 
 In the case of the Osaka Asaito Co., the company sent a letter to the Windsor Chamber of 
Commerce in July advertising the company as “one of the prominent exporters of Linen-goods in 
Japan” and supplied a list of commodities it could export.  The categories including: linen piece 
goods, spun rayon fabrics, tyres and tubes, rubber goods, wooden parts for textile machines, and 
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general merchandise such as toys, buttons, “X-mas goods, etc.”324  In response, H. J. Lassaline, 
Secretary-Manager of the Windsor Chamber of Commerce, forwarded the letter to the 
Department of Trade and Commerce and advised the Osaka Asaito Co. that it had been referred 
to Trade and Commerce.  Hall’s response to the Lassaline consisted of the same stock letter sent 
to other Canadian companies enquiring about trade regulations, and Kenderdine was again left to 
deal with the company in Japan.325  Conversely, when Kenderdine was supplied with pertinent 
information directly from Japanese companies, he would pass this along to Trade and 
Commerce.  As an example, an unnamed exporting house provided potential clients a chart 
outlining a complex, eleven-step procedure for ordering silk fabrics.  Kenderdine obtained a 
copy of this chart and passed it to the Asia Section at Foreign Trade.  He commented on the 
cumbersome process involved in securing transactions for silk that the chart highlighted and also 
stated, “The procedure is not peculiar to silk fabrics, with certain variations the routine applies to 
all export transactions and the paper work involved is really stupendous.”326 
  
 Supply shortages of raw materials and commodities kept Canadian companies from 
exporting certain goods that SCAP and the B!eki-ch! were looking for, while trade restrictions 
and complex procedures caused problems for Canadian businesses looking to do trade.  The 
short time to respond to SCAP’s offers for tenders also made it difficult for Canadian companies 
to respond adequately to trade opportunities, and there existed a lack of interest from Canadian 
companies.  Nonetheless, Canadian exports to Japan increased substantially, from $559,224 in 
1947 to $8,000,548 in 1948.327  In the 15 January 1949 issue of Foreign Trade, Kenderdine 
wrote that Canada had supplied “an appreciable part” of coal exports to Japan, and the first 
postwar shipments of rayon pulp and flaxseed to Japan had come from Canada.328  Imports from 
 
104 
Japan increased from $349,566 to $3,143,995, and Japanese imports to Canada in the first six 
months consisted mostly of sundry consumer goods.329  Table 1.2 provides a breakdown of the 
top commodities traded between Canada and Japan in 1948. 
 
 
Table 1.2 Commodity Breakdown, 1948330 
U.S.$ 
 
Exports to Japan      Value in $ 
Coal        5,079,079 
Flax Seed       1,197,867 
Pulp Sulphate       486,039 
Whiskey       273,942 
Feed Meal       131,567 
 
Imports from Japan  
Scrap Metal       1,615,33 
Food Products (Tea, Oranges, etc.)    355,029  
China and Porcelain Ware     293,977 
Silk Fabrics       226,972 
Cotton Fabrics      96,999
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4  The United States and Japan, 1949: The Dodge Line and Economic Recovery 
 The reverse course was initiated in 1948 as official American policy but the debates 
between Washington and SCAP delayed the introduction of measures aimed towards dealing 
with the Japanese economy’s most serious problems.  General MacArthur was given firm 
directions at the end of 1948 to carry out the policies of NSC 13/2.  To help SCAP and the 
Japanese Government carry out NSC 13/2 and the Nine Point Economic Stabilization Plan,  
Joseph Dodge, president of the Detroit Bank, was requested to visit Japan by President Truman.  
He was given the rank of minister and served as the financial adviser to SCAP.  Dodge’s 
foremost task was to balance Japan’s budget, with the objective of curbing inflation, boosting 
economic production, and, consequently, reduce Japan’s dependence on United States economic 
aid.  To carry this out, Dodge did not simply set edicts; rather, he worked closely on guiding 
policy and created a series of programs that became known as the Dodge Line.331   
 
 The Dodge Line worked by reigning in the factors causing Japan’s inflation and debt, 
while returning the economy to normal practices.  This was achieved, first, by consolidating all 
of the Japanese Government’s accounts including general accounts, special accounts (operation 
of government-owned industries), and accounts of government-affiliated agencies, while 
American aid was also factored into the budget for the first time.332  The effects from this were 
immediate, causing Japan to go from a deficit of 141.9 billion yen in the fiscal year 1948 to a 
surplus of 156.7 billion yen in the fiscal year 1949.333  Furthermore, this had a deflationary effect 
on the economy that lasted into 1950.  The creation of the Counterpart Fund helped control 
Japan’s deficit and reduce American spending since it required the Japanese Government to pay 
into the Fund an equal share of yen as it received from American aid.334  Other measures were 
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introduced to reign in government loans and reduce or eliminate subsidies.  These measures 
helped to boost the Japanese economy, though in June 1949 there was a downturn of the global 
market.  This downturn consequently affected Japan by causing a decrease in demand for 
Japanese exports.  Furthermore, the United Kingdom devalued sterling in September 1949.  
Consequently, SCAP lost $25,000,000 in its holdings of sterling because the sterling agreement 
signed in 1948 contained no provisions that safeguarded Japan from such a devaluation.335  In 
response, “the Japanese Government temporarily suspended the sanctioning and handling of all 
export contracts with countries other than the United States.”336 
 
 Nonetheless, the measures adopted in 1949 addressed many of the more pressing 
problems that had hampered trade in the previous years, such as the lack of a fixed exchange 
rate, reparations removals, and strict economic controls.  On 25 April, the yen was finally set at a 
fixed exchange rate of ¥360 to 1 U.S. dollar.  Regarding reparations, officials in Washington had 
been wrangling over the political and legal consequences of unilaterally ending Japan’s 
reparations program.  However, it was viewed as a necessary step to help rebuild Japan’s 
economy, and on 12 May, interim directive Serial No. 104 was issued and General McCoy who, 
in turn, relayed to the Far Eastern Commission that the reparations removal program was ended.  
The United States gradually loosened its control over Japan’s trade and economic institutions 
over the course of 1949.  In February, SCAP transferred all control over foreign exchange 
derived from international trade, and the Japanese Government was later given almost total 
control over the negotiations of raw materials and foodstuffs.  An important development for 
Japan’s long-term trade policies and conduct was the merger of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry and the B!eki-ch! to create the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.  
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Ultimately, the measures in 1949 to revive Japan’s economy and improve its international trade 
led to the  1 December SCAP directive “Licence Free Exports” (SCAPIN 2059) that gave the 
Japanese Government almost complete control over Japan’s international trade beginning on 1 
January 1950.  Also passed on 1 December was the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Control Law.  This law, at first glance, seemingly placed limits on Japan’s international trade by 
necessitating that foreign exchange acquired by citizens from private trade be turned over to a 
government account that ESB was in charge of.337  However, MITI retained the law for another 
30 years.  Beginning in 1950, trade was conducted almost entirely by the Japanese Government 





5  Canada and Japan, 1949: Most Favoured Nation Treatment and GATT  
 With the United States taking more direct control over policies to remedy Japan’s 
economic problems, the Far Eastern Commission’s ability to enact policy that affected Japan’s 
economy was effectively marginalized over the course of 1949.  The unilateral termination of 
reparations removals by the United States put an end to one of the biggest points of contention in 
the Far Eastern Commission, yet mounting tensions between the United States, Soviet Union, 
and China finally began to seriously prevent the Commission from carrying out its work.338  The 
consequent deadlocks and delays in the Far Eastern Commission along with the United States’ 
willingness to take a more unilateral approach to rehabilitating the Japanese economy meant that 
Canada was rapidly losing the voice it had to affect broader Japanese economic policy through 
the Far Eastern Commission.  There was however, a change at the Canadian Liaison Mission 
with the appointment of Joseph Cleland Britton as the Department of Trade and Commerce’s 
new Commercial Representative.  It had been announced in the 11 September 1948 issue of 
Foreign Trade that Britton would take over from Kenderdine at the end of 1948 because 
Kenderdine planned to return to private business in British Columbia.339  Britton was extensively 
qualified for the position, having worked for the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service since 
1931 except from June 1942 to May 1943 when he was part of the Royal Canadian Naval 
Volunteer Reserve.  Prior to his appointment to the Canadian Liaison Mission, he was the 
Commercial Secretary in St. John’s, Newfoundland. 
 
 Despite the deterioration of the Far Eastern Commission, the Canadian Government was 
able to address the pressing issue of whether to grant Japan most favoured nation treatment.  This  
fell outside of the Commission’s purview and related directly to Canada’s postwar economic 
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policies that favoured multilateralism and economic liberalization. The United States intended to 
raise the issue during the Third Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, in Annecy France.  With the conference slated to begin on 8 April 1949, the 
Canadian Government was pressed to resolve its policies on the matter.  Throughout 1948, the 
government had been warm to the idea of granting most favoured nation status to Japan, but the 
deliberations continued into 1949.  The discussions that occurred between March and early April 
had the greatest impact on Canada’s position whether to grant most favoured nation treatment to 
Japan.  Input was obtained from representatives of Canadian industries, the Department of Trade 
and Commerce, the Canadian Liaison Mission, and other governments including the United 
States and those present for the pre-Annecy Commonwealth discussions held in London.340   
 
 The Canadian Manufacturer’s Association made their views known in late December 
1948 and early March 1949, arguing against granting most favoured nation treatment to Japan.   
J. T. Stirrett, General Manager of the association, expressed several concerns to the Secretary of 
State for External Affairs on 23 December that concerned the contentious trading practices by 
Japanese companies from 1932 to 1939.  The foremost practices said to have jeopardized 
Canadian manufacturing industries during this period were the wholesale dumping of cheap 
Japanese goods, and Japanese companies going so far as to copy Canadian products—including 
the “Made in Canada” label.341  Stirrett then referred back to the issue of knitted gloves in 
December 1948, contending that the lower cost of Japanese textiles entering Canada, even after 
duty and freight were paid, were “below Canadian factory costs in competitive lines” and that 
this posed a threat to Canadian manufacturers.342  Prewar competition from Japan was described 
as “ruthless” in Stirrett’s March letter, and he argued that granting most favoured nation 
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treatment to Japan would result in a repeat of the “disastrous competition” of the prewar years343  
It was further argued granting most favoured nation treatment to Japan would bind the Canadian 
Government’s ability to take “drastic” actions to prevent undue competition from Japanese 
exports.  Records indicate that the Canadian Government seriously took into consideration the 
concerns of Canadian manufacturers as it mulled what policy to pursue.   
 
 Canadian officials met with United States officials on 5 March in Washington and on 16 
March in Ottawa.  The first meeting was held in the office of Merrill C. Gay, of the Commercial 
Policy Division.  American officials were said to be “most anxious” for Canada’s support at the 
Annecy conference while Gay expressed that Canadian and American interests were similar.  
However, Gay raised a number of questions that continued to perplex the Canadian government: 
the lack of a fixed exchange rate; the practice of dumping, to which Gay cited the concerns about 
Japanese gloves and toys; and reports from Tokyo that bilateral trade arrangements were being 
insisted upon by SCAP “for any trade at all.”344  Colonel L. F. Schockner, representing the 
United States Army’s Civil Affairs Division, responded to concerns about Japanese dumping, 
countering that the United States would also not want to see a revival of such practices.  
Concerning the cases of Japanese gloves, it was stated that United States officials were aware of 
the problem but needed more information to ascertain its seriousness.  Both the glove and toy 
issues were explained as exceptional cases that had likely escaped SCAP’s attention.345  Colonel 
Shockner also responded to concerns that bilateral arrangements were needed in West Germany 
despite most favoured nation treatment applying there, saying his suspicion was that “export-
import planning was probably the objective, rather than firm commitments.”346  The Canadian 
official made clear that no official position could be taken at the time.   
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 A letter sent by Pearson to Britton on 9 March highlights a number of the considerations 
the Canadian Government was taking into account that connected most favoured nation 
treatment to its trade practices with Japan.  Broadly stated, Pearson asked: whether granting most 
favoured nation states or agreeing to a bilateral trade agreement would affect Canada’s trade 
obligations such as the non-discriminatory obligation in the Geneva Agreement; whether SCAP 
was guided by GATT and the International Monetary Fund rules; what the current trade policies 
in Japan were including information on dumping and controls on imports, exports, pricing, and 
quantity; and whether Canadian trade with Japan could only be maintained by agreeing to 
granting it most favoured nation treatment or concluding a bilateral arrangement.347  Britton 
clarified what bilateral trade arrangements between and Japan other countries meant, and added 
that granting most favoured nation treatment to Japan could assist Canada’s bargaining position 
if it were to negotiate a bilateral trade arrangement with Japan through SCAP.348  While neither 
providing most favoured nation treatment or concluding a bilateral trade arrangement meant that 
Canadian goods would be discriminated against, Britton pointed out that SCAP was more likely 
to direct trade to those countries that provided reciprocal treatment to exports from Japan, and 
most favoured nation treatment would indicate Canada’s willingness to increase its Japanese 
imports.349  However, Pearson noted that SCAP had approached Canadian officials about a 
possible bilateral trade arrangement that was similar to one received from the Joint Export-
Import Agency prior to 16 March meeting in Ottawa.  This had raised some doubts about 
SCAP’s intention to trade on a most favoured nation basis.350  Nonetheless, the conclusion of 
trade agreements by the United Kingdom and Australia with Japan was taken by Britton to 
indicate their satisfaction with SCAP’s conformity to GATT and IMF rules; dumping was 
unlikely because floor prices on Japanese exports had been established by SCAP in conformity 
 
112 
with global norms.351  Britton opined that Canada might conclude arrangements following the 
Annecy conference that conformed to Canadian trade policy.352 
  
 Dana W. Wilgress, Canada’s High Commissioner in London, cabled Ottawa on 10 March 
reporting about the American preparations for the conference and views from the United 
Kingdom Government about the situation.  United States officials had been preparing the 
proposal based on a system in effect in West Germany at the time, though there were 
ruminations about modifying the a proposal to “impose some reciprocal obligations on SCAP” 
and in case a fixed exchange rate was not established during the conference.353  American 
manufacturers were also worried about unfair competition from Japan.354  To this end, Pearson 
later replied to Wilgress that the prevailing view from Ottawa was that the United States had 
been making a number of promises about Japan’s economic rehabilitation that had not come into 
effect yet: “At the official level here the view is held that the U.S. is putting the cart before the 
horse.”355  Like the Canadian Government, the United Kingdom Government had not committed 
to the policy either way.  It was Wilgress’ contention that the United Kingdom was unlikely to 
agree to grant Japan most favoured nation treatment because criticism was mounting in the 
British Parliament, press and industry, while political difficulties could have been expected from 
Australia and New Zealand.356  Moreover, some British officials seemed to think it was a non-
urgent matter, although the United Kingdom Ambassador was asked to gauge the seriousness of 
the United States on the subject.357  India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, expressed in a 
telegram that Japan should be “encouraged to participate in world trade on the basis of equality 
with other nations, subject to suitable safeguards for the security and general interest of allied 
powers.”358  The telegram was only meant to state the Indian Government’s views, but echoed 
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calls for certain conditions to be met, such as establishing a fixed exchange rate and having 
measures in place to prevent unfair competition from Japan, prior to granting Japan most 
favoured nation treatment.359 
 
 The 16 March meeting with United States officials did not sway the Canadian 
Government.  Four days prior to the meeting, Pearson wrote to Wilgress that the government had 
accepted the general recommendations of a 3 March memorandum, though it was undecided 
whether a public statement would be made before the conference.360  Pearson presented Cabinet 
with a memorandum outlining the policy decisions of the Cabinet Committee on External Trade 
Policy that had been recommended by Interdepartmental Committee.  Initially, the Cabinet 
Committee on External Trade policy had agreed on three of four points: the Canadian 
Government could not consider entering into an agreement at the time; the delegation to Annecy 
should try to get the United States to drop or postpone their proposal; and if the United States 
would not agree, the Canadian delegation should consider a conditional most favoured nation 
agreement that protected Canadian industries.361  Left undecided still was whether a public 
statement should have been made before the conference began.  The memorandum 
recommended that a draft for a press release be created that emphasized the government’s 
consideration of Canadian industrial concerns.  The draft release was supposed to: 
 (a) refer to the submissions which the Government [had] received from Canadian 
 manufacturers and traders on the question of most-favoured-nation treatment for Japan; 
 (b) point out that no specific proposals [had] as yet been received by the Canadian 
 Government, although it [was] known that the United States [would] probably be raising 
 the issue at the Annecy meeting, and 
 (c) give assurance that in any such discussions as might take place at Annecy, the views 




A press release was drafted that referred to the “many submissions the Government has recently 
received from Canadian manufacturers and traders regarding trade relations with Japan” but 
stated that the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Pearson, had not heard of any specific 
proposals.363 
 
 At the Annecy conference, the United States’ proposal “most-favoured-nation treatment 
for Japan” was item 12 on the agenda.  During the pre-Annecy Commonwealth discussions,  
the United Kingdom indicated that it would not enter into negotiations during the conference and 
communicated this to the United States.364  Even so, the issue was brought up in the British 
House of Commons on 19 May.  Albert Richie, First Secretary, High Commission in United 
Kingdom, noted that William Treling was interested to know “what members of the British 
Commonwealth, particularly Canada, feel about this matter [MFN treatment for Japan]” during 
his questions to Arthur Bottomley, Secretary for Overseas Trade.365  Faced with a lack of 
support, the United States requested on 12 June that item 12 be withdrawn from the conference.  
The issue, however, was not finished for the Canadian Government nor the Americans.  On 26 
September the Canadian Government deliberated whether Japan should receive an invitation to 
enter into tariff negotiations with the Contracting Parties to the General Trade Agreement and 
other countries about its possible accession into the GATT.  The Contracting Parties to the 
GATT were set to meet in September 1950 for the next round of tariff negotiations.  If a vote 
was passed by the Contract Parties, Japan would have been accorded most favoured nation 
treatment by Canada due to Canada’s position as a Contracting Party.  In a memorandum from 
26 September 1949, Pearson stated that while the United States had faced opposition from the 
Contracting Parties at Annecy, Canada’s position to “persuade the United States to drop, or at 
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least postpone, the whole proposal” was likely the deciding factor that caused the United States 
to eventually withdraw the issue from the Annecy agenda.366   
 
 Pearson offered the major arguments for and against supporting the ascension of Japan 
into the GATT.  The arguments were telling of Canada’s conception of multilateralism and 
economic liberalization in the postwar era.  Seven arguments were presented for supporting the 
United States’ policy.367  First, Canada had been committed to lowering trade tariffs since World 
War II, and going against this policy would have opened Canada to accusations that it had 
abused or was giving up the most favoured nation approach to trade.  Second, Canada’s policy 
was to help rebuild the economies of countries like Japan, and a continued trade deficit along 
with excluding Japan from useful markets had the potential to turn the country into a “fertile 
field for the spread of misery, disease and communism.”  Third, Japan’s prewar trading practices 
had been motivated by their war aims, but with the prewar motivations, government and threat 
removed, Japan could become self-sufficient if it had access to the world markets.  Fourth, 
Canada would be at a disadvantage to other countries who offered Japan most favoured nation 
treatment.  Fifth, the implementation of single fixed exchange rate for the yen had eliminated one 
of the major arguments against providing MFN treatment to Japan.  Sixth, tariffs on goods from 
the United States exports to Japan might be lowered during negotiations between the two 
countries.  Finally, membership in the GATT would bind Japan to supervisory rules that went 
beyond those of the most favoured nation treatment. 
 
 The arguments Pearson presented against supporting Japan’s accession into the GATT 
were similar to the ones used against according Japan most favoured nation treatment earlier in 
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the year.368  First, it was argued the practice of dumping Japanese goods was likely to occur in 
Canada and other markets.  There were fears of competition from cheap labour and Japanese 
goods being sold below cost, while it was further worried that Japanese goods such as textiles, 
metal products, pottery, and glassware could be placed in markets that threatened Canadian 
companies.  Harkening to its trade partnership with the United States, Pearson offered that 
Canada’s most favoured nation duties were already lower than those of the United States.  In 
regards to the United Kingdom, it was argued that Canadian imports of United Kingdom goods 
could be harmed by competition from Japanese goods.  Finally, Pearson stated “that the question 
of Japanese trade and tariffs should not be considered separately from Japan’s industrial and 
economic future.”369   
 
 Ultimately, the Cabinet denied most favoured nation treatment to Japan the following 
day, and the issue was not resolved until after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.  
The Canadian Government did not make any moves to hinder the recovery of Japan’s industrial 
or economic recovery nor its international trade, and the withdrawal of support at the time was 
not out of line with its policies of multilateralism or economic liberalization.  The benefits of 
most favoured nation treatment had the potential of being conveyed in the following year or with 







6  Canada in Japan, 1949: Private Trade Stalled 
 Despite the implementation of the Nine Point Economic Stabilization Program in the first 
half of 1949 and the creation of Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Canadian exports 
to Japan were lower in 1949 than in 1948.  Japan’s total exports in 1949 doubled from their 1948 
value to approximately $500,000,000, while imports grew 38% for a total of $940,000,000.370  
Japanese exports to Canada also rose considerably.  However, the figures of Canadian-Japanese 
trade from this time are somewhat muddled.  According to an article published by Britton in 
Foreign Trade on 8 March 1950, Canada exports to Japan increased slightly from U.S. 
$4,018,786 in 1948 to $5,443,118 in 1949, while Japanese exports to Canada rose from  
$1,911,698 in 1948 to $5,102,934 in 1949.371  This contradicts figures provided by the Asia 
Section of the Foreign Trade Service in March 1949 that indicated Canadian exports to Japan 
were valued at $8,000,548 in 1948 while imports of Japanese goods were valued at $3,143,995.  
The trade statistics used by the Asia Section of the Foreign Trade Service match those obtained 
by Michael G. Fry from the Dominion Bureau of Statistic’s External Trade Branch/Section 
publication, Review of Foreign Trade, Calendar Years 1947-1957.372  Furthermore, the Asia 
Section’s statistics also match those that later appeared in an article by the Foreign Trade Service 
in early 1951 (see Table 1.3).  Britton provides a breakdown of commodities traded in 1949, but 
the commodities do not mesh with the trade situation at the time.  For instance, Britton lists coal 
as the third largest Canadian export to Japan in 1949.  However, as this section shows, Canadian 
coal exporters faced difficulties competing in 1949.  Britton was correct to say that Japanese 
exports to Canada increased in 1949, but even here his figures do not gel.  From the accounts of 
the letters sent by the Department of Trade and Commerce, 1949 was a difficult year for 
Canadian companies looking to export to Japan.  Consequently, it is the position of this thesis to 
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agree with the figures provided by the Asia Section of the Foreign Trade Service and those 
provided by Michael G. Fry in his monograph on Canadian-Japanese trade.  Canadian trade 
dropped in 1949 from $8,000,000 in 1948 to $5,860,000 in 1949.  The major factors that 
contributed to this drop were issues with trade procedures, competition from the United States, 
and the lack of a bilateral trade arrangement between Canada and Japan.  One further point of 
clarification is necessary, though.  Britton, in his new capacity as Canada’s Commercial 
Representative at the Canadian Liaison Mission, worked extremely hard throughout 1949 and 
would have been very familiar with Canadian-Japanese trade by 1950.  This section is only 
possible due to the surviving records of his work and contains many of his observations and 
arguments. 
 
 Trade policies and competition from United States companies worked to the disadvantage 
of Canada in a number of ways.  In March 1949, the Department of Trade and Commerce 
solicited input from its staff and Kenderdine—though he no longer worked for them—about 
adverse factors affecting Canadian exports to Japan.  F. B. Clark responded on 12 March that the 
failure of Canadian companies to offer competitive pricing and their inability to meet delivery 
dates at times were significant factors limiting their trade, but that competition from American 
companies was the foremost factor hindering Canadian exports.373  Firms that had representation 
in Japan were already at an advantage over those attempting trade from abroad, and Clark argued 
that American firms, well-established and with close contacts with SCAP, had an increased 
advantage to Canadian companies.  He provided an example from 1948 when SCAP placed a 
tender for eight million feet of lumber.  Companies on Canada’s west coast were able fulfill this 
request and their costs were lower, but the orders were placed with the United States.374  It was 
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also argued that the fixed exchange rate, which had not been set by March, and the fluctuation of 
commodity prices were other factor affecting Canadian exports.  T. M. Burns echoed Clark’s 
arguments, saying Canadian and American commodities often overlapped and that the latter 
tended to be favoured.375  Burns also recognized that bids from Canadian companies were often 
higher than those from United States sources, and that the presence of American firms along with 
their contacts to SCAP in Japan worked to Canada’s disadvantage.376  Kenderdine also shared 
Clark and Burns’ views and added that the lack of a reciprocal trading agreement between 
Canada and SCAP harmed Canadian exports.377  Still, Burns and Kenderdine were understanding 
that the preponderance of American companies and the United States “peculiar position” 
overseeing and controlling the Occupation gave American companies a natural advantage. 
 
 Canadian companies also faced issues with supplies, at times quality, and competition 
due to bilateral trade arrangements.  For instance, pig iron and iron ore were not available for 
export.  On the east coast, Dominion Steel and Coal was not interested in shipping from their 
deposits in Newfoundland, and Steep Rock Iron Mines Limited were satisfied selling their excess 
material to the United States.378  On the west coast, Texado was insufficiently developed to 
supply iron ore at the time.379  Alberta contained most of Canada’s coking coal supplies, but 
American companies were at an advantage because of the high freight costs on shipping supplies 
from Alberta.380  High ash content in coal from Canada’s west coast in 1948 had also caused the 
loss of some coal orders in early 1949.381  In 1948, United States companies were supplying 
Western Europe with the bulk of its coal, which was a contributing factor to Canada’s high 
volume of coal exports to Japan that year.382  Weakened demand for coal in Western Europe in 
1949 meant that American companies could cut into the Canadian share of coal exports.383  
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Canadian supplies of wheat had sufficiently increased to be exportable compared to the previous 
years, but imports of foodstuffs continued to only be for relief purposes or use in manufacturing 
commodities.384  Wheat exports remained problematic for Canadian companies until 1950.   
 
 Canadian companies lost the chance to offer tenders on 20,000 metric tons of wheat 
sometime around September 1949 due to the sterling area agreement with Japan that excluded 
offers from countries outside the sterling area.385  Likewise, the British Columbia Pulp and Paper 
Company Limited had lost business because of bilateral trade arrangements.  The company had 
shipped rayon to Japan prior to the war, was one of the first companies from Canada to send a 
representative to Japan in fall 1947, and had shipped 2,000 metric tons of rayon pulp in 1948.386  
For 1949, they “were encouraged to believe” they would receive a contract for 25,000 metric 
tons of rayon pulp, but were left with a contract for only 10,000 metric tons.  Their prices were 
competitive and the quality of their products well respected by Japanese buyers.  R. J. Killam, 
Company Representative, stated, “It is a peculiarity of the rayon pulp business that rayon 
manufacturers like to get used to two or three particular pulps and maintain this blend steadily so 
as to eliminate variations in their product.”387  According to Killam, the problem was that SCAP 
was allotting fewer U.S. dollars to rayon pulp purchases, favouring sterling area countries and 
companies who were conducting private barters.  In the 11 June 1949 copy of Foreign Trade, 
Britton argued that bilateral trade arrangements between Japan and other countries, along with 







growth of Canadian exports to Japan in 1949.388  On 11 July, Britton wrote to Heasman: 
 I have repeatedly referred to the obstacles confronting Canadian exporters endeavouring 
 to sell their products in Japan and you will be aware that although there would appear to 
 be many items on the import requirements list which could be supplied competitively by 
 Canada, in actual fact the commodities are obtained through the United States or 
 countries having trade agreements with Japan. 
 
Britton also argued in September that the rigid policy of balancing trade meant that the new trade 
measures being introduced for late 1949 and early 1950 were unlikely to help increase Canadian 
exports for several months.389  Bartering agreements and bilateral trade arrangements were not 
uniform in all instances, though, and the Japanese Government worked on revising these 
regulations in early 1950.390   
 
 The Canadian Government was committed to GATT and economic liberalization, but the 
issue of most favoured nation treatment to Japan was not decided upon until the end of 
September.  Because the government was satisfied that its trading policies with Japan were 
similar to most favoured nation treatment, no additional bilateral trade arrangement was seen as 
necessary.  Japanese goods were already being imported at a higher rate to balance trade, and an 
agreement would have been unlikely to increase Canadian exports.  Furthermore, as Clark stated 
in his March letter, “Japanese goods offered for export [were] not essential to the Canadian 
economy.”391  The Canadian Government was content to wait for SCAP to implement its reverse 
course policies in 1949 instead of settling on a trade arrangement that only had the possibility of 




 SCAP’s policies in 1949 were beneficial for some Canadian exports.  The fixed exchange 
rate eliminated one of the biggest problems of the preceding years.  Likewise, SCAP had 
provided more time to submit tenders on trade offers, companies were more acquainted with the 
procedures of dealing with the Japanese market, trade procedures had also been simplified, and 
delays at the B!eki-ch! had been reduced.392  Overall interest from Canadian companies for 
conducting trade with Japan remained low for most of 1949, but the Department of Trade and 
Commerce did receive a steady stream of enquiries from businesses looking for assistance.393  
Not all Canadian companies had difficulties dealing with SCAP and the B!eki-ch!.  Torao 
Okimi, from Hamilton Beach, Ontario, was satisfied with the responses received from SCAP, the 
B!eki-ch! and Kenderdine about trade possibilities.394  Britton was helping negotiate sales of 
Canadian wheat as a private barter transaction at the end of 1949.395  He was also working on 
three other private barter deals at the time, one of which was for unbleached sulphite pulp, and 
wrote to Heasman that “a number of Canadian firms are seriously considering private deals with 
Japan.”396  Likewise, enquiries and offers from Japanese companies continued to be received by 
Trade and Commerce and Britton.  The Far East Company, in Tokyo, sent Trade and Commerce 
a letter offering chemicals, camphor products and silk textiles, and was interested in Canadian 
agricultural products, particularly oil-bearing seeds.397  On 5 November, T. Itoh, Managing 
Director of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, wrote to the Board of Trade of the 
City of Toronto requesting information on imports and exports.398  Acting on behalf of “private 
Japanese concerns,” I. A. Davis, of Davis & Company, sent Trade and Commerce a request for 




 In September, Britton anticipated that SCAP was working towards using more funds 
from its commercial accounts to increase the purchase of raw materials and foodstuffs.400  There 
was other good news that SCAP was transferring greater control over the trade of raw materials 
and foodstuffs to the Japanese Government.  In December, Britton went on to write Colonel 
Cosgrave about the significant reorganization and reduction of SCAP’s economic staff.   
 There appears to be no doubt that SCAP are getting out from under insofar as trade is 
 concerned and that it will be entirely in the hands of private trading firms in Japan.  At 
 the present time traders in Japan are dealing mainly with the Japanese Department of 
 International Trade and Industry [MITI] and virtually ignoring the recently powerful 
 SCAP Foreign Trade Division.401 
 
Trade arrangements between Japan and other countries were expected to increase in 1950 which 
could have limited Canada’s trade potential, but the Japanese Government was set to assume 
control over most aspects of Japan’s international trade on 1 January 1950.  Despite a poor year 












War and Peace, 1950-1951: 
The Korean War and the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
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1  Canada in Japan, 1950-1951: Trade Partners 
 On 8 September 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed by Japan and 48 
countries including Canada, and went into force on 28 April 1952, officially ending the war and 
the Occupation.  It was during these last two years leading up to the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
that the Japanese Government assumed almost total control over its international trade.  The 
creation of MITI and the Foreign Exchange Control Board in 1949, along with the creation of the 
Export Bank of Japan in December 1950 (later renamed the Export-Import Bank of Japan in 
April 1952), reshaped the institutional structure of how trade was planned and conducted.  On 1 
January 1950, the Japanese Government gained oversight over most of the country’s private 
trade.402  The country had actually entered 1950 experiencing one of the worst economic 
downturns of the Occupation period.403  Prices of Japanese goods had increased after the British 
pound was devalued in September 1949, causing thirty other countries to devalue their 
currencies, and harming Japanese exports to important markets.404  However, the outbreak of the 
Korean War on 25 June 1950 created a demand for Japanese goods, notably from orders placed 
by the United States, and led to an economic boom that curtailed the severe economic downturn 
that began in late 1949.  Trade between Canada and Japan benefited from the relaxation of trade 
regulations and restrictions along with the demand generated by the Korean War.  The benefits 
of new trade policies in early 1950 were not immediate, but by the end of 1951, Japan was 
Canada’s fourth largest export market.405 
 
 At the Far Eastern Commission, the Soviet Union withdrew its delegation on 19 January 
1950 after a vote failed to remove the Chinese delegation because they still represented the 
Kuomintang.406  The Commission decided that the absence of the Soviet delegation did not 
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constitute a de facto veto, but its activities were still in decline and the Commission began 
holding its meetings once every two weeks after 6 April 1950.  To help break the Commission’s 
deadlock, SCAP issued interim directives on two FEC policy papers in January, “Japanese 
Official Agents Abroad for Trade Purposes” and “Japanese Official Agents Abroad for Handling 
Civil Status and Property Matters”, and issued another interim directive in February on 
“Japanese Participation in Technical Agreements and Conference.”  The first two papers had 
been vetoed by the Soviets prior to their departure on 19 January, while the third paper had 
approval in the Steering Committee but had not made it to a vote by the Commission.407  Policy 
papers on agricultural reform, intellectual property, and the cessation of the trial of war criminals 
were developed by the Commission during its last years, but items 4 through 11 on the agenda 
were listed as “inactive” after 13 July.408  The last meeting of the Far Eastern Commission was 
held on 20 September 1951.  Because the peace treaty would restore Japan’s sovereignty, there 
was no future need for the Commission.  Members of the Far Eastern Commission agreed “that 
the Commission [hold] its next meeting whenever any representative should desire,” and the 
Commission itself was disbanded on 28 April 1952.409  Even after the return of the Soviet 
delegation in October 1950, the work performed by the Commission in its final years two years 
did not impact the Japanese economy. 
 
 The most substantial developments for the Canadian Government’s long-term Japanese 
interests during 1950-1951 occurred outside of the Far Eastern Commission.  The Canadian 
Government considered issues such as Japan’s admittance to international bodies like the World 
Health Organization and the International Labour Organization, but these discussions were not 
strictly limited to the Far Eastern Commission’s activities.  More important was that the process 
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towards a peace treaty with Japan, a matter that had been mostly stalled since August 1947 for 
governments other than the United States, gained momentum in 1950.  The history of how the 
peace treaty was developed during the final years of the Occupation is beyond the scope of this 
study, but remarks are necessary on Canada’s economic interests in the final peace treaty.  
Leading up to the peace conference, Canada participated in the Commonwealth Conference of 
Foreign Ministers held in Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), in January 1950, and the Associated 
Commonwealth Working Party on a Japanese peace treaty in May 1950.  The Canadian 
Government was also in close contact with the United States during the negotiations over 1950-
1951.  As a matter of official policy, security remained the Canadian Government’s top priority, 
but it was the government’s specific economic interests that shaped the final peace treaty.  First, 
Canadian views on Japan’s fisheries, due in large part to the work of the Department of 
Fisheries, were instrumental to the final revisions of Article 9 Chapter 4 of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty.  Secondly, Canada did not want reference to Japan’s potential participation in the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade included, though the government’s policy to support 
Japan’s eventual integration into the multilateral systems of the time was maintained.  Lastly, 
going back to 1946, Canadian insurance companies had a vested interest in their Japanese 
business.  The government’s persistence that provisions related to insurance companies be 
included was instrumental in the development of section D of the Protocol to the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, “Insurance And Insurance Contracts (Other than Life) Which Had Not Terminated 
Before The Date At Which The Parities Became Enemies.” 
 
 Leading up to the peace treaty, the Canadian Liaison Mission underwent its most 
significant change with the departure of E. H. Norman who was recalled to Ottawa in October 
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1950 due to the allegations of Norman’s alleged communist activities.410  Pearson, who had the 
utmost confidence in Norman and his work, defended him publicly against these charges, and 
Norman was eventually exonerated of the charges of disloyalty.  Such was the trust that the 
Canadian Government had in Norman that he was appointed Head of the American and Far 
Eastern Division in December, and also the Acting Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations at the end of May 1951.  Norman accompanied Pearson as an advisor to San Francisco 
for the peace treaty conference.  At the Liaison Mission, Norman was replaced by Arthur 
Menzies as Head of the Mission.  Previous to his appointment, Menzies had served as the Head 
of the American and Far Eastern Division.  J. C. Britton continued in his role as the Commercial 
Representative.  
 
 Trade negotiations, as of 1 January 1950, were handled directly by MITI and Japanese 
import houses and overseas exporters, but the early months of 1950 were confusing for Trade 
and Commerce since the effects of new regulations were unknown and potential for growth of 
Canadian exports still seemed low.  The two major stumbling blocks towards increasing 
Canadian-Japanese trade at the beginning of 1950 were the need to balance trade between the 
two countries, as it was a matter of SCAP policy, and the lack of a bilateral trade arrangement. 
The value of Japan’s total imports in the first nine months of 1950 reflected these early 
problems: imports were valued at U.S.$683,392,518, a decrease from the same period in 1949 of 
U.S.$739,746,165.411  Japanese exports, though, were up compared to the same period in 1949.  
Even so, the dwindling trade in the first months of 1950 necessitated SCAP to conserve the 
limited resources of U.S. dollars available to Japan while pressure was put on the Japanese 
Government to use supplies of U.S. dollar and Sterling derived from its own exports.412  For 
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Canada, this meant that Japan was unlikely to import Canadian goods unless they were 
unobtainable from other sources.413   
 
 The shortage of U.S. dollars was a drawback connected to both of the major issues 
affecting Canadian-Japanese trade in early 1950.  Canada’s policy regarding bilateral trading 
agreements had not changed from the previous years.  This position was firmly restated by C. M. 
Isbister, Director, International Trade Relations, in July:  
 The Canadian market is very freely open to imports from abroad.  For this very reason it 
 is not proposed to enter trade agreements by which balanced trade is to be achieved either 
 by the use of discretionary import regulations or by Government guarantees of minimum 
 imports from some other country.  It is not possible at the present time for the Canadian 
 Government to contemplate any further loans abroad.  In conclusion, the Canadian 
 Government’s avoidance of bilateral trade agreements of the type probably contemplated 
 by Japan is based upon our inability to adapt to our economy the techniques by which 
 such agreements are usually implemented.414 
 
Confidentially, Isbister added that the Canadian public was worried about the reemergence of 
Japan’s prewar trading practices, but that Cabinet had decided in early 1950 to not oppose 
Japan’s participation in the GATT.  The government’s position was one of neutrality, but Isbister 
recognized that Canada would eventually be forced to take a public position in favour or in 
opposition.  At the time, the government was content that its own policies of economic 
liberalization were sufficient and that it did not need to venture into risky agreements.  Likewise, 
it was in no rush to see a substantial return of Japanese exports arriving in Canada.  C. F. 
McGinnis, Director of the Import Division, wrote to Heasman regarding a company looking to 
facilitate Japanese exports into Canada: “In the case of goods of Japanese origin, I think we will 
have all we can handle in the way of direct importations and the repercussions that usually 
follow them, without being flooded with similar commodities through the United States that 




 Speaking to the problem of balanced trade, Japan’s import requirements in early 1950 
remained tightly regulated: items not listed on the Japanese import program required the 
Japanese Government and SCAP’s approval, and it was not expected that calling for offers or 
tenders would be used except in some instances where the Japanese Government might have 
imported products for distribution within Japan.416  Britton communicated in January, “... the 
value of Canadian exports to this country will still be largely determined by the extent of 
Canadian purchases of Japanese products.”417  On 17 March John English, Commercial 
Counsellor at the Canadian Embassy in New York, relayed to Heasman a memorandum he had 
received as part of a deputation from an American firm, Oriental Exporters Inc.  The 
memorandum presented the issue of balanced trade and how Japan’s U.S. dollar deficit in its 
trade with both the United States and Canada were two of the foremost problems facing 
Canadian-Japanese trade: “It is evident at present that the total amount of Canada-Japan trade is 
dependent upon the quality and dollar value of goods that Canada is willing and able to purchase 
from Japan.  ...Her meagre dollar earnings will be spent for dollar commodities ... and other 
products which cannot be procured from other areas other than the U.S.”418  The memorandum’s 
assessments were, in fact, incisive at the time.  When Import Notice No. 10 was released in the 
spring, no provisions were made for the importation of Canadian wheat for April through June.  
An anticipated provision for 2,000 tons of sulphite pulp from Canada was also absent; imports 
for sulphite pulp from Sweden and the Netherlands were listed.   
 
 The downbeat prospects for trade eventually proved to be inaccurate, however.  Canadian 
exports to Japan were certainly not aided by the system of controls in place and exports of raw 
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materials did suffer, but trade between the two countries in the first six months of 1950 improved 
over the same period the previous year.  Importantly, MITI had been making overtures to Britton 
and Trade and Commerce during the first half of 1950 about increasing the quantity of Japan’s 
Canadian imports.  In the same correspondence about Import Notice No. 10, Britton mentioned 
that Japanese importers were pressing MITI “...to set up some system under which they can 
import raw materials from Canada on a regularly scheduled basis either by private barter or on 
straight cash terms.”419  MITI also indicated to Britton in May that “private barter offers on 
Canadian rayon would be considered,” and that a provision for 2,000 tons of sulphite pulp on a 
barter basis for that quarter was expected in further Import Notices.420   Britton, as stated in the 
previous section, was assisting a company in its negotiations in December 1949 to export 
unbleached sulphite pulp during December 1949.  In January he was trying to help a Canadian 
exporter in Tokyo “launch a barter deal based on rayon pulp, sulphite or sulphate pulp and 
lumber.”421  Entering into 1950, Canadian wheat exports were approved by the Japanese 
Government and SCAP on a barter basis.  Even though Canadian wheat was not on the list of 
imports for April through June, wheat exports accounted for 70 per cent of Canada’s exports to 
Japan for the six months of 1950.422  During this time, the value of Canada’s exports was over 
$10,000,000—up from $4,500,000 for the first six months of 1949.423  The value of Japanese 
exports to Canada also rose in the first six months to $4,500,000.424  Considering the loss of 
some of Canada’s other commodity exports during this time, the value of wheat exports to 
Canada’s overall trade was staggering.  Coal had declined from its initial peak of $5,079,000 in 
1948 to $23,000 in 1949, and no exports were recorded for the first half 1950.  Total value of 
wood pulp in 1949 was $2,144,000, up from $486,000, but then it declined sharply in 1950 to 
only $6,000 in the first six months.  Wheat was the major source of the rise in Canadian exports 
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for the first six months of 1950, but as Table 1.3 highlights, new commodities were also exported 
to Japan. 
 
Table 1.3 Canadian Exports to Japan for the First Six Months of 1950425 
U.S.$ Thousands 
 
Year    1948   1949   1950 (First half) 
 
Total exports   8,000   5,859   11,474 
Wheat        772   9,206 
Flour of wheat      6   123 
Hides, skins       287   16 
Wood pulp    486   2,144   6 
Aluminum, in bars     16 
Nickel, fine      193 
Zinc, speltor          17 
Asbestos          136 
Alcoholic Beverages   287   837   913 
Flaxseed      1,197 
Meats     348   678   135 
Coal    5,079   23 
Fertilizers, manufactured 44 
Milk products       100   19 




Table 1.4  Japanese Exports to Canada for the First Six Months of 1950426 
U.S.$  Thousands 
 
Year    1948   1949   1950 (First half) 
 
Total exports   3,143   5,51   4,987 
Oranges   173   503 
Tea    182   198   64 
Tuna fish, canned  22   6   38  
Cotton fabrics   96   292   1,433 
Flax, hemp and jute mfg. 38   175   447 
Silk fabrics   223   175   447 
Toys    264   276   218   
Scrap iron   160   973   479 
Gloves, mittens, etc.  1,615   159   13 





 Throughout 1950, the work of the Department of Trade and Commerce, along with that 
of Britton in Tokyo, remained, in many respects, similar to what it was in the previous years.  
The system of trade certainly had changed since August 1947 but Canadian and Japanese 
businesses continued to contact Trade and Commerce and Britton about their trade interests.  A 
few cases of enquiries relating to trade procedure, regulations, or just for general assistance, 
made during 1950-1951 demonstrate the groundwork that Trade and Commerce and Britton 
continued to provide for companies.  One of the notable examples from 1950-1951 involved 
Yukie M. Nishidera, a nisei who had been relocated to Kelowna, British Columbia, after Pearl 
Harbour, where she attended the Herbert Business College.  After the war she moved to Japan.  
On 28 January 1950, Gladys D. Herbert (Mrs. Gordon D. Herbert) wrote on behalf of Nishidera 
and forwarded a letter of hers to C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce.  Nishidera 
wanted to embark on a business endeavour in Japan: 
  I have been wondering about importing goods from The United States or Canada 
 to carry on a business here in Japan, - such critical items as shoes, cosmetics and dresses.  
 We have these articles here now, but not of the quality we Niseis and many other 
 Japanese prefer.  Therefore, I have spoken of this matter to a businessman in Fukuoka, 
 and he strongly recommended that I carry out my plans.  He has also offered to help me 
 in every way possible. 
  As the economic status of Japan is very low, I feel that it will be necessary to 
 purchase low-priced goods or old stock.  It will sell more readily than the expensive 
 goods. 
  I have had no experience in business transactions of this kind, and so have turned 
 to you for the necessary information as to whom I should contact, and what procedure I 
 should follow.  I would prefer to become an agent for the companies concerned.”427 
 
Newman forwarded a copy of the letter to Britton and informed Mrs. Herbert that it was the 
Department’s practice to have their commercial representatives do the work from their respective 
areas and that Nishidera could expect to be contacted by Britton.428   Nishidera was not the only 
Japanese-Canadian who enquired about trade between 1947-1951, but the correspondence 
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involving her is unique for three reasons.  First, of the records examined for this study, hers is the 
only example when an individual’s nisei background is made explicitly clear.  Secondly, 
Nishidera’s letter highlights some of the personal difficulties experienced by Japanese-Canadians 
who had grown up and spent their whole lives in Canada and then moved to Japan.  According to 
Mrs. Herbert, Nishidera’s move to Japan was not of her choosing.  One of the earliest tasks for 
the Canadian Liaison Mission involved meeting with Canadians who had lived in Japan during 
the war and it was expected that the Mission would be contacted by some Japanese-Canadians 
who had moved to Japan.  Those who moved back often faced harsh conditions they were not 
expecting.  Finally, Britton’s response to Yukie highlights that trade restrictions were still in 
place on number of imports—in the case of Nishidera, there were restrictions on personal goods 
seen as “luxuries.”429  Both Britton and Trade and Commerce remained open to assisting 
Nishidera but her business proposal was impractical at the time due to the restrictions on the 
imports she was enquiring about. 
  
 It will be recalled that Trade and Commerce asked the officials from their own respective 
divisions in September 1948 to provide a list for Kenderdine of exportable commodities along 
with the names of Canadian companies that could potentially supply these items to Japan.  
Moore Cosgrave, working in Vancouver as the Western Representative, was visited by Alvin 
Melnick in September 1950.  Melknik, representing A.I. Melnik & Co. whose operations were 
based in Tokyo, provided Cosgrave with a list of items they could export.  Certain items, such as 
steel oak lumber, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals were brought to the attention of Trade and 
Commerce, instead of leaving it to importing houses, because there was a shortage of these in 
items Canada.430  William J. Michaud Co. Limited, Montreal, Harrisons & Crosfield Limited, 
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Montreal, Canadian Industries Limited, Montreal, Chas. Tennant & Co. (Canada) Ltd., Toronto, 
McArthur Chemical Col. Ltd., Montreal, and Philip Bros. (Canada) Limited, Montreal, were 
importing firms suggested by S. G. Barkley, Division Chief for Chemical and Allied Chemicals, 
as companies that would have had an interest in heavy chemicals.431  Barkley also provided the 
names of several companies, and quick notes about the current status of the products being 
imported by these companies, who would have more specific interests in litharge and lithopone, 
dyestuffs, benzene hexachloride, and iodine and camphor; caustic soda, bleaching powder, 
penicillin were not needed while copper sulphate could be imported only if the “quotations 
[were] very attractive.”432  G. H. Rochester, Chief, Wood Products Division, suggested J. Fyfe-
Smith & Company Limited from Vancouver be informed of the availability of oak lumber; the 
costs of transportation made it unlikely that companies on Canada’s east coast would have had 
an interest in lumber imports.433  Tedford, still the Commodity Officer for Non-Ferrous Metals, 
stated with some reluctance that the demand for aluminum products had left Canadian firms in 
short supply.434  He suggested firms such as Metals & Alloys, Canada Metal, and General 
Smelting and Refining, that had difficulties in the past obtaining enough ingot to handle their 
orders, be informed of these importable items; the Aluminum Company of Canada was at 
capacity to fill their orders and it was suggested their corrugated sheet production could benefit 
from Japanese imports of sheet aluminum.435   
 
 Britton was integral to assisting Trade and Commerce in this matter.  The information he 
supplied was unfavourable about A. I. Melnik & Co. and the imports that Trade and Commerce 
was interested in.436  Concerning A. I. Melnik & Co., Britton admitted that his dealings were 
only of several months after having been contacted by MITI and SCAP about the company’s 
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interest in obtaining a contract from Texada for iron ore.  Although Britton was convinced of 
Melnik’s own “good character,” he questioned his business experience, noted that the business 
was small with limited capital, was unsure whether Melnik could obtain the “necessary 
compensatory credits to complete the transactions,” and that his ability to fill larger orders was in 
doubt.437  “The competition for the available export and import business in this country is 
extremely keen and there are a number of larger established firms with whom I prefer to see 
Canadian importers and exporters deal.”438  Britton’s opinion was not entirely negative, however, 
about Melnik’s company.  He felt that “[Melnik] could be relied upon to handle any inquiries 
which reach him expeditiously and that he is as well placed as any of the smaller firms here to 
handle their purchases.”439  Nonetheless, Britton stated that the primary interest of Canadian 
companies would be in steel, a commodity that was already difficult to obtain not just from 
Japan, and made all more unlikely for import because of the “prohibitive” rising costs due to the 
Korean War.  Regarding non-ferrous metals, some were available but in most cases the demand 
in Japan was too great to allow export in addition to the fact that all non-ferrous metals were 
subject to control.440  Prices on aluminum were also high, and Britton suggested that the larger 
Japanese firms were in a better position to handle inquiries for ferrous metals “of all types.”  The 
records examined do not indicate whether any orders were placed with the A.I. Melnick Co. by 
Canadian companies in 1950 or 1951. 
 
 The Korean War was the most important development for Canadian-Japanese trade in the 
latter part of the Occupation, creating a far greater demand for Canadian products than in the 
previous year and a half.  Prior to the outbreak of the war, MITI wrote a White Paper on Japan’s 
“Trade Conditions and Future Problems.”  The report gave a gloomy outlook on Japan’s 
economy and economic potential at the time, finding the economy to be in a state of 
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stagnation.441  Trade between Japan and East Asia in 1949 was low, only 15-20% of the 1930-
1934 volume when, at one point, China had received 50% of Japan’s exports and provided it 
with 35% of its imports; Japan’s industrial output had risen but industrial firms were using 
outdated technologies, methods and raw materials of a lesser quality; and the deflationary effects 
of the Dodge Line policies in 1949 were tapering demand for domestic goods.442  The Korean 
War created a substantial demand for Japanese commodities, though.  In July alone, only one 
month after the war began, Japanese exports jumped to a value at U.S.$74,000,000—well above 
the monthly average of U.S.$50,000,000 for the first six months of 1950 and a postwar record for  
Japan up to that point.443  The need for raw materials and essential commodity imports also 
increased.  From the 9 September edition of Foreign Trade: 
 Provision was made in the July-September foreign exchange budget for imports valued at 
 U.S.$257,340,867, comprised of raw materials amounting to $138,608,000 and foodstuffs 
 totalling $69,000,000.  The foreign exchange allocation for imports in the present quarter 
 was 80 per cent higher than the total for April-June.   
 
Additional expenditures were being planned on essential imports “such as petroleum, raw rubber, 
coking coal, iron ore, salt, leather and foodstuffs for stock-piling.”444  Japan’s U.S. dollar 
holdings increased rapidly after the outbreak of the war, growing to $400,000,000 by the end of 
1950 and substantially improving Japan’s foreign exchange.445   
 
 The Department of Trade and Commerce expected Canadian-Japanese trade to benefit 
because of the war.  William Frederick Bull, Director of the Commodities Branch, wrote on 8 
August to John A. Marsh of the Canadian Exporter’s Association:  
As a basing point and training centre for a substantial army, it is anticipated that there 
will be heavy demands on Japanese Industry for supplies.  This, in turn, will lead to 
heavy overseas purchases of raw materials.  Japan, at the present time, has been 
accumulating dollars and certain elements in that country are now pressing for the 
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liberalization of their dollar purchase programme, in view of the present emergency.  ... 
[We] expected that there will be heavier demands on Canada for exports to Japan.446 
 
Four government import systems were operating in Japan by October: “purchases by the 
Japanese Government; the allocation, or ‘first come, first served,’ system; the automatic approval 
system; and the long-term contract system.”447  The Annual Review for 1950 from the Canadian 
Liaison Mission stated: “The system of automatic approval and the system for long term 
contracts introduced during the latter part of the year gave importers more leeway in their 
negotiations with sellers abroad.”  Under the automatic approval system, MITI planned to import 
$9,137,700 worth of goods from Canada from January through to March 1951, consisting of 
$1,250,00 for sulphite pulp, $369,000 of asbestos, $2850,000 of zinc ingot, $810,000 of iron ore, 
$200,000 of hops, $205,000 of raw wool, and $132,700 of mica splittings.448  Under the long-
term contract budget system, MITI planned to import $30,370,000 worth of Canadian goods: 
$3,220,000 worth of rayon pulp; $1,650,000 of sulphite pulp; and $25,000,000 of wheat.449  
Britton was informed that nickel would also be purchased, though he was not provided a figure 
in November for this.  On a private barter basis, MITI intended to import linseed, barley, wool 
rags and coking coal from Canada.450   
 
 Moreover, in January 1951, Ryuki Takeuchi, International Trade Administrator, Taiichiro 
Matsuo, deputy director of the International Trade Bureau, and Masao Katao, chief of the 
Overseas Market selection (all MITI officials) visited Ottawa for two days to discuss raw 
materials and essential commodities needed by Japan, as well as “to assess the Canadian market 
for Japanese products.”451  Adding to the strength of the Canadian-Japanese economic 
relationship towards the end of the Occupation, Ottawa approved plans by the Japanese 
Government Overseas Agency to open an office in Ottawa. The agency and its functions were 
 
139 
approved by the Canadian Government in April 1951 and its permanent office was established 
by December 1951.  Initially the agency and its personnel were not given diplomatic status.  The 
agency was permitted to provide: 
 (a) semi-consular functions, including assistance to Japanese nationals residing in Canada 
 in matters of Japanese citizenship and property regulations which may concern them; 
 (b) the supplying of trade and travel information to Canadians; 
 (c) the promotion of trade between Canada and Japan.452 
   
 
 Despite the economic boost in the latter half of 1950, the Korean War was not a panacea 
for all of Japan’s economic problems.  Japan continued to have a shortage of U.S. dollars into 
May 1951 and was having difficulties importing raw materials.  By April 1951, MITI 
temporarily suspended imports under the automatic approval system because of Japan’s shortage 
in foreign exchange holdings.  Although a number of Canadian products at the time were 
affected, some funds were made available for “programmed commodities, items under the 
automatic approval system, and miscellaneous items from dollar areas, in the April-June 
quarter.”453  Furthermore, the measures were only temporary and did not halt all imports from 
Canada.  In April, the Japanese Government allocated for imports from the U.S. dollar area such 
as: asbestos, sulphite pulp, pigment resin colour, fixers and binders.454  In May, the Japanese 
Government also allocated for imports from the U.S. dollar area for: up to $100,000 of douglas 
fir, spruce and hemlock; $500,000 for machinery; $20,000 for books and periodicals; and $5,000 
for miscellaneous goods.455  Most importantly, leading up to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the 
basis of Canada and Japan’s economic relationship for the following years in the 1950s was 
firmly established.  The Canadian Liaison Mission was staffed by a small number of very 
competent officials with years of experience who were well-positioned to handle issues related to 
Canadian-Japanese trade, while the Japanese Government was also branching out globally, 
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setting up representation in other countries, and increasing its autonomy in creating Japan’s trade 
policy.  Japanese exports to Canada in 1951 remained nearly identical to their 1950 value but the 
value of Canadian exports to Japan climbed to $72,976,000 for 1951.456  Raw materials were 
established as Canada’s principle export to Japan and the trade pattern between the two countries 
along with the trade imbalance were set for the following years despite the efforts for reciprocal 




2  Canada and Japan, 1950-1951: Towards Peace 
 As Japan’s economic fortunes increased, the country expanded its trade with former 
enemies whom it was technically not at peace with yet.  The lack of a peace treaty remained the 
quintessential loose end that would determine the country’s economic future.  Over the course of 
1950-1951 the final details of the peace treaty were hammered out.  For Canada, security had 
always been the government’s primary strategic interest regarding Japan’s future; ensuring that 
Japan no longer had the means to wage war had always factored into the government’s economic 
considerations.  Throughout 1950 and leading up to the peace conference, these considerations 
were determined more by the immediate and tangible benefits of trade than from worries about 
Japan’s ability to remilitarize—United States policies up to then had soundly taken care of that 
issue.  Canadian policies on the final settlement were refined over the course of its participation 
in the Colombo Conference, the Commonwealth Working Party on a Japanese peace treaty in 
May 1950, and in its negotiations with the United States, but Canada’s strategic interests in the 
eventual settlement remained mostly the same as they had been in 1946 and 1947.  The Canadian 
Government’s interest in fisheries and insurance companies dated back to 1946 and it had been 
willing to sign onto a peace treaty in 1947. 
 
 Following the Colombo Conference in January 1950 and going into the Commonwealth 
Working Party on the Japanese Treaty, in May 1950, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
Pearson, outlined the “Canadian attitude” for the High Commissioner in London and Ralph 
Collins, First Secretary at the Embassy in the United States—the latter of whom was familiar 
with the work of the Far Eastern Commission and had attended the Canberra Conference.  
Canada’s top priority was security with its primary interests being to prevent the reemergence of 
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an aggressive Japan and to ensure Japan’s own domestic security.  To this end, similar to the 
Canadian position in late 1945 when the government first defined its role for the Far Eastern 
Advisory Commission, it was considered inadvisable to press the United States on actions it 
would consider imprudent given the enormity of the United States’ responsibility.457  It was 
deemed unwise to impose any restrictive economic clauses, but it was suggested that Japan 
possibly be bound to carry out Occupation reforms for a certain period of time such as the 
continued dissolution of the zaibatsu.458  From the May conference, it was clear that “reparations 
from industrial assets, internal security controls, and limits on non military industrial production 
(with the exception of the aircraft industry) [were] dead issues.”459  Long-range economic 
controls were suggested for further study and Canada’s interests mostly connected to trade 
agreements and Japan’s fishing industry. 
 
 In September 1950, after President Truman’s announcement that there was a need for a 
peace treaty with Japan to be concluded, bilateral meetings were held in New York.  One of the 
American memorandum from these talks outlined potential political and commercial 
arrangements in the treaty, stipulating that: “Japan would agree to adhere to multilateral treaties 
dealing with narcotics and fishing.  Prewar bilateral treaties could be revived by mutual 
agreement.  Pending the conclusion of new commercial treaties, Japan would extend most 
favoured nation treatment, subject to normal exceptions.”460  The latter point about Japan 
extending most favoured nation treatment is of particular note since a provision very similar to 
this appeared in the final treaty.  Regarding multilateral agreements, the government had no 
objection to the wording of Article 8, “existing multilateral treaties and agreements designed to 
promote fair trade practices," so long as it made clear that it was not in reference to the General 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.461  Furthermore, the government was of the opinion that 
references to the GATT, “directly or obliquely,” were inappropriate in the peace treaty unless 
prior agreement had been reached by the Contracting Parties on Japan’s accession—a 
proposition that was unlikely to occur.462  The government accurately guessed that Japan would 
likely seek accession to the GATT and to gain most favoured nation treatment regardless of 
whether such provisions appeared in the final peace treaty.463  The government was more 
interested in seeing Japan eventually become part of the prevailing multilateral economic and 
political systems of the time but not by having this mandated in the peace treaty. 
 
 Protecting Canada’s fisheries on its west coast and reaching bilateral fishing agreements 
were the Canadian Government’s paramount commercial interests for the peace treaty.  Based on 
a draft proposed by the United States on 27 March 1951, the Canadian Government again refined 
its policies.  The Department of Fisheries and representatives from Canada’s fishing industries 
were consulted about the provisions concerning fisheries that were being worked into the final 
peace treaty.  So great was the concern about allowing Japan access to fish in territories of 
interest to Canada, the government was willing to press for the issue to be dropped from the 
treaty: “If suitable restrictions along lines indicated here cannot be incorporated in the Peace 
Treaty, it would seem undesirable to include in the Peace Treaty any provision that would have 
the appearance of inviting Japan to participate in the fisheries adjacent to our West Coast.”464  
However, Article 9 of Chapter 4 from the draft treaty circulated in early July 1951 satisfied the 
Minister of Fisheries and Cabinet that Canadian fishing interests were protected adequately.  
Specifically, that “...the Japanese government had undertaken that its fishermen would not enter 
waters in which they had not fished in 1940, pending the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral 
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agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and 
development of fisheries on the high seas.”465  The role the Department of Fisheries played in 
securing Canadian interests was noted in a Department of External Affairs memorandum on 27 
July: “Our wishes with respect to ensuring that the Japanese not return to their prewar 
malpractices in fishing on the high seas have been adequately met as a result of action by the 
Department of Fisheries.”466 
 
 Finally, a draft of the Protocol attached to the treaty “on contracts, periods of 
prescription, negotiable instruments, and contracts of insurance” was circulated prior to the peace 
conference.  Only a few countries had an interest in its provisions and the United States could not 
sign it for constitutional reasons.467  The Canadian Government was interested in helping to 
protect the Sun Life Assurance Company and Manufacturers Life Insurance Company.  These 
two companies had substantial interests in Japan prior to the war and were the first two 
companies that Canada had assisted with their Japanese commercial interests back in 1946.  A 
revision to the final Protocol was made by 2 August 1951 that was acceptable to the Canadian 
Government.   
 
 Canada received its invitation on 27 July to attend the conference in San Francisco but as 
the conference approached, it became more apparent to the Canadian Government that the 
conference was being held solely to get the treaty signed.468  The reasons provided from 
American officials for the conference’s short length of procedure placated the Canadian 
Government.  On 8 September, Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State of External Affairs, and 
Robert Mayhew, Minister of Fisheries, signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty.  The economic 
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interests of Canada were realized in Chapter 4, “Political and Economic Clauses”, Articles 9 and 
12, and the Protocol to the San Francisco Peace Treaty (see Appendix 4 and 5).  Parliament 
approved the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Protocol on 2 and 9 April 1952, and authorized 
the Secretary of State for External Affairs “to sign on behalf of the Government of Canada an 
instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, and to provide for the deposit of 
such instrument in accordance with Article 24 of said Treaty.”469  Full diplomatic relations with 
Canada were restored on 28 April when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force.  The 
Canadian Liaison Mission was given status of an embassy and Arthur Menzies became Canada’s 
first ambassador to Japan in the postwar era, bringing to a close the period when Canada and 
Japan redeveloped their economic relationship.  The restoration of normal diplomatic relations 
between Canada and Japan heralded the resumption of a political and economic relationship that 
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Conclusions: Just the Beginning 
 The Occupation period of 1945-1951 has been overlooked in most studies that evaluate 
Canada and Japan’s economic relationship in the 20th century.  Existing studies that touch on 
this period have suffered because records and archives were previously unavailable or from the 
misconception that this was an insignificant period in Canadian-Japanese relations.  The 
oversight of the importance of this period is understandable.  In the aftermath of World War II, 
the strategic importance of Japan paled in comparison to that of Europe for the Canadian 
Government.  Japan, as a defeated country under occupation led by American authorities, did not 
have its sovereignty restored until the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect on 28 April 
1952.  Canadian-Japanese diplomatic relations were not normalized until the treaty went into 
effect, thus posing a challenge for the redevelopment of their economic relationship without the 
availability of normal diplomatic channels.  At the same time, trade between Canada and Japan 
was minimal until 1950.  The lack of normalized diplomatic relations and the fact that the low 
levels of trade increased only late during the Occupation can be easily interpreted to mean that 
little of consequence was accomplished in the late 1940s that affected Canada and Japan’s 
postwar economic relationship.  However, Canada and Japan, trade partners prior to 1941, 
redeveloped their economic relationship beginning after the signing of the Instrument of 
Surrender in September 1945 and not solely in the 1950s.  The growth of trade between Canada 
and Japan in the postwar period of the 1950s was tied to the developments that took place 
throughout the pivotal years of 1945-1951. 
 
 Both Canada and Japan stood to gain from the redevelopment of their economic 
relationship.  Security was the Canadian Government’s top priority as a matter of official policy, 
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but in practice the government was not seriously threatened by Japan.  As a result, Japan’s 
economic recovery and the resumption of its international trade were soundly endorsed by the 
Canadian Government from early on during the Occupation.  Canada stood to gain economically 
by establishing a foothold in the Japanese market and politically if it helped Japan successfully 
integrate into the multilateral institutions of the time.  The Canadian Government’s attempts to 
foster trade between the two countries involved a small number of government officials working 
in Ottawa, Washington and Tokyo.  The principle venues used by the Canadian Government to 
reengage Japan were the Far Eastern Commission in Washington and the Canadian Liaison 
Mission in Tokyo.  Support came from officials working for the Department of External Affairs 
and the Department of Trade and Commerce in Ottawa.  J. E. Kenderdine, J. C. Britton, E. H. 
Norman, G. S. Hall, G. R. Heasman, Lester B. Pearson and H. H. Wrong were the foremost 
Canadian Government officials whose work affected economic relations between Canada and 
Japan.  These officials were connected in the right places to be quickly informed on changing 
political and economic developments.  Bolstered by the government’s policies that encouraged 
economic liberalism and promoted the recovery of Japan’s international trade, the Department of 
Trade and Commerce worked closely with the Canadian Liaison Mission to help Canadian 
companies conduct trade with Japan, and assisted Japanese parties interested in trade with 
Canada.  The cooperative work between Kenderdine, then Britton, in Tokyo and Hall and 
Heasman in Ottawa was the lynchpin in the Canadian Government’s direct effort to foster trade 
with Japan.  Of course, just as significant (and necessary) for Canada’s economic reengagement 
with Japan were the Canadian companies that attempted to conduct trade with Japan and endured 
through the difficult phase when Japan was first reopened to limited private trade.  Interest from 
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Canadian companies to conduct trade with Japan was limited for most of the Occupation but the 
types of trade Canadian companies were interested in varied considerably.   
 
 For Japan, redeveloping its former trade relationship with Canada was not a pressing 
matter when compared to the enormous task of rebuilding its country.  Furthermore, the 
importance of the Canadian market was overshadowed by that of the United States.  Still, there 
were tangible economic and political benefits for Japan.  The B!eki-ch! and, later, MITI were 
the principle Japanese agencies responsible for overseeing trade and, later, trade policy.  It is 
worth repeating, however, that this thesis does not make use of records from the Japanese 
Government and that Japan was unable to form official diplomatic relations until the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect.  Even correspondence from Japanese citizens and 
government officials was quite limited until 1949.  Nonetheless, the records that have been used 
indicate that there was interest from both the B!eki-ch! and MITI to develop Japan’s trade 
relations with Canada.  Quite notable were MITI’s enquiries beginning in late 1949 about 
importing goods from Canada.  Japan depended on exports to grow its economy and to obtain 
desperately needed raw materials in return.  Canada offered a number of the raw materials, 
commodities and foodstuffs needed by Japan to rebuild its industries and provide for its citizens.  
This study has also shown that the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Canadian 
Liaison Mission received enquiries from Japanese companies and boards of trade interested in 
conducting trade with Canada.  Japanese interest in trade relations with Canada was initially low 




 There were four major political factors that shaped Canada and Japan’s economic 
relationship during the Occupation period.  First, Canadian-Japanese relations were developed in 
part through the Canadian Government’s balance of its relationship with the United States, 
United Kingdom, and its participation in the Far Eastern Commission.  This was also influenced 
by the lack of normalized diplomatic relations with Japan.  Because of Canada’s large military 
and financial contributions during World War II, the Canadian Government asserted its political 
independence after the war.  Despite belonging to the Commonwealth, Canada wanted to avoid 
constraints on the political independence it had earned.  The government was content, though, 
with the dominant position of SCAP as the occupying authority and inclined to support or defer 
to American decisions on Occupation policies when the two countries’ political, security or 
economic interests intersected.  At the same time, the Canadian Government supported the 
multilateral process of the Far Eastern Commission and sought continued American participation 
in this forum.  The government was quite willing to have its representative press Canadian 
interests even when these did not correspond to those of the United States or the United 
Kingdom.  Because of the lack of normalized diplomatic relations with Japan, Canada had to 
pursue its political goals through other channels.  Ultimately, Canada’s independence gave it a 
more profound voice on international affairs, its relationship with the United States eased 
Canada’s responsibilities connected with the more burdensome aspects of Occupation duties, and 
the Far Eastern Commission provided the government an opportunity to support multilateral 
institutions and have a say in East Asian politics. 
 
 Secondly, Canadian policy was subject to political developments beyond its control.  
SCAP was imbued with a sense of duty to help Japan and guided by the legal requirements of the  
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Potsdam Declaration, Instrument of Surrender, and Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive.  Both 
SCAP and officials in Washington seriously considered recommendations that emerged from the 
Far Eastern Commission but the Commission’s influence declined over time as the Cold War 
intensified.  Canada’s representative to the Far Eastern Commission attempted to mediate when 
possible, seeking the continued participation of the Soviet Union and encouraging cooperation 
from the United States.  However, the decline of the Commission was beyond Canada’s control 
because of the fundamentally different views between members of the Commission and the later 
decline of American-Soviet relations.  Likewise, SCAP’s authority over Japan was sweeping and 
the United States unilaterally enacted the reverse course.  The measures of the reverse course 
ultimately benefited Canadian-Japanese trade but these measures were beyond the influence or 
control of the Canadian Government. 
 
 Thirdly, Canadian policies, developed largely by the Department of External Affairs in 
consultation with the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Liaison Mission, consistently 
supported high levels of economic development for Japan’s industries along with Japan’s 
eventual integration into the prevailing multilateral institutions of the time such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  These policies not only endured after 1951 but Canada was 
one of the main proponents for Japan’s accession into the GATT in the 1950s.   
 
 Finally, trade with Japan was of marginal importance for the Canadian Government for 
most of the Occupation.  The number of Canadian political officials involved with developing 
policy and facilitating trade was small, and the problem of the lack of normalized diplomatic 
relations between Canada and Japan was compounded by SCAP’s control of Occupation 
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policies.  Consequently, trade was facilitated by officials working for the Department of Trade 
and Commerce, Canada’s Commercial Representative at the Canadian Liaison Mission, Japanese 
officials who reached out to Canada in the final period of the Occupation, and from the efforts of 
Canadian and Japanese companies that cut through the formidable trade regulations in place 
during the Occupation.  The small number of officials working in Ottawa and Tokyo to facilitate 
trade between the two countries were highly qualified, talented and dedicated.  Their efforts laid 
the groundwork for Canada and Japan’s cordial postwar relations in the 1950s. 
 
 There were three distinct periods in the redevelopment of Canada and Japan’s economic 
relationship during the Occupation, and each period presented unique challenges for the 
development and conduct of trade.  The first period began in 1945 with the signing of the 
Surrender Instrument and lasted through the end of 1947.  Japan’s ability to trade during this 
time was limited by SCAP out of security concerns while it enacted the economic 
demilitarization and deconcentration policies.  Until 15 August 1947, trade with Japan was 
conducted on a government-to-government basis and strictly controlled by SCAP.  Canadian 
exports prior to August 1947 are not indicative of either the Canadian Government or Canadian 
businesses’ interests pertaining to the development of trade with Japan.  The Canadian 
companies that were most direct about their interest in resuming business with Japan were 
insurance and aluminum companies.  More significant for Canada and Japan’s long-term 
economic relationship was that Canada developed its principle economic policies concerning 
Japan during this period.  Likewise, the institutions that affected Canadian-Japanese economic 
relations the most until 1949 were created during this period: the Far Eastern Commission, the 
Canadian Liaison Mission, and the B!eki-ch!.  When limited private trade resumed, Canadian 
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companies had their first real opportunity to conduct business with Japan since 1941.  Japan’s 
international trade suffered from the country’s lack of raw materials, its limited foreign exchange 
and uncertainty over reparations.  Canada’s reparations claim was small and the government was 
not heavily invested in receiving reparations from Japan; promoting Japan’s international trade 
was of greater importance for the Canadian Government. 
 
 The second period began in 1948 as Canadian-Japanese trade expanded with the 
resumption of limited private trade and lasted through 1949 when the United States implemented 
the measures of the reverse course to rehabilitate Japan’s economy.  The Department of Trade 
and Commerce and the Canadian Liaison Mission performed their most prolific work during this 
period to assist Canadian companies looking to conduct trade with Japan.  Short-term difficulties 
that affected trade included the need for companies to adjust to changing trade policies, 
fluctuating demands for commodities, the short response times for offers on tenders, and 
competition from American companies.  Economic controls in the first two and a half years of 
private trade and the resistance of General MacArthur to the reverse course in 1948 also 
impacted Japan’s international trade.  Other problems such as the lack of a fixed exchange rate, 
rampant inflation, uncertainty over reparations, and trade restrictions were left unresolved until 
measures of the reverse course were implemented in 1949.  The Canadian Government also 
refused to conclude any bilateral trade agreements with Japan, arguing its liberal trade policies 
already allowed for substantial Japanese imports.  Japan continued to suffer from a lack of raw 
materials and limited foreign exchange at the end of 1949.  However, despite the diverging types 
of raw materials and commodities exported to Japan in 1948 and 1949, this was the period when 




 The final period began in 1950 when Japan gained control over its foreign private trade 
and ended in 1951 with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.  Control over Japan’s 
foreign trade shifted from SCAP to MITI but while trade restrictions were relaxed somewhat in 
1950, the Japanese Government retained close oversight of imports into Japan.  Consequently, 
the ability for Canadian companies to export to Japan was not entirely remedied by this shift in 
oversight.  The Korean War coincided with a period when MITI was attempting to bolster 
Japan’s imports from Canada.  The timing of the war was fortuitous for the Japanese economy, 
and Canadian exports to Japan, led by wheat, climbed significantly in the following years.  The 
pattern of Canadian-Japanese trade for the postwar years was firmly established in this final 
period.  Just as Canadian exports to Japan were increasing, progress was being made on the 
peace settlement for Japan.  Japan’s fishing industries and the business of Canadian insurance 
companies had been of particular concern to the Canadian Government in 1946 and 1947.  
Canadian concerns about Japan’s fishing industries and Canada’s own insurance companies were 
raised by the government during the peace settlement negotiations in 1950-1951 and affected the 
final provisions contained in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the associated Protocol. 
 
 As a vocal proponent of Japan’s economic recovery during the Occupation, the Canadian 
Government endeavoured to form a close trade relationship with Japan in the postwar period.  
Furthermore, the government continued to advocate for Japan’s integration into the global 
economy and was one of the main supporters of Japan’s accession into the GATT.  On 31 March 
1954 a trade agreement was signed by Pearson, Canada’s Trade Minister C. D. Howe, and 
Japan’s Ambassador to Canada, Koto Matsudaira.  Langdon writes that Canada differed from 
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other Commonwealth countries because it conducted tariff negotiations with Japan and that the 
1954 agreement was in conformity with GATT regulations.470  Trade developed slowly between 
Canada and Japan in the late 1940s—Canadian exports to Japan actually decreased in 1949, 
though mostly as a result of the loss of Canadian coal exports to American companies.  However, 
Canada and Japan’s postwar economic relationship was the result of more than just the increase 
of exports in 1950-1951.  Considering that limited private trade only resumed in August 1947 
and that by the end of 1951 Canada was the fourth largest exporter of goods to Japan, Canada 
and Japan managed to redevelop their economic relationship in only a few short years.  The 
foundation for the strong economic relationship that developed after the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty would not have been possible had it not been for the work by government and trade 
representatives from both Canada and Japan throughout 1945-1951. 
 
 This thesis has attempted to provide the first detailed account of Canadian-Japanese 
economic relations in the Occupation period, yet this subject can still be explored in further 
studies.  Certain records at Library and Archives Canada were unavailable when the research for 
this thesis was conducted.  For instance, only recently were records opened about negotiations 
between the Canadian Liaison Mission and the Canadian Commercial Corporation.  
Alternatively, a study that uses archives and records from Japan would expand the understanding 
of how this relationship developed from a Japanese perspective.  There is potential for Canadian-













Canadian Articles Exported to Japan: 1946 to the First Four Months of 1949 
 
[Source: LAC.  DEAR, RG20-A-3, Vol. 724 File Part 6, File 13250.  G. S. Hall, Asia Section, Foreign Trade 
Service, “Trade with Japan.” 3 August 1949.] 
 
    1946                              1947                           1948          1st Four Months 1949 
     
         Quantities   $ Values   Quantities   $ Values   Quantities   $ Values  Quantities   $ Values 
 




P Gal 8 24     18 160 
Rubber Hose   289       
Cigars Lb 10 51       
Cigarettes M 10 42       
Books Bound 
or Unbound 




No. 1 1,086   2 2,627   
Ammonium 
Sulphate 








    76     
Printed Matter 
NOP 
    10  18   
Mica Trimmed 
Sheet or Block 
CWT   400 18,500     
Ale  Beer and 
Porter 
Gal     7,380 7,988 5,400 5,643 
Coal NOP Ton     481,102 5,079,07
9 
1,570 23,132 
Coke NOP Ton     60 384 56 358 
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    1946                              1947                           1948          1st Four Months 1949 
     
         Quantities   $ Values   Quantities   $ Values   Quantities   $ Values  Quantities   $ Values 
 
Apples Fresh Brl     18 140   
Jams, Jellies 
and Preserves 
Lb     1,952 452   
Pears Canned Lb     1,120 318   
Apples 
Canned 
Lb     1,890 311   
Peaches 
Canned 
Lb     3,330 678   
Fruits Frozen 
NOP 




Lb     11,707 3,612 135 33 
Cider Gal     30 44   
Fruit Juices 
NOP 
     120 129   
Onions Bush     420 719   
Potatoes NOP 
except Seed 
Bush     1,676 3,669   
Turnips Bush     60 83   
Vegetables 
Fresh NOP  
      5,759   
Pickles       1,445   
Sauces and 
Catsups 




Lb     3,072 592   
Tomato Juice 
Canned 
Lb     1,000 74   
Tomatoes 
canned NOP 
Lb     5,773 609   




    1946                              1947                           1948          1st Four Months 1949 
     
         Quantities   $ Values   Quantities   $ Values   Quantities   $ Values  Quantities   $ Values 
 
Peas Canned Lb     6,040 934 114 16 
Vegetables 
Frozen 
Lb     12,864 2,948   
Vegetables 
Canned NOP 
Lb     38,471 6,107 114 12 
Beans Bush     40 250   
Rice Lb     7,800 1,270 1,000 157 
Corn Meal Brl     44 715   
Oatmeal and 
Rolled Oats 
CWT     13 213   
Flour of Rye Brl     21 357   
Flour of Wheat Brl     61 1247 204 2,250 
Meal NOP CWT     30,740 131,567   
Biscuits and 
Bread 
CWT     22 368   
Cereal Foods 
Prepared 
      2,257   




Lb     4,440 684 150 19 
Macaroni 
Spaghetti NOP 




CWT     11 230   
Candy NOP Lb     128 63   




      359   
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    1946                              1947                           1948          1st Four Months 1949 
     




      590   
Maple Syrup Gal     110 825   
Molasses and 
Syrups NOP 
Gal     228 620   
Sugar NOP Cwt     618 5,271 3,200 22,100 
Cocoa 
Powdered 




      278   
Coffee and 
Imitations of 
Lb     300 585   
Spices       1,633   
Tea Lb     364 200   
Vinegar Gal     100 104   
Yeast Lb     500 185   
Vegetable Food 
Products NOP 




      71   
Flax Seed NOP Bush     219,567 1,197,867   
Fillets of Sea 
Fish NOP Fresh 
CWT     15 484   
Oysters Fresh CWT     7 392   
Shell Fish 
Fresh NOP 
CWT     17 1,374   
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1946                              1947                           1948          1st Four Months 1949 
     




CWT     31 2,244   
Salmon 
Canned 
CWT     15 864   
Sardines Little 
Fish in Oil 
CWT     5 205   
Sea Fish 
Canned NOP  




Pair     1,165 6,163   
Boots Shoes 
Leather Upper   
NOP 
Pair     741 1,864   
Beef and Veal 
Fresh 
CWT     6,681 319,526 3087 174,344 
Mutton and 
Lamb Fresh 




Lb     38,309 19,998 13,337 6504 
Canned Meats 
NOP 
Lb     5436 2,610 19,745 11,548 
Pork Pickled 
in Barrels 
CWT     40 1,174   
Sausage and 
Bologna 
CWT     30 1,343 99 4,020 
Milk Powder, 
Whole Milk 
CWT     12 836 132 5,280 
Lard CWT     8 301   
Eggs in the 
Shell NOP 
Doz     3,300 1,727 6,360 3,497 
Honey Lb     818 201   
Animal 
Products NOP 
      1,026   
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1946                              1947                           1948          1st Four Months 1949 
     
         Quantities   $ Values   Quantities   $ Values   Quantities  $ Values  Quantities   $ Values 
 
Beef Pickled in 
Barrels 
CWT       5 250 
Edible Animal 
Entrails 
CWT       2 57 




CWT      13   
Surgical and 
Sanitary Cotton 




      35   
Artificial Silk 
Dresses  
      25   
Rags and Waste 
NOP 
CWT     20 180   
Wool Rags and 
Waste 
CWT       3 37 
Pulp Sulphite 
B1 Dissolving 
CWT     46,264 486,039 55,595 564,173 
Manufactures 
of Wood NOP 
      11,805   
Book Paper CWT     2,024 14,795   
Newsprint 
Paper 
CWT     3,942 28,579 6,027 40,509 




      291   
Toilet Paper CWT     81 1,236   
Machinery and 
Parts NOP 
      130   
Telegraph and 
Telephone App. 
      105   
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    1946                              1947                           1948          1st Four Months 1949 
     




      76   
Ores NOP Ton     1,102 63,780   
Plated Ware 
Silver 
CWT      1180   
Salt       278   
Soap Flakes 
and Powders 
Lb     360 128   
Soap NOP Lb     700 85 1,200 204 
Toilet Soap Lb       1,394 358 
Lye       78   
Baking Powder      7 168   
Polishes Boots 
and Shoes 
CWT      32   
Polishes NOP       88   
Drugs and 
Chemicals NOP 
      44   
Candles Lb     900 445   
Films Motion 
Picture 
Feet     1,199,092 13,047   
Scientific 
Apparatus NOP 
      168   
Radio 
Receiving Sets 
No.       1 45 
Asbestos 
Milled Fibres 
       73 15,508 
Hides and Skins 
Calf 





Selections from the Draft of the Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy toward 
Japan (NSC 13/2) 
 
[Source: Japan, National Diet Library. Modern Japan in archives.  “Recommendations with 
Respect to U.S.Policy toward Japan (NSC13/2).”  http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/img_r/M008/ 
M008-001r.html] 
 
The REGIME OF CONTROL 
 
 8.  Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.  This Government should not at this time 
propose to any major change in the regime of control.  SCAP should accordingly be formally 
maintained in all its existing rights and powers.  However, responsibility should be placed to a 
steadily increasing degree in the hands of the Japanese Government.  To this end the view of the 
United States Government should be communicated to SCAP that the scope of its operations 
should be reduced as rapidly as possible, with a corresponding reduction in personnel, to a point 
where its mission will consist largely of general supervisory observation of the activities of the 





 12.  International Political and Economic Changes.  Henceforth emphasis should be given 
to Japanese assimilation of the reform programs.  To this end, while SCAP should not stand in 
the way of reform measures initiated by the Japanese if he finds them consistent with the overall 
objectives of the occupation, he should be advised not to press upon the Japanese Government 
any further reform legislation.  As for reform measures already taken or in process of preparation 
by the Japanese authorities, SCAP should be advised to relax pressure steadily but unobtrusively 
on the Japanese Government in connection with these reforms and should intervene only if the 
Japanese authorities revoke or compromise the fundamentals of the reforms as they proceed in 
their own way with the process of implementation and adjustment. If exigencies of the situation 
permit, SCAP should consult with the U. S. Government before intervention in the event the 
Japanese should resort to action of such serious import.  Definite background guidance 
embodying the above principles and indicating the United States Government’s view as to the 
nature and extent of the adjustment to be permitted should be provided SCAP in the case of 
certain reforms. 
 
 13.  The Purge.  Since the purpose of the purge has been largely accomplished, the U. S. 
should now advice SCAP to inform the Japanese Government informally that no further 
extension of the purge is contemplated and that the purge should be modified along the following 
lines: (1) Categories of persons who have been purged or who are subject to the purge by virtue 
of their having held relatively harmless positions should be made re-eligible for governmental, 
business and public media positions; (2) certain others who have been barred or who are subject 
to being barred from public life on the basis of positions occupied should be allowed to have 
their cases re-examined solely on the basis of personal actions; (3) a minimum age limit should 




 14.  Occupation Costs.  The occupational costs borne by the Japanese Government should 
continue to be reduced to the maximum extent consonant with the policy objectives of the pre-
treaty period as envisaged in this paper. 
 
 15.  Economic Recovery.   Second only to U. S. security interests, economic recovery 
should be made the primary objective of United States policy in Japan for the coming period.  It 
should be sought through a combination of United States aid program envisaging shipments 
and/or credits on a declining scale over a number of years, and by a vigorous and concerted 
effort by all interested agencies and departments of the United States Government to cut away 
existing obstacles to the revival of Japanese foreign trade, with provisions for Japanese merchant 
shipping, and to facilitate restoration and development of Japan’s exports.  In developing Japan’s 
internal and external trade and industry, private enterprises should be encouraged.  
Recommendations concerning the implementation of the above points, formulated in the light of 
Japan’s economic relationship with other Far Eastern countries, should be worked out between 
the State and Army Departments after consultation with the other interested departments and 
agencies of the Government.  We should make it clear to the Japanese Government that the 
success of the recovery program will in large part depend on Japanese efforts to raise production 
and to maintain high export levels through hard work, a minimum of work-stoppages, internal 
austerity measures and the stern combatting of inflationary trends including efforts to achieve a 
balanced internal budget as rapidly as possible. 
 
 19.  Control of Japanese Economic War Potential.  Production in, importation into, and 
use within Japan of goods and economic services for bona fide peaceful purposes should be 
permitted without limitation, except: 
  a.  Japan’s economic war potential should be controlled by restrictions on 
 allowable stockpiling of designated strategic raw materials in Japan. 
  b.  Japan’s industrial disarmament should be limited to the prohibition of the 
 manufacture of weapons of war and civil aircraft and the minimum temporary restrictions 
 on industrial production which can be advocated in the light of commitments already 
 made by the United States regarding the reduction of the industrial war potential.
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Appendix 3  
G. A. Newman, Acting Director, Export Division, to J. E. Kenderdine, Special 
Representative, Canadian Liaison Mission, 21 October 1948 
 
[Source: Library and Archives Canada. “TRADE BETWEEN CANADA AND JAPAN.”  RG20-A-3.  Volume 724 
File Part 6.  File no. (creator) 13250] 
 
 
Dear Mr. Kenderdine: 
 With reference to your letter of September 23rd, your file 211, I wish to advise that we 
would like to have enabled advice as to opportunities for quotation against tenders for the 
following commodities, of which we have an exportable surplus.  Such cabled advice, of course, 
would only be required when the deadline for submission of quotations is of very short notice: 
 
Foodstuffs and Allied Products 
Beef, fresh, frozen or pickled 
Mutton or lamb, fresh or frozen 
Heavy sow products 
Offals 
Sausages (beef only) 
Canned meats 
Fish (particularly canned) 
Honey 
Poultry 
Tobacco (leaf or manufactured) 
Animal feeds 
Apples 
Beans and peas 
Potatoes (table and seed), potato starch 
Flaxseed 
Linseed oil 
Rapeseed and oil 
Forage crop seeds 
Vegetable seeds 
Biscuits 
Macaroni and spaghetti 
Confectionary 
Cocoa powder 
Canned fruits, soups and vegetables 
Jams, jellies and marmalade 
Sauces and condiments 
Wheat gluten and starch 
 
 
Automotive and Agricultural Machinery and Equipment 




Tractor and road equipment 








Non-Ferrous Metals and Products 
Coal 
Barytes 
Copper wire and cable (bare and insulated) 
Copper and brass sheet and strip, plates 
Asphalt roofings and sidings 
Aluminum foils 
Magnesium and alloys 
Calcium 
Abrasive cloths and papers 
Dead-burned magnesite 
Aluminum 
Cerium metal for lighter flints 
Mica 
 
Chemical and Allied Products 
Copper sulphate 
D.D.T. and parathion (Insecticides) 
Aluminum sulphate or alum 
Polystyrene moulding powder 
Vinyl moulding powder 
Plastic film 
Phenol formaldehyde or bakelite moulding powder 
Paint products (all types) 




Iron oxide (synthetic) 
 
Leather and Textile Products 
Sole and upper leather 
Footwear (canvas, rubber and leather) 
Army type blankets 
 





 (G.A. Newman), 





Selections from the Treaty of Peace with Japan 
 




POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLAUSES 
 
Article 9 
Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion 
of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and 




(a) Japan declares its readiness promptly to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each 
of the Allied Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other 
commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis. 
 
(b) Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four 
years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty 
 (1) accord to each of the Allied Powers, its nationals, products and vessels 
(i) most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, 
restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the importation and 
exportation of goods; 
 
(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, 
and with respect to natural and juridical persons and their interests—such 
treatment to include all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, 
access to the courts, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property 
(tangible and intangible), participating in juridical entities constituted under 
Japanese law, and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional 
activities; 
 
(2) ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese state trading enterprises shall be 
based solely on commercial considerations. 
 
(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an Allied Power 
national treatment, or most-favored-nation treatment, only to the extent that the Allied Power 
concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may 
be, in respect of the same matter. The reciprocity envisaged in the foregoing sentence shall be 
determined, in the case of products, vessels and juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, 
any non-metropolitan territory of an Allied Power, and in the case of juridical entities of, and 
persons domiciled in, any state or province of an Allied Power having a federal government, by 
reference to the treatment accorded to Japan in such territory, state or province. 
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(d) In the application of this Article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate 
from the grant of national or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure 
is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the party 
applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of 
payments (except in respect to shipping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential 
security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the circumstances and not 
applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. 
 
(e) Japan's obligations under this Article shall not be affected by the exercise of any Allied rights 
under Article 14 of the present Treaty; nor shall the provisions of this Article be understood as 




Selections from the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace with Japan 
 




D. INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE CONTRACTS (OTHER THAN LIFE) WHICH HAD 
NOT TERMINATED BEFORE THE DATE AT WHICH THE PARTIES BECAME ENEMIES 
 
1. Contracts of Insurance shall be deemed not to have been dissolved by the fact of the parties 
becoming enemies, provided that the risk had attached before the date at which the parties 
became enemies, and the Insured had paid, before that date, all moneys owed by way of 
premium or consideration for effecting or keeping effective the Insurance in accordance with the 
Contract. 
 
2. Contracts of Insurance other than those remaining in force under the preceding clause shall be 
deemed not to have come into existence, and any moneys paid thereunder shall be returnable. 
 
3. Treaties and other Contracts of Reinsurance, save as hereinafter expressly provided, shall be 
deemed to have been determined as at the date the parties became enemies, and all cessions 
thereunder shall be cancelled with effect from that date. Provided that cessions in respect of 
voyage policies which had attached under a Treaty of Marine Reinsurance shall be deemed to 
have remained in full effect until their natural expiry in accordance with the terms and conditions 
on which the risk had been ceded. 
 
4. Contracts of Facultative Reinsurance, where the risk had attached and all moneys owed by 
way of premium or consideration for effecting or keeping effective the Reinsurance had been 
paid or set off in the customary manner, shall, unless the Reinsurance Contract otherwise 
provides, be deemed to have remained in full effect until the date at which the parties became 
enemies and to have been determined on that date. 
Provided that such Facultative Reinsurances in respect of voyage policies shall be deemed to 
have remained in full effect until their natural expiry in accordance with the terms and conditions 
on which the risk had been ceded. 
Provided further that Facultative Reinsurances in respect of a Contract of Insurance remaining in 
force under clause 1 above shall be deemed to have remained in full effect until the expiry of the 
original Insurance. 
 
5. Contracts of Facultative Reinsurance other than those dealt with in the preceding clause, and 
all Contracts of Excess of Loss Reinsurance on an "Excess of Loss Ratio" basis and of Hail 
Reinsurance (whether facultative or not), shall be deemed not to have come into existence, and 
any moneys paid thereunder shall be returnable. 
 
6. Unless the Treaty or other Contract of Reinsurance otherwise provides, premiums shall be 




7. Contracts of Insurance or Reinsurance (including cessions under Treaties of Reinsurance) 
shall be deemed not to cover losses or claims caused by belligerent action by either Power of 
which any of the parties was a national or by the Allies or Associates of such Power. 
 
8. Where an insurance has been transferred during the war from the original to another Insurer, 
or has been wholly reinsured, the transfer or reinsurance shall, whether effected voluntarily or by 
administrative or legislative action, be recognized and the liability of the original Insurer shall be 
deemed to have ceased as from the date of the transfer or reinsurance. 
 
9. Where there was more than one Treaty or other Contract of Reinsurance between the same 
two parties, there shall be an adjustment of accounts between them, and in order to establish a 
resulting balance there shall be brought into the accounts all balances (which shall include an 
agreed reserve for losses still outstanding) and all moneys which may be due from one party to 
the other under all such contracts or which may be returnable by virtue of any of the foregoing 
provisions. 
 
10. No interests shall be payable by any of the parties for any delay which, owing to the parties 
having become enemies, has occurred or may occur in the settlement of premiums or claims or 
balances of account. 
 
11. Nothing in this part of the present Protocol shall in any way prejudice or affect the rights 
given by Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace signed this day. 
  
E. LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
 
Where an insurance has been transferred during the war from the original to another Insurer or 
has been wholly reinsured, the transfer or reinsurance shall, if effected at the instance of the 
Japanese administrative or legislative authorities, be recognized, and the liability of the original 
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